



Daily Report

Latin America

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Friday
7 July 1989

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Cuba

Court-Martial of MININT, FAR Officials

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["Synthesis" of the "second session, part one" of the court-martial of Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez and 13 other Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and Interior Ministry (MININT) officers at the FAR Universal Hall in Havana on 1 July—recorded]

[Text] [Division General Ramon Espinosa Martin] We resume the hearing of the trial. Will the defendant, Antonio de la Guardia Font, stand before the tribunal.

[Espinosa] De la Guardia: The law entitles you to testify. Do you want to testify?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Espinosa] Answer the questions of the prosecutor.

[Brigadier General Juan Escalona Reguera] Defendant Antonio de la Guardia, when did you enter MININT?
[De la Guardia] In 1960.

[Escalona] In 1960. Had you carried out activities against the tyranny?

[De la Guardia] Yes, I participated.

[Escalona] In Cuba?

[De la Guardia] In Cuba, I participated by supporting the directorate, and later in MININT.

[Escalona] How did you enter the ministry?

[De la Guardia] MININT? Through the National Revolutionary Police [PNR].

[Escalona] As of that moment, what post did you hold in MININT?

[De la Guardia] As of that moment, I began to work with Commander (Diaz Arguelles) in the PNR. I then worked in the MININT Instruction Directorate, then with the Border Guard Troops, then with Special Troops, where I served for 18 years.

[Escalona] For 18 years.

[De la Guardia] Later, I was transferred to the (CIMEX) [Cuban Foreign Trade Corporation], where Department Z is located, and later to the intelligence section in 1987.

[Escalona] Defendant, how and through whom, did you initiate your contacts with drug trafficking?

[De la Guardia] In 1987 or late in 1986 through an officer who was my subordinate, Ruiz Poo. He proposed a contact, an operation through one of his relatives who was involved in drug trafficking.

[Escalona] You did this directly through Ruiz?

[De la Guardia] Through Ruiz and his superior officer, Amado Padron.

[Escalona] Did you accept the proposal?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Were you empowered to accept the proposal by yourself or did you consult with anyone?

[De la Guardia] No sir, I was not empowered to do so.

[Escalona] You did not feel you had to consult about such a proposal with anyone?

[De la Guardia] I should have consulted about such a proposal.

[Escalona] What was Ruiz' proposal?

[De la Guardia] Ruiz proposed flying a plane with—I do not remember how much—cocaine, landing it in Varadero, and later transferring the drugs to some boats that would go to the United States.

[Escalona] There was a first operation that was carried out with Amado Padron and Miguel Ruiz, right?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] This proposal was presented to you. Was it carried out?

[De la Guardia] The operation was not [corrects himself] the operation was carried out, but the final destination point was not reached. I think the merchandise did not reach the final destination point, and the operation was not concluded; it was not possible to collect the money. Then, the same officer proposed another operation.

[Escalona] Who proposed that?

[De la Guardia] The same officer proposed that we carry out another operation with the same person, with the same relative.

[Escalona] How was that operation carried out?

[De la Guardia] The operation was carried out through Varadero.

[Escalona] Exactly like the first one?

[De la Guardia] Exactly like the first operation.

[Escalona] Was the operation completed?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] The operation was completed. That was the second operation you carried out.

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] What was the difference in time between the first and the second operation?

[De la Guardia] I cannot give you details regarding the dates; however, I think it would not have been more than 1 or 2 months. I really do not know. I cannot tell you the details. I do not want to tell you something that may confuse you later on.

[Escalona] There were not.... [changes thought] Did all operations involve cocaine?

[De la Guardia] No, there was one involving marijuana, which was proposed to me by Elmer, the chief of the naval section.

[Escalona] Elmer is Alexis Lago, right?

[De la Guardia] Yes, Alexis Lago. I do not recall the exact date. However, at that time, he was also supposed to come from the south, with a boat. I was told he was coming from Jamaica and would sail around the island, and then enter [Cuban] waters through Pinar del Rio. I believe the boat sailed all the way through Bahia de Cadiz Key, where it remained for a few days. Then, the marijuana was delivered to some motorboats which picked up the marijuana and transported it to the United States.

[Escalona] How did Alexis Lago become involved in drug trafficking? Thus far, you [words indistinct] Ruiz, who together, with Amado offered to put you in contact with Ruiz' relative in the United States.

[De la Guardia] Alexis Lagos, as I said...

[Escalona, interrupting] So the operation was carried out. Is that the first operation you were aware of?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Then, how did Alexis Lago, who knows nothing about that, get to offer you...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] Let me explain this to you.

[Escalona continues] ...to offer you [words indistinct]?

[De la Guardia] Let me explain this. The relations we had were with some boatmen who sometimes brought to Cuba goods—not drugs, but various goods lacking in Cuba—from the United States. These were people who were linked to drug traffickers. In addition...

[Escalona, interrupting] Were you aware of that?

[De la Guardia] Pardon?

[Escalona] Were you aware of that beforehand?

[De la Guardia] Yes, we were aware of that. Moreover, some officers told me these people.... [changes thought] At that time, the relationship between the officers and the boatmen were not so close. The relations between them were just beginning. However, the officers heard comments and thus knew these boatmen could also get involved in these operations. Later on, as the relationship developed, the boatmen expressed their desire to participate in some operations. After getting to know the boatmen, he had more confidence and strengthened the links with them. Therefore, I think this is how Comrade Alexis Lago received the boatmen's proposal and accepted the operation. I think this is how he established the links.

[Escalona] There is another officer who is involved in drug trafficking. She is Captain Rosa Maria.

[De la Guardia] Rosa Maria Abierno.

[Escalona] She also gave you a proposal?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Was her proposal the same as the one received from [words indistinct]?

[De La Guardia] Her proposal also required an air shipment.

[Escalona] A shipment by air?

[De la Guardia] Yes, it required an air rather than a sea shipment.

[Escalona] Was this shipment made?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Was the shipment paid for?

[De la Guardia] Yes, that shipment was paid for.

[Escalona] Did officer Abierno also present a proposal because she was told about the other proposals by the boatmen, or did she do so because she began to notice other MC [department within Interior Ministry responsible for finding ways to counter U.S. embargo against Cuba] officers were doing so?

[De la Guardia] I believe she thought.... [changes thought] First, I imagine that somebody must have proposed it to her, and she also must have had some type of information. She also could have decided to present the proposal on her own initiative, but I doubt it. Nevertheless, she had to have some information about the situation that allowed her to present this proposal to me.

[Escalona] According to the information we have, another officer appeared: Eduardo [Diaz Izquierdo].

[De la Guardia] Eduardo already worked with Amado; I imagine that while working together they talked about it, and Eduardo took.... [changes thought] The proposals were never presented by Eduardo. Eduardo would give them to Amado, and Amado would give them to me.

[Escalona] We are talking about operations that took place in 1987?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Were new operations held in 1988?

[De la Guardia] I can recall two operations held in 1988. Reading the court papers, I noted that more drug runs [bombardeo] were made by some officers in Las Villas. I do not recall these operations; I would not like to [words indistinct] but I do not recall authorizing these drug runs in Las Villas. The ones I authorized in 1988 were given to Amado Padron.

[Escalona] In 1988?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] You did not authorize Sanchez Lima to undertake a marijuana operation in 1988?

[De la Guardia] A marijuana operation in 1988? I do not remember it, but it could be. I do not want to be categorical in my response. Anyway, if I authorized the first shipment, I am as guilty and responsible as if I had authorized 15, 14, or 13 operations. If I recall correctly,

I only authorized Amado Padron to undertake two operations in 1988. I may have given my authorization for that marijuana operation you mentioned, but I do not remember it. I can tell you that I remember...

[Escalona, interrupting] Special circumstances occurred during this operation...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] It could be...

[Escalona continues] ...because it entails a ship that ran into oil problems in the southern part of the island. Some of your officers—those who worked in your department—had to take some actions because the ship's crew members were arrested...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] I remember...

[Escalona, interrupting] Your officers took these actions and went to cover up [tirar un manto] and get the crew members out of there?

[De la Guardia] I was informed of the incident after it had taken place, but I did not know the ship had marijuana. I had not...

[Escalona, interrupting] According to the information we have, over 30,000 pesos were paid. These 30,000 pesos were given to you.

[De la Guardia] I learned of the incident after it occurred. I was told the ship had oil problems. I had no knowledge of an operation. I was informed that a ship used by them had experienced oil problems and that the Coast Guard had intercepted it and then released it. I was not informed that the ship had marijuana or...

[Escalona, interrupting] You say that in 1988 you authorized two operations?

[De la Guardia] To the best of my recollection, in 1988 I authorized Amado Padron to undertake two operations.

[Escalona] You authorized Amado Padron?

[De la Guardia] I say this to you because in 1988...

[Escalona, interrupting] But five operations appear here in the court papers.

[De la Guardia] Yes. There were some drug runs I do not recall. I mean [words indistinct] but I do not recall...

[Escalona, interrupting] There are three operations coordinated by Sanchez Lima in 1988. You [words indistinct].

[De la Guardia] Those are the operations I do not recall.

[Escalona] This was your position as the head of a small department within the ministry. A small department that, by this time, was mostly funded by drug trafficking?

[De la Guardia] That is correct.

[Escalona] Could it have been possible for Sanchez Lima or other officers to have undertaken operations without your knowledge?

[De la Guardia] It is possible, because they were the ones who had direct relations with the boatmen. I had no direct contact with those people.

[Escalona] So in addition to having a drug-trafficking center in Cuba, we also could have had sort of drug-trafficking subsidiaries? Could your officers have themselves become operation centers?

[De la Guardia] I guess they could have. I could not control them in that sense. I should have, but I did not.

[Escalona] I believe this is much more dangerous for the country.

[De la Guardia] I guess so.

[Escalona] Did any of those officers feel capable of carrying out an operation?

[De la Guardia] I did not think they would without first consulting with me.

[Escalona] In this marijuana case we are talking about, which Sanchez Lima coordinated, there is another significant thing. The boats remained in Cuba and were sold to the National Institute of Tourism [INTUR]. Do you remember that?

[De la Guardia] Yes, I remember.

[Escalona] Did the income you received as a result of the sale of boats to INTUR reach your hands?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Did you report that sale?

[De la Guardia] It must have been reported.

[Escalona] During the first 6 months of 1988, there was a new operation. It was coordinated with an aircraft in Varadero and made use of the mechanisms that had been created. Was 400,000 pesos paid here?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Then in May and June, they went to pick up the 400,000 pesos in Mexico?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] You know about that?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] In 1988, there is another operation [corrects himself] there are three operations—in October, November, and December—which were coordinated by Sanchez Lima. One operation involved Prendes, one involved Elmer, and the other one involved only Sanchez Lima, who also participated in the first operation. It also involved a boat, which remained the entire day in Cadiz Bay. In other words, it went out at night for a drug run 30 miles to the north but was not paid. He said they went on the drug run, were unable to pick up drugs, and returned empty. That boat also remained in Cuba?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] Sanchez Lima then undertook another operation. He also maintained a boat in Bahia Cadiz Key during the day, and at night a drug run was made 15 miles from Key Sal [Salt Key]. This operation was paid for. In December, Sanchez Lima and Luis Del Grande stayed a day in Puntaicaco, and made a drug run 25 miles from Cross Key. Elmer, Prendes, and Sanchez Lima participated in this operation.

[De la Guardia] I do not remember all of that.

[Escalona] Is it possible that Sanchez Lima controlled a branch of the MC?

[De la Guardia] That is possible.

[Escalona] When did you begin your relationship with him?

[De la Guardia] When we were transferred to the CIMEX intelligence department, and Sanchez Lima worked for an office of CIMEX known as Interconsul. Then when the comrades of the ministry left CIMEX, they were transferred to my department.

[Escalona] Then you received Sanchez Lima, which is when you began your relationship with him?

[De la Guardia] That is where my relationship with Sanchez Lima began.

[Escalona] But nothing seems to indicate that Sanchez Lima asked you for authorization as chief of the department to conduct operations.

[De la Guardia] He asked me for authorization for some of them.

[Escalona] In 1988, he did not ask you for permission.

[De la Guardia] Not in 1988.

[Escalona] But there were three operations?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] What is the basis for your confidence in Sanchez Lima, his operations, and his honesty?

[De la Guardia] I never thought that he would do something that I would not be told about beforehand.

[Escalona] Did you have any mechanisms for controlling your officers' activities?

[De la Guardia] No, that was impossible; I had no mechanisms; I had only myself to rely on.

[Escalona] How many operations can you recall from 1989?

[De la Guardia] Mr Prosecutor, I recall two during 1989. There might have been other operations, but I do not remember any.

[Escalona] Two? In 1989? This year?

[De la Guardia] In 1989, I recall three involving Amado Padron and one involving Elmer.

[Escalona] One with whom?

[De la Guardia] From Elmer's and Sanchez Lima's groups.

[Escalona] But you do not recall any operation coordinated by Rosa Maria Abierno?

[De la Guardia] Well, when I say Amado Padron I also mean Rosa Maria, because Padron was Rosa Maria's, Eduardo Diaz', and Alex's [Miguel Ruiz Poo's] boss. Therefore, when I mentioned Amado alone...

[Escalona, interrupting] Does that mean that Padron was involved in all the operations?

[De la Guardia] In all those that concerned his group.

[Escalona] So you basically delegated the drug trafficking activities to Amado Padron?

[De la Guardia] Well, also to Elmer. When there was an operation, Elmer's group...

[Escalona, interrupting] Well, who was in Elmer's group? Sanchez Lima? According to what you are telling me here, you conducted operations and everybody knew about them.

[De la Guardia] That is correct.

[Escalona] So Rosa Maria's operations were directed by Amado Padron?

[De la Guardia] Yes. Well, in 1987, Rosa Maria conducted an operation with Elmer, not with Padron. She conducted that operation with Gabriel Prendes and Elmer.

[Escalona] What about in 1989?

[De la Guardia] She conducted those operations with Padron.

[Escalona] Why the change?

[De la Guardia] I do not recall why Rosa Maria changed from one group to the other; I do not recall.

[Escalona] Rosa Maria coordinated a 500-kg drug operation in February?

[De la Guardia] Yes, that operation was directed by Amado Padron's group.

[Escalona] Yes, Amado and Rosa Maria.

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] In that operation they [not further identified] delivered 500,000 pesos, I mean \$500,000.

[De la Guardia] I only received \$350,000, I believe. My memory is not very clear on that point.

[Escalona] \$350,000?

[De la Guardia] Yes, I think so.

[Escalona] There was another operation in March. That one was coordinated by Eduardo Diaz, who also belonged to Amado's group, right?

[De la Guardia] Yes, by Eduardo; that is correct, sir.

[Escalona] It says here that the March operation involved a drug run 20 miles from Bahia de Cadiz.

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] The operation involved \$150,000, which was sent inside a television set to Padron. Amado Padron then delivered 150,000 pesos [currency as heard] to you. Is that correct?

[De la Guardia] I do not remember.

[Escalona] You do not remember? Well, in March there was a drug run using a plane that operated 15 miles from Key Cruz del Padre. The plane landed in Varadero Beach. There were two boats off the coasts of Barlovento and Varadero. This operation was coordinated by Amado and Rosa Maria.

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] That operation involved \$580,000 and Jorge Martinez brought it [not further specified] by plane through the Bolleros area.

[De la Guardia] I remember that.

[Escalona] Oh, I see.

[De la Guardia] However, I do not remember whether the [word indistinct] was 580,000 [currency not specified], nor do I remember whether they delivered to me...

[Escalona, interrupting] No, because they used the purchase of art pieces as a cover for...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] Yes, but in any case I do not remember.

[Escalona] You do not remember?

[De la Guardia] I remember the operation. What I do not remember is the amount of money involved.

[Escalona] Padron and Rosa Maria Abierno coordinated another operation in April. On this occasion, the drug run took place 15 miles from Key Cruz del Padre. This operation involved \$600,000, which has not yet been collected.

[De la Guardia] I was told that the operation involved \$500,000.

[Escalona] There was another drug run off the coast of Varadero Beach in April 1989. On this occasion, the front business to cover up the operation involved roosters.

[De la Guardia] I remember that one, too.

[Escalona] Oh, you remember?

[De la Guardia] During that operation they delivered approximately \$500,000 to me.

[Escalona] Oh, I see. Here it says, however, that Tony was given \$400,000.

[De la Guardia] Well, they did not tell me the amount.

[Escalona] It also says here that \$110,000 was inside one of the infamous seized refrigerators. The rest of the 600,000 [currency not specified] was shared among Joel, Willy, Pineda, Alexis, and Eduardo.

[De la Guardia] Oh well, it seems...

[Escalona, interrupting] Did you know about that?

[De la Guardia] No, I did not know anything about that.

[Escalona] In April, there was a cocaine run in waters off the coast of Cuba. The boat broke down and was repaired in Barlovento. From Barlovento, the boat left for Varadero.

[De la Guardia] I remember that.

[Escalona] You do remember that?

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] Nevertheless, the money from that operation was not collected either.

[De la Guardia] No, it was not collected.

[Escalona] The boat stayed in Cuba?

[De la Guardia] Yes, it stayed in Cuba.

[Escalona] Sanchez Lima traveled to Panama, right? He was trying to collect the money. Subsequent investigations proved that reports that the money had not been collected were false. The money was indeed collected.

[De la Guardia] I did not know that the money had been collected.

[Escalona] Well, I will have to ask Sanchez Lima when he is presented here.

[De la Guardia] Who?

[Escalona] I will have to ask Sanchez Lima when he is presented here.

[De la Guardia] Yes, of course.

[Escalona] I am not sure whether I should ask him or you. After all, you were his boss, and he did not inform you about the collection of \$150,000.

[De la Guardia] Unless he delivered that money to...

[Escalona, interrupting] Or, I should say, almost \$200,000. In any case, another operation was conducted on 22 April. There was a drug run 15 miles from Key Cruz del Padre. A boat picked up the drop. Amado Padron and Eduardo were involved in those operations. The grandfather [not further identified] delivered \$150,000. You did not collect that money?

[De la Guardia] No.

[Escalona] No, you did not, because the money was inside a refrigerator seized at Eduardo's house.

[De la Guardia] I did not know about that either.

[Escalona] There was another drug run on 23 April at the aforementioned place. The drop was picked up by boat. They [not further identified] were waiting for it in

Varadero. Amado Padron coordinated that operation. He was given \$130,000, which were placed inside a refrigerator. You never saw that money, right?
[De la Guardia] I did not receive that either.

[Escalona] Because this was also inside a refrigerator that was seized from Jose Medina Fernandez. Right? One was seized from Eduardo and the other one was seized from Medina Fernandez. In this operation and in the previous one, 156 kg of cocaine were seized, and 156 kg were buried in Cayo Romano. Did you know that?
[De la Guardia] I did not know that.

[Escalona] Therefore, it appears that you did not know about some of these operations.
[De la Guardia] No I did not.

[Escalona] So, Defendant Tony de la Guardia, what can you tell the tribunal about this strange situation involving drugs, money, proceeds, items received, items not received? In other words, how did you handle this?
[De la Guardia] I did not in fact have the control over the operation that I should have had. I never had that much control. In other words, I never controlled the operations. These operations called for direct supervision, which sometimes required being out of Havana for 3 or 4 days. My job did not allow me the time to do that. We trusted that the officers were not going to do anything without consulting me. They were always supposed to give me the money resulting from those operations.

[Escalona] You delegated that responsibility to Amado Padron?
[De la Guardia] To Amado, when they were Amado's operations, and to Elmer, when the operations were run by Elmer.

[Escalona] Defendant De la Guardia, I am particularly interested in learning about something else. How many officers in Cuba knew about this business?
[De la Guardia] The officers who are detained here in this hall.

[Escalona] Anybody else?
[De la Guardia] Nobody else, as far as I know. I know of nobody else, I can assure you of that. When asked, I provided the names of all those who had any knowledge of this.

[Escalona] You believe that you all managed to keep these operations completely secret for 2 and 1/2 years, that no others learned about this or received any benefits from these activities?
[De la Guardia] Perhaps some people received some benefits but they did not know about this because...

[Escalona, interrupting] How did they receive benefits? Indirectly?
[De la Guardia] No, no, I do not know. Perhaps some relationship; someone might have given someone else a gift, but the recipient would not have known that the gift

was bought from drug trafficking proceeds, or that the money came from anything like that. I do not think that anyone else knew about this, because if they had known about this...

[Escalona, interrupting] What did you do with the boat's crewmen once they were on shore, such as when you had to wait for the plane? What did your officers do with the crew?
[De la Guardia] They took the crew to some houses that we had rented in Santa Maria and Varadero.

[Escalona] You brought them from Varadero to Santa Maria?
[De la Guardia] From Varadero to Santa Maria.

[Escalona] They were there until the plane arrived?
[De la Guardia] No [corrects himself] Yes, they were there until the plane arrived. On the day that the plane arrived, they went to Varadero and waited for the boat.

[Escalona] Who were those crewmen? What nationality were they? Were they Colombians, [word indistinct], or what?
[De la Guardia] No, they were Cubans. I do not know if all of them were Cubans. I believe that many of them were Cubans.

[Escalona] Do you have a detailed list of the money seized from each of your officers?
[De la Guardia] No, I really do not have that. Oh wait, yes, yes, I do have that; I saw the list. I saw it in the document that...

[Escalona, interrupting] Could that money be part of the salaries you paid them?
[De la Guardia] No, no, not by any stretch of the imagination.

[Escalona] And from where do you think that...
[De la Guardia, interrupting] From drug trafficking.

[Escalona] From drug trafficking?
[De la Guardia] Absolutely.

[Escalona] Was this their share?
[De la Guardia] No, actually nobody should have kept one cent from the drug trafficking proceeds. They should have handed the money over to me, and I could then have taken the money and justified...

[Escalona, interrupting] About these meetings we discussed here yesterday.
[De la Guardia] [Words indistinct]

[Escalona] Mexicans, Colombians, U.S. citizens, etc, participated and your officers and Amado Padron were present. Were you not aware of this?
[De la Guardia] I knew about that, but I did not participate in the meetings here. I did not meet with any of them. I participated in a meeting with the Mexican

[not further identified] during a trip I made to Mexico to coordinate a tobacco operation. At that meeting, we discussed the possibility of using Mexico, but we did not reach any.... [changes thought] After that, I did not meet with anyone again—not even with the Mexicans. We were unable to complete the final operation.

[Escalona] Were drug trafficking deals not discussed with the Mexicans?

[De la Guardia] Yes, we discussed the matter with the Mexicans; we did discuss it with these Mexicans.

[Escalona] What did the Mexicans propose to you?

[De la Guardia] They proposed that the courier used for transporting tobacco be used to handle the drugs as well.

[Escalona] Yes.

[De la Guardia] That is what I discussed with them. They wanted us to find them a Colombian or someone who had access to drugs. I never spoke with the Mexicans again after that.

[Escalona] Was an operation conducted with the Mexicans?

[De la Guardia] No, we did not conduct any operation with them.

[Escalona] That you know of?

[De la Guardia] I am almost certain that an operation was not carried out because those Mexicans.... [changes thought] We broke off our relationship with those Mexicans because they stole an investment we had made with them.

[Escalona] A what?

[De la Guardia] An investment we had.... [changes thought] The money that Amado had picked up in Mexico remained in that country and was to be invested by the Mexican in speculative financial deals.

[Escalona] In what kind of deals?

[De la Guardia] Financial speculation.

[Escalona] Oh, yes.

[De la Guardia] This Mexican was going to invest the money. This is when I met the Mexican. I met him through business ties, not through drug deals.

[Escalona] The money, however, came from drug trafficking?

[De la Guardia] The money came from drug trafficking. I do not know if the Mexican knew that it was drug money at that time, but I think that he did. That Mexican did not keep his commitment to us and, likewise, he did not keep his commitment that he made to contacts that had been arranged by Amado Padron and Jose Luis Pineda. The Mexicans stole approximately \$200,000 from these Colombians.

[Escalona] De la Guardia, where did you meet Defendant Jorge Martinez?

[De la Guardia] I met Martinez, I believe I first saw him here in Havana.

[Escalona] Where?

[De la Guardia] I believe he went to my office and that Ochoa had sent him.

[Escalona] Sent by Ochoa?

[De la Guardia] Ochoa, right.

[Escalona] Why?

[De la Guardia] I do not recall the reason for the first meeting; I met him then. I do not recall what we talked about. I do not recall if we spoke of drug related matters or not. I cannot be specific about this...

[Escalona, interrupting] Did you meet him before or after your trip to Colombia?

[De la Guardia] My trip where?

[Escalona] To Colombia.

[De la Guardia] You are talking about Martinez' trip to Colombia?

[Escalona] Yes.

[De la Guardia] It had to have been before.

[Escalona] You met him before his trip to Colombia?

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] De la Guardia, he stated yesterday that he made those trips because you were able to solve his passport problem.

[De la Guardia] Yes. We obtained the visa in the Panamanian Embassy each time he traveled to Colombia in 1988.

[Escalona] Did you know that he had been given a Colombian passport?

[De la Guardia] No, I did not know, but...

[Escalona, interrupting] And this was before he went to Colombia.

[De la Guardia continues]...he told me had gotten one...

[Escalona, interrupting] De la Guardia, was Martinez your [stresses the word "your"] representative at the meeting with Escobar?

[De la Guardia] No, no. Look, Martinez said yesterday that I had been invited to Colombia, but this is not true. I have never been invited to Colombia by anyone.

[Escalona] Who was the person invited?

[De la Guardia] I do not know. Maybe he went on his own, but I was never invited to Colombia by anyone. Furthermore, I never met the group of four persons he is said to have met either. I did not know those four Colombians. I did not know them.

[Escalona] You never saw them?

[De la Guardia] I never in my life saw those four Colombians.

[Escalona] De la Guardia, you have a pledge to tell...
[De la Guardia, interrupting] Yes, the whole truth. Seriously, I will tell you about the Colombian I knew, but these particular Colombians I did not know.

[Escalona] Perfect. You met one Colombian? You did not meet these Colombians?
[De la Guardia] What?

[Escalona] You did not meet the Colombians who met with Martinez?
[De la Guardia] I did not meet them.

[Escalona] Do you know how Martinez went to see Escobar?
[De la Guardia] I have no idea; I never had any type of relations with Escobar. I do not know what he [Martinez] said when he introduced himself. I do not know what Escobar said to [corrects himself] I do not know what he said to let Escobar know with whom he worked or who he represented.

[Escalona] When did you discuss the possibility of drug trafficking with Ochoa for the first time?
[De la Guardia] In 1988.

[Escalona] When in 1988?
[De la Guardia] It must have been when I went to Angola at the beginning of 1988.

[Escalona] How did the conversation come up, De la Guardia?
[De la Guardia] I do not recall how it came up or how it started, but it did take place and we did talk about it. I do not believe it was the first time I met Ochoa in Angola. It must have occurred after several conversations, rumors,...

[Escalona, interrupting] Did Martinez visit you after these meetings?
[De la Guardia] Yes. Martinez visited me after these meetings.

[Escalona] Was his visit a coincidence or had arrangements been made between you and Ochoa to send someone to meet with Escobar?
[De la Guardia] No, no. I really never sent Martinez to meet with Escobar nor did Ochoa ever tell me to send Martinez to see Escobar.

[Escalona] Did Martinez go with the help of his [Ochoa's] officers?
[De la Guardia] Right, I had to get him the visa and his passport so he could leave.

[Escalona] Was there any talk about establishing a cocaine laboratory in Africa?
[De la Guardia] Yes sir.

[Escalona] When?
[De la Guardia] It must have been in 1988 or at the beginning of 1989.

[Escalona] Did you discuss it only once?
[De la Guardia] We...

[Escalona, interrupting] Did you discuss that possibility in 1988?
[De la Guardia] I do not, I do not [repeats himself] remember if we discussed this in 1988 or in 1989. We discussed, we commented on this possibility, but never implemented anything specific.

[Escalona] Did you mention it to Ochoa?
[De la Guardia] Yes, I mentioned it to Ochoa.

[Escalona] So you discussed this possibility?
[De la Guardia] Yes, we saw this as a possibility.

[Escalona] Did Ochoa agree to it?
[De la Guardia] Yes, in a certain way.

[Escalona] Explain to me what—in a certain way—means?
[De la Guardia] Well, we commented on it, but never implemented or were able to carry out the plans [words indistinct]. We held a conversation, and we saw there were possibilities for establishing a cocaine laboratory in some of those [African] countries. However, we simply discussed the subject, and carried out no action or investigations.

[Escalona] I have a question De la Guardia. How far were you planning to go with these drug deals?
[De la Guardia] Actually, I was not planning to get too far. I was not interested in conducting large drug operations or establishing laboratories or things like that. I just wanted to obtain some foreign exchange. Actually, it was not just to get foreign exchange. I am not trying to find a justification for everything I have done [words indistinct]. I do not want to justify the harm I have caused. Moreover, I had already planned not to carry out any more drug operations, since the enterprises that had been created were progressing and had some capital; they had basic capital that could produce foreign exchange. I did not want to continue with the drug trafficking. I did not like that business. Honestly, I am not trying to justify my actions. I was aware I was causing harm. I never realized how much harm I caused. However, I was aware I was acting wrongly. I did not feel comfortable with this.

[Escalona] When did you make the decision to cease the drug trafficking? Was it in...
[De la Guardia, interrupting] Actually...

[Escalona, interrupting] When did you intend to cease the drug trafficking deals?
[De la Guardia] I meant to end the drug trafficking last year.

[Escalona] Did you carry out eight operations during the first year?

[De la Guardia] *That is correct, that is correct. However, I thought: This year I will not continue. That is what I thought. I was not sure if I would have done it again.*

[Escalona] Well, you had an objective last year.

[De la Guardia] Yes, that is correct.

[Escalona] That objective turned into eight operations...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] This year.

[Escalona] This year, during the first half of this year.

[De la Guardia] Yes.

[Escalona] What assurance do we have this business was going to end?

[De la Guardia] I could not assure that. I was [words indistinct] what I was thinking.

[Escalona] In addition, there was already the risk that your officers were acting on their own [piezas sueltas] in this business.

[De la Guardia] No, what...

[Escalona, interrupting] You already had the contacts, the possibilities.

[De la Guardia] What happened is that I was planning to close the sea channel, and not to carry out any further operations—in other words, to restrict access to the contacts.

[Escalona] De la Guardia, do you have children?

[De la Guardia] I have four children.

[Escalona] Four?

[De la Guardia] Four.

[Escalona] Did you ever think—while you were carrying out those operations in which you received drug trafficking dollars, and when you reinforced your enterprises through drug trafficking—did you think about the repercussions drug trafficking has for youths around the world?

[De la Guardia] Actually, I did not think, [repeats himself] I did not think about that.

[Escalona] You have traveled much around the world.

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] You have seen poverty.

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] You have seen the repercussions of drug trafficking.

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] You have seen what drug trafficking does to youths.

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] Are you aware that is the scourge of mankind these days?

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] You are part of that factory of disgrace for the world?

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Escalona] How does your conscience feel De la Guardia?

[De la Guardia] Very bad.

[Escalona] I have finished Mr President.

[Espinoza Martin] De la Guardia, respond to the questions the defense lawyer will ask you.

[Defense Lawyer Maj Juan Aramis Villalon Ona] We think there are some elements that must be specified to further clarify this situation we are [words indistinct] representing here our defendant. My first question will be directed toward something I want to determine concerning the diamond deal—as my defendant said during the hearing—with defendant Ochoa Sanchez. One second please. It has been said that they delivered six or seven diamonds to you.

[De la Guardia] Yes, sir.

[Villalon] I would like to know what happen to those diamonds?

[De la Guardia] Those diamonds came from Angola. I received them. I knew nothing about diamonds. Therefore, I investigated their value. I sent the diamonds to Panama. An acquaintance who works with jewelry there gave us an appraisal of the diamonds. I think he even sent them to Switzerland. The diamonds came back with an appraisal, but their price was truly insignificant. They had no commercial value. It was not worth investing anything, because they were worth very little and there was almost no profit there. Thus, I sent the diamonds back to Angola along with their appraisal stating the reason why those diamonds were worthless.

[Villalon] After learning that the diamonds had no commercial value, did you receive any other diamonds?

[De la Guardia] No.

[Villalon] Did you hear anything about the 136 diamonds sent to Panama?

[De la Guardia] No, I did not know anything about that.

[Villalon] So you had nothing to do with those deals?

[De la Guardia] No, I had nothing to do with the diamond operations.

[Villalon] Did you know through whom defendant Ochoa Sanchez sent the diamonds to Panama? Did he send them through one of the people who work with you?

[De la Guardia] No. The diamonds were received in Havana, but those were not Martinez' diamonds. I did not know anything about Martinez' diamonds.

[Villalon] How many men did you have in the department you headed, in the MC?

[De la Guardia] Approximately, including the officers, it would be approximately 20 or 30 men. I cannot tell you the exact number.

[Villalon] As for the drug trafficking operations, you just told the prosecutor that at first you did not conduct those operations personally. You said you were rather involved in the legal matters that deal with establishing enterprises and that for that reason some drug trafficking operations could have been carried out without you knowing about them. Among the operations that were carried out, for example the ones coordinated by Amado Padron, there are several operations—I recall when I talked to you at the State Security Department, you remember when I went to tell you I was your lawyer—that you had not authorized and that you did not know about. That is why I am repeating that same question I asked you at the State Security Department.

[De la Guardia] Well, I did not know about the Key Romero operation. I did not know that operation had been carried out. I was not aware of it. There was another operation conducted by an individual called Miguelito. I learned later that [words indistinct]. I do not want to free myself from my responsibilities over...

[Villalon, interrupting] We know that, defendant. We know you are aware of your responsibility.

[De la Guardia] In addition, to the operations I just mentioned, I did authorize Padron to conduct all the other operations. I authorized him to conduct the other operations he carried out.

[Villalon] Fine. Did you also know about some of the operations conducted by Sanchez Lima?

[De la Guardia] No, in that case if there were more operations...

[Villalon, interrupting] There were three operations.

[De la Guardia] I do not recall the drug runs conducted at Las Villas in 1988. I also do not recall the operation involving the cargo ship that was seized and subsequently released. I did not know that the ship had drugs on board. I did not know that the ship had drugs and that it had to do with one of our operations.

[Villalon] What about the operations linked with the ship "Ali Baba?"

[De la Guardia] I was told the "Ali Baba" was a regular ship. In other words, a ship that was [word indistinct] normally. I was told it did not have [words indistinct] got out...

[Escalona, interrupting] But look at your comrades.

[De la Guardia] I did not know about the operations in which they went out.

[Villalon] For how long did you serve [word indistinct] before becoming...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] Twenty-nine years.

[Villalon] Twenty-nine years. Were you sent on internationalist missions and other significant operational missions during those years?

[De la Guardia] Yes. I received two medals for my work as an internationalist and I completed several important missions.

[Villalon] Repeat once again, the medals you have received.

[De la Guardia] Two medals of...

[Villalon, interrupting] Two medals?

[De la Guardia] Of first rank internationalist.

[Villalon] First rank?

[De la Guardia] Yes, and the others have to do with important operations.

[Villalon] We would now like for you... [changes thought] We will not continue on the same issues you have discussed here with the prosecutor. Therefore, I am going to ask you questions about other issues. I would like for you—if you are willing—to make an evaluation here of the consequences of the serious charges against you and your attitude concerning your responsibility to the party, our commander in chief, and the prestige of our Revolution, whose integrity and honesty are somewhat affected by these events.

[De la Guardia] I want to stress here that, first of all, I accept all the charges raised against me. I also want to point out that I am the person most responsible for this. I have a serious responsibility in this. None of my superiors was aware of this. On several occasions they asked me if I was aware or if I had any participation in actions of this nature, and I denied it. I said I had nothing to do with it.

I also want to point out that the basic reason for all of these operations is, first of all, a state of (?deterioration) of irresponsibility—what have you, of all descriptions—of corruption, that at a certain moment, I had, we had. It did not allow me to see, it did not allow me to become aware of the serious mistakes I was making. It was an attitude of looking after my personal interests, seeking profit and personal benefits for myself. All of this allowed me access to money, money that I did not have to justify in any way. All of this contributed in great part toward these problems.

I am fully aware of the damage, the tremendously serious mistakes I have made, the damage I have done Fidel, the Revolution, my comrades, my institution, my children; this is irreparable damage. I also want to point out that we—the defendants who are here—do not represent MININT. There are hundreds of heroic fighters in MININT who, day after day, shed their blood and wipe the sweat from their brows, making sacrifices, guarding the coasts and keys of our country; they provide security, guard us from our enemy, and fulfill internationalist missions.

We forgot all of them; all of this was forgotten. We betrayed the image of our [cries] martyrs, of our brothers whom we have infamously betrayed. [De la Guardia continues to cry as he speaks.] I did not think of them, I just did not think of them. My conscience bothers me very much; I feel very bad just to think of my brothers who died in Angola and Venezuela. We deserve the worst; we deserve severe punishment.

I ask that this serve as an example to other revolutionaries, fighters, so they will not commit the crimes I committed, ever. This can never be erased from one's conscience—impossible—to betray the commander in chief and his image, the Revolution, my institution, my comrades who were loyal to me for so many years. How could I be so disloyal to them, after they trusted me so much?

I also want to stress once again that this serve as an example. [De la Guardia continues to cry, is offered a glass of water, drinks, and clears his throat.] I urge the other detained persons to have a civic, honest attitude, and to tell the truth of why they did these things and not to seek refuge in the Revolution.

There is no excuse at all for this. Some day, let us hope very soon for me, but perhaps later on for them, they will be able to forgive me and remember me as the revolutionary I once was for 20 some years [cries] and not for what I have done, and for what I am now. That is all, Mr President.

[Villalon] Concerning Rosa Maria [Abierno], you just told us you were almost sure she had gotten involved in the drug deal through another comrade.

[De la Guardia] No. What I meant is that she entered the drug deal through [word indistinct] comrade. I do not know how she entered the drug deal. I only know that—I recall this very well—Rosa Maria and Prendes visited me at my home on a Sunday, I remember, and proposed a deal to me. The two of them together did. In other words, I do not know who joined whom.

They asked me to participate in an operation. I do know that the link for this operation was someone Rosa Maria knew. The link was someone Rosa Maria knew and not someone that Prendes knew.

[Defense Lawyer Maj Luis Raul Martinez Perez] Excuse me, Mr President. Did you order or authorize another of your officers to use any of Rosa Maria's links for drug trafficking operations without telling her or expressly telling your officer not to tell Rosa Maria anything, because she was not trustworthy?

[De la Guardia] What? Can you repeat the question please?

[Martinez] I asked you whether you ordered or authorized someone else to use one of Rosa Maria's links...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] Of Rosa Maria's?

[Martinez] Yes, one of her links. Did you authorize someone to contact Rosa Maria's links to conduct drug trafficking operations and did you tell your officer Rosa Maria could not be trusted for that kind of operation?

[De la Guardia] No. What I do not remember well is whether [words indistinct].

[Martinez] How many women work in your department?

[De la Guardia] There are several women.

[Martinez] And Rosa Maria is the only one who was...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] The only one who knew about this.

[Martinez] Why do you think she was the only one...

[De la Guardia, interrupting] Because of the kind of work the other female comrades did and because the other female comrades would not get involved in any of this. They are revolutionary comrades who would never get involved in such activities.

[Martinez] And Rosa Maria is not a revolutionary?

[De la Guardia] She is a revolutionary like me, with a certain training level. The other female comrades...

[Villalon, interrupting] Gentlemen of the court, I know that as the chief of the department, the defendant must answer the questions he is asked, but it seems to me that, unfortunately, some of the questions have a subjective and a captious tone, which could lead my defendant to give incorrect answers. It seems to me he must answer the questions, but I believe my comrades, who need to clarify things for their defendants, are asking captious and subjective questions. We are all defending these people and we have to represent them.

[Espinosa] Defense lawyer, ask more specific questions.

[Martinez] Mr President, I did not mean anything with my questions. I was only curious to see how in an office where there are a number of female comrades, there is only one who gets involved in drug deals. That is the only reason I asked those questions. I did not mean to ask captious questions and I did not mean to ridicule or [word indistinct] the defendant. I have finished.

[Escalona] Mr President.

[Espinosa] De la Guardia, answer the prosecutor's questions now.

[Escalona] Defendant De la Guardia. Yesterday, defendant Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez made statements before this court. For us, it is important to know about your relationship with Arnaldo in detail. When did that relationship begin? When did that relationship start to be linked with drug trafficking activities? How did you exchange opinions about possible deals? What were his positions? What were the opinions he gave you concerning your small business? What were his ideas in general?

[De la Guardia] My relationship with Arnaldo began in 1988 after my trip to Angola. I do not remember the exact date on which we started talking about drugs or how the subject came up. I know we talked about the profitability of large drug operations. We talked about several countries that live off those activities and of countries that had to live off those activities because of the nature of their economies.

Our conversations usually centered around those topics. We talked about drugs in general, without falling into situations in which I could tell him about the operations I had carried out.

I cannot tell you the exact date when I talked to him or when he talked to me about the possibility of getting involved in drug deals. I do not remember where we were when we started to talk about those things or how it happened.

Yesterday, he said I had never told him I was involved in drug deals. I lied to Arnaldo once. I did tell him—I want to be frank—that I had never conducted drug operations through Cuba. In other words, I told him I had never being involved in drug deals in which the drug touched Cuban territory. That was the truth. Later on, when he was aware that I was indeed involved in drug trafficking, I told him I conducted drug runs off the northern coast of Cuba. I told him the drop-offs were picked up there. I told him that when the planes entered they were clean. I told him how I coordinated the operations and how I operated in Cuba. He was aware of that. However, I want to be frank. That is why I told you what I told him at first. I told him the planes always entered clean.

We obviously talked about my links. I told him I had links. We talked about the boatmen. He asked me whether they could be used to pick up freight from merchant vessels. I reiterated to him that it was very difficult to use those boatmen for that kind of operation because of their nature. They were irresponsible people and were not prepared for large-scale operations or for...

[Escalona, interrupting] Excuse me. Are you talking about a merchant vessel carrying drugs?

[De la Guardia] Yes. I was saying that a merchant vessel can transport large amounts of drugs. I told him the boatmen were not prepared to receive the amounts of [word indistinct]. In other words, they were not prepared for such large operations. I always told him it was very difficult to use the links I had. I told him it was difficult to use my links because of the size of the operations he mentioned and because of the people with whom we had to deal—in other words with Escobar. I said it was not a good idea to use my links, because they were going to make a bad impression on Escobar. I told him the vessel would come in and go out and no one would be waiting for it out there in the sea. I told him that perhaps one boat would go, but not the other one, things like that. I

asked him what excuse we would give those people if something like that happened? Those boatmen were good for small operations, but not for large ones.

[Escalona] How much drugs would that vessel carry?
[De la Guardia] I never found out because.... [changes thought] They were big vessels, merchant vessels.

[Escalona] Perhaps hundreds of tons of cocaine?
[De la Guardia] No, no, no. I do not think that much. Perhaps 4 or 5 tons.

[Escalona] Or 10 tons?
[De la Guardia] Or 10 tons.

[Escalona] On board one ship?
[De la Guardia] On one ship.

[Escalona] Did he tell you that for those deals there were links with Escobar?
[De la Guardia] Martinez [Defendant Jorge Martinez Valdez] told me about the links with Escobar, because he traveled to meet with Escobar.

[Escalona] You are saying that Martinez traveled to meet with Escobar?
[De la Guardia] Yes. Later on I found out.... [changes thought] Yes.

[Escalona] You found that out because it was your own officers who had arranged it all, right?
[De la Guardia] No. I was not aware of the relationship between Martinez and Escobar. Martinez told me about it later. He told me he had a Colombian passport. He told me he met with Escobar through one of Escobar's brothers and through a Panamanian. That is what he told me more or less. The information I have about Martinez' trips to meet with Escobar.... [changes thought] He told me about his links with those people.

[Escalona] Martinez told you that?
[De la Guardia] Yes, Martinez.

[Escalona] Ochoa never told you about that relationship?
[De la Guardia] Yes, he told me about that relationship, too.

[Escalona] What did Ochoa tell you?
[De la Guardia] He told me he had a relationship or that he was in touch with Escobar.

[Escalona] Why did you give \$50,000 to Ochoa?
[De la Guardia] Ochoa asked me for \$100,000 and then he asked me [rephrases] No, I mean he asked me for \$100,000, but I could not give it to him. I did not have that much money at the time. I gave him \$50,000 later.

[Escalona] Why?
[De la Guardia] He did not tell me...

[Escalona, interrupting] But why did you give him \$100,000, or was it that Ochoa felt he had a right to ask you for \$100,000?

[De la Guardia] Due to the relationship there was.

[Escalona] Commercial?

[De la Guardia] No, not commercial, because he was referring to something having to do with ivory, but, oh well...

[Escalona, interrupting] And that ivory operation amounted to \$100,000?

[De la Guardia] The ivory deal amounted to \$70,000 approximately.

[Escalona] Seventy thousand dollars?

[De la Guardia] Seventy thousand dollars.

[Escalona] Ochoa sent you \$70,000?

[De la Guardia] No, I sent it to Ochoa for the ivory.

[Escalona] You sent \$70,000 to Ochoa in payment for the ivory you received. But the \$70,000 you sent had nothing to do with the \$100,000 he asked you for?

[De la Guardia] No, nothing.

[Escalona] Then, why did you feel obliged to give Ochoa \$50,000?

[De la Guardia] [Words indistinct]

[Escalona] I ask you, did any of you ever wake up from dreaming that this country could live off the money from narcotics trafficking?

[De la Guardia] Of course.

[Escalona] That this country would never experience shame from living off money that serves to murder the people? You never talked about that?

[De la Guardia] No, we never talked about it.

[Escalona] This is enough, Mr President.

[Espinosa] Will the defendant Amado Padron Trujillo come before the tribunal?

[Espinosa] Defendant, the law allows you the right to testify. Do you want to testify?

[Padron] Yes.

[Espinosa] Answer the questions of the prosecutor.

[Escalona] Defendant Amado Padron, were you a member of MININT?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] Beginning when?

[Padron] Since 1963.

[Escalona] How did you make the connection with Ruiz?

[Padron] What?

[Escalona] With Ruiz, with Ruiz Poo.

[Padron] In Panama.

[Escalona] At this stage?

[Padron] Yes, at this stage.

[Escalona] In your new stage, as businessman?

[Padron] That is correct.

[Escalona] What was Ruiz Poo doing in Panama?

[Padron] Ruiz Poo was the representative for Interconsult.

[Escalona] When did you first talk about narcotics trafficking?

[Padron] I returned to Cuba and he remained in Panama as representative of Interconsult, no, MC...

[Escalona, interrupting] No longer as Interconsult, but for MC.

[Padron] MC.

[Escalona] You spoke about drug trafficking in Panama?

[Padron] No, never.

[Escalona] When was the first time the subject came up?

[Padron] The first talks took place when I was back in Cuba, he was the MC representative and he contacted his cousin Reynaldo Ruiz.

[Escalona] What did he propose concerning drugs?

[Padron] He told me that his cousin's wife was Colombian and that there was a possibility of carrying out some drug trafficking operations through Cuba.

[Escalona] Were you not horrified when he made that proposal?

[Padron] Yes, at the beginning, but then I consulted higher up.

[Escalona] When was the beginning?

[Padron] When he told me and I asked how this could be possible, however, I consulted on this higher up.

[Escalona] You were no longer sufficiently horrified to prevent you from proposing to Tony de la Guardia this new line of work?

[Padron] That is correct.

[Escalona] Well?

[Padron] We proposed this deal to Tony de la Guardia and he said we would have to look into it carefully, as more information was needed and we needed to talk things over with Ruiz.

[Escalona] That is Ruiz, the relative?

[Padron] Yes, Ruiz, the relative. We then asked him to come to Cuba to hold talks.

[Escalona] Who asked him, Tony de la Guardia or you?

[Padron] He [Tony de la Guardia] authorized me to have Ruiz come to Cuba.

[Escalona] Then he gave you the responsibility of being the great drug trafficking mentor within MC?

[Padron] That is correct.

[Escalona] You took up this responsibility with great zeal?

[Padron] That is correct.

[Escalona] So much so that.... [changes thought] How long did it take you to bring Ruiz to Cuba?

[Padron] About 15 to 20 days afterward.

[Escalona] Where did you take him?

[Padron] He came on his own plane.

[Escalona] Where?

[Padron] To a Cuban base.

[Escalona] Villa Clara?

[Padron] Villa Clara.

[Escalona] Who met him there?

[Padron] Ruiz [Miguel Ruiz Poo] met him.

[Escalona] What story did you make up to get a border patrol officer to escort him?

[Padron] This was coordinated by Comrade Tony.

[Escalona] Who?

[Padron] Tony.

[Escalona] Tony. What about the use of the border patrol house and all the attentions afforded. Was that arranged by Tony?

[Padron] The border house was lent to us.

[Escalona] Who are us?

[Padron] Ruiz, myself, and (Yani).

[Escalona] In other words, Tony got a general permit for you to be attended well and without being disturbed?

[Padron] That is correct. What else?

[Escalona] Continue to tell the court all the activities from that moment on—Varadero, the boats, the ships, the contacts, the links and so on.

[Padron] Sure. After contacting Ruiz, we agreed to carry out the first drug operation. Ruiz left and we told him that when he had the operation ready to let us know through Miguel [Ruiz Poo].

Afterward, about 1 or 1 and 1/2 months later, we were advised that everything was prepared, meaning that the conditions were right for carrying out the first operation. We instructed him to send us the plane's registration number, information on the type of plane, the pilots who

would participate in the [corrects himself] I mean the names of the pilots. He said that this was always a problem: figuring out who would carry out the first operation.

Once we had this information, we asked.... [changes thought] The information was passed on to Tony's office so that he could submit the request for a landing permit. The request was submitted, stating that the airplane would bring computer equipment. The landing permit was issued. Thus, the first drug trafficking operation was carried out in late 1986.

[Escalona] [Words indistinct] 1986.

[Padron] Yes. Late in 1986 or early in 1987.

[Escalona] January 1987?

[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] Was this a cocaine [operation]?

[Padron] Yes, cocaine.

[Escalona] I see. The operation was carried out by you and Reynaldo?

[Padron] And Reynaldo.

[Escalona] Aha. What happened?

[Padron] Well, the airplane arrived and it brought 300 kg of cocaine. It was unloaded in Varadero and sent to the United States through some boatmen whom he had sent in advance—in other words, they had arrived the previous day [corrects himself] no, they had arrived 3 or 4 days in advance. The drugs were seized. In other words, the U.S. Coast Guard captured the boatmen a few miles off the coast.

[Escalona] Was that the first [operation]?

[Padron] It was the first.

[Escalona] And later?

[Padron] Later Reynaldo again contacted Ruiz, meaning Miguel, in Panama; he asked Ruiz...

[Escalona, interrupting] Reynaldo was still working in Panama?

[Padron] Reynaldo traveled from here to Panama.

[Escalona] Expressly for that purpose?

[Padron] No, he came.... [changes thought] When the first operation was carried out, he came from Panama via...

[Escalona, interrupting] I mean, was he still the MC representative in Panama?

[Padron] Ah, yes, yes, yes. He came for that operation. As I was saying, the second contact was made later for the second operation. Reynaldo asked Miguel to check out the possibility of carrying out another operation, because the previous one could not be carried out and the collection never took place. Miguel contacted me and, following a consultation, the operation was

approved, so he was given the green light. The operation was carried out 2 or 3 months later, around March 1987, and the airplane brought 400 kg of drugs.

[Escalona] 400 kg?

[Padron] Of cocaine.

[Escalona] I see.

[Padron] The previous operation's modus operandi was followed in this operation. The drugs were picked up at the airport and transferred to the boats. It could not be sent in the first boat. Only one boat arrived so the whole amount could not be loaded. Therefore, the boat had to make a second trip. In other words, the operation was divided into two phases.

[Escalona] I see.

[Padron] All the drugs were eventually smuggled and \$400,000 was paid.

[Escalona] How much was paid?

[Padron] \$400,000.

[Escalona] \$400,000?

[Padron] \$400,000.

[Escalona] Go on, go on.

[Padron] The money was...

[Escalona, interrupting] You have approximately 12 adventures of the same kind to tell us about.

[Padron] The money was delivered to Tony. Later on, while in Varadero, the boatmen who had been working in this second operation with Ruiz brought us another citizen, who was called (Galichi), to coordinate a new operation.

[Escalona] Who brought (Galichi) to you?

[Padron] The boatmen who took the second load.

[Escalona] Aha.

[Padron] The same modus operandi [would be used], meaning the plane would land and the drug would be transferred to the speedboats.

[Escalona] Aha.

[Padron] This was discussed or authorized [corrects himself] This was discussed with Tony, was authorized, and we later carried out the operation. The airplane came from Colombia with 500 kg of cocaine, it was unloaded in Varadero, and the boatmen who came with him unloaded it. This operation.... [changes thought] Approximately 370 kg were taken; they [not further identified] were also caught. In other words, the money was not collected. Later, when the remaining 130 or 140 kg were picked up, we collected \$130,000.

[Escalona] You consulted with Tony on all the operations that you carried out?

[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] All of them?

[Padron] I...

[Escalona, interrupting] And if Tony was abroad, you did not carry out an operation until Tony...

[Padron, interrupting] That is correct; we did not carry it out. That was our way of conducting operations.

[Escalona] Padron, I have a question: Were you only involved in cocaine deals?

[Padron] What?

[Escalona] You were never involved in marijuana deals?

[Padron] No.

[Escalona] Why? Was marijuana not...

[Padron, interrupting] No, I was never asked to participate in marijuana deals.

[Escalona] Perhaps Elmer or Alexis Lago Arocha and you divided the work: He took care of marijuana and you took care of cocaine. Was that the arrangement?

[Padron] No, absolutely not. I was never asked to participate in marijuana operation.

[Escalona] Let us talk about 1989 then.

[Padron] In early 1989, specifically in February, my subordinate Comrade Rosa Maria Avierno commented to me about her contacts with drug traffickers, namely Jorge and Alberto, who...

[Escalona, interrupting] Who?

[Padron] Jorge and Alberto, who brought the launches; he [not further identified] was the launch man.

[Escalona] The launch man.

[Padron] We had previously carried out a drug operation with them. They proposed to us another drug operation similar to the previous one. In other words...

[Escalona, interrupting] Rosa Maria arranged that when she was Elmer's subordinate?

[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] That was during the first operation?

[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] So you are now talking about a second operation; why did she transferred?

[Padron] That was a decision made by the leadership.

[Escalona] By the leadership, but that (?does not mean that you do not know why). Why did she leave Elmer to come and work with you?

[Padron] That was a decision made by...

[Escalona, interrupting] Was there a new division of labor in your MC?

[Padron] No, that was a decision of the leadership because she was...

[Escalona, interrupting] Elmer was chief of operations in [word indistinct]?
[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] And you were head of a directorate?
[Padron] Of a special operations section.

[Escalona] But you ended up being the boss and even more?
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] Even the boss of the launch people?
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] Did you take over Elmer's responsibilities?
[Padron] Apparently, yes.

[Escalona] You were more efficient?
[Padron] I do not know.

[Escalona] Okay, continue.
[Padron] They proposed an operation similar to the previous one, that is, to put the drug ashore in Varadero and transfer it to the launches. In the beginning, we told them that we no longer wanted to be involved in any more operations...

[Escalona, interrupting] Not participating in any more operations was your decision?
[Padron] Tony's, I am talking about operations in which the drug passed through...

[Escalona interrupting] As Tony's lieutenant, you helped him very little to implement his decisions, correct?
[Padron] I was not his lieutenant.

[Escalona] As the person in charge of the drug operations, you helped him very little to implement his decisions, because Tony said no in late 1987, and you carried out all the operations you wanted in 1988. He said no in 1988 and you came up with more operations than ever in 1989. You did very little to enhance Tony's self-respect as a boss or his image as a boss, correct?
[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] But in April, you carried out many operations?
[Padron] We carried out five operations in April.

[Escalona] Had you carried out five operations in any other month?
[Padron] What?

[Escalona] Had you carried out five operations in any other month?
[Padron] Months?

[Escalona] In a single month.
[Padron] No, never. That was between January...

[Escalona, interrupting] And this took place after Tony's decision that there would be no more operations—a decision that you ignored.
[Padron] No more within the territory...

[Escalona, interrupting] There would be launch people and drug traffickers; all those would be in national territory under your protection?
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] And the drug was floating on the sea waiting for you to pick it up. And you carried out five operations. Why did you carry out five operations in April?
[Padron] Not in April.

[Escalona] There were five operations in April 1989.
[Padron] We did not carry out five operations...

[Escalona, interrupting] Rosa Maria and Amado, Joel and Amado, Eduardo and Amado, and Eduardo and Amado. Those are four operations involving you.
[Padron] Four operations.

[Escalona] And another one involving Sanchez Lima and Prendes. Those are five MC operations in April. I ask you, the great drug boss within the MC: Why did you step up this suicidal way of carrying out operations?

[Padron] That was the last month we were going to carry out operations, and we wanted to have...

[Escalona, interrupting] Amado: You are speaking the truth, correct?
[Padron] I...

[Escalona, interrupting] Until recently you were a MIN-INT officer?
[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] How many times have you mentioned to me that you entertained the thought of not carrying out any more operations?
[Padron] Several times but...

[Escalona, interrupting] What guarantees does this country have that you were going to stop drug trafficking in April?
[Padron] None.

[Escalona] Did you really feel disciplined enough to withdraw from such a productive business?
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] When did that discipline first appear?
[Padron] As I said, I had even spoken with all the officers and told them I would not carry out any more operations.

[Escalona] But Amado, what does cassette five explain?
[Padron] I told you, it was the last.

[Escalona] It was a farewell?
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] A big farewell party. You never felt the enemy had infiltrated this trade?
[Padron] No.

[Escalona] Who guaranteed you that those well-known Mariel boatmen would keep your secret in Miami?
[Padron] Nobody. However, on the two occasions they were arrested, they did not say they were from Cuba. They said they were from the Bahamas.

[Escalona] They always said they were from the Bahamas?
[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] (Where did you give that information?) Did you have policemen in the [words indistinct]?
[Padron] No, a newspaper published the statements.

[Escalona] A newspaper. You believe, then, that the DEA did not have the slightest knowledge?
[Padron] I believe it did, but...

[Escalona, interrupting] When do you believe the DEA first knew of this?
[Padron] From the time (Treinaldo Ruprez) was arrested.

[Escalona] From the time (Treinaldo) was arrested. You did not stop, however.
[Padron] No.

[Escalona] What?
[Padron] No.

[Escalona] But you are aware of what it would mean for Cuba if the DEA had nabbed you red-handed?
[Padron] Yes, we were very well aware.

[Escalona] We are going to talk about your international contacts now. What were your international contacts like?
[Padron] [Words indistinct]

[Escalona] With Colombians, Mexicans, Americans?
[Padron] As I said, my first contact was with Colombians in Mexico. After that, here in Cuba, officer Joel told me that there were three Colombian men and one Colombian woman who was the wife of my latest contact—a contact who did not work with me—who had come to Cuba and wanted to meet with me. I met with them and the Colombian men and woman told me of the possibility of carrying out a drug operation. They proposed, among other things, that we set up a laboratory on one of the keys on the northern coast and the possibility of obtaining paper to counterfeit dollars.

[Escalona] To set up what on one of the keys?
[Padron] A laboratory to...

[Escalona, interrupting] A key on Cuba's northern coast?
[Padron] Correct. And to deal in cocaine through the airport...

[Escalona, interrupting] Who attended this meeting?
[Padron] Joel and I attended this first meeting.

[Escalona] Joel and who?
[Padron] I.

[Escalona] You. Go ahead.
[Padron] We did not give the Colombians any encouragement. We really did not want to establish ties with the Colombians. We wanted to do business solely and exclusively with the boatmen. In regard to the paper, we told them that we were not certain, and they explained that the paper could only be gotten at the state level, that no individual or merchant could purchase that type of paper anywhere, that a state had to purchase it.

[Escalona] Did the Colombians know you were a major in the MININT?
[Padron] No, no.

[Escalona] They never knew it?
[Padron] No. In regard to the laboratory, we said from the start that no, that could not be done here, that it was madness. All the proposals were discussed with Tony, who said he agreed with us that nothing could be done about this, but to take Comrade Martinez to the next meeting and...

[Escalona, interrupting] Who?
[Padron] Martinez.

[Escalona] Where did you meet Martinez?
[Padron] Who?

[Escalona] You.
[Padron] No. Tony told me to take Martinez to the meeting.

[Escalona] You knew Martinez?
[Padron] I think I knew him but I had no.... [changes thought] I knew him.

[Escalona] You knew him.
[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] From where did you know him?
[Padron] From Tony's office.

[Escalona] You had seen him in Tony's office?
[Padron] I had seen him in Tony's office.

[Escalona] Whom did Tony say Martinez was?
[Padron] Gen Ochoa's aide.

[Escalona] Gen Ochoa's aide.
[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] Perfect. Then Tony decided that Martinez should attend the meeting.

[Padron] Correct.

[Escalona] Continue.

[Padron] The next day we went to the meeting with Martinez and the same proposals were discussed. We told the Colombians that if they were interested in the laboratory it could be installed in another country, in Africa or any other country, but they were not interested in this. Referring to the paper, Martinez said at the meeting that he would check out the possibility of purchasing this kind of paper in an African country.

The Colombians left later on without receiving a positive reply. We said no to everything they proposed. However, they were on the same flight as Martinez when he went back to Panama.

[Escalona] Who flew with Martinez, the Colombians?

[Padron] The Colombians. They left the same day that Martinez left. He had scheduled a trip to Panama.

[Escalona] I see.

[Padron] They were on the same flight, and later on, when Martinez returned, he told us that he had gone to Colombia with Fernando—who (?was also a) Colombian—and had met with Pablo Escobar.

[Escalona] Amado, Amado, did you not know about Martinez's trip?

[Padron] I did not.

[Escalona] What?

[Padron] I did not know about Martinez's trip.

[Escalona] Who took care of the budget.... [corrects himself] Martinez' passport?

[Padron] Well, I was in charge of requesting a visa for Martinez every time it was needed. However, we were told that Martinez would make some communications deal in Panama.

[Escalona] Martinez had never talked to you about this?

[Padron] No, never.

[Escalona] Did you know Martinez was going to Colombia?

[Padron] No, I learned about this after he returned.

[Escalona] Then you are not the drug-trafficking boss. You were falling into disgrace. How was that?

[Padron] Well, I knew nothing. When he returned from Colombia he told us that...

[Escalona, interrupting] What did he tell you?

[Padron] That he had gone with [the Colombians] to Colombia and that he had used a Colombian passport he had to enter Colombia.

[Escalona] What else did he tell you?

[Padron] He said that he had met with Pablo Escobar and that Pablo Escobar had offered to make several cocaine deals, that is drug-trafficking deals.

[Escalona] Amado.

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] When you introduced Martinez to the foreigners during your meeting in Havana, whom did you say he was?

[Padron] One of our group.

[Escalona] What group? What kind of group did you say it was?

[Padron] No, no, no. We never said who we were or anything because, well, it was a relationship that went back some time. I do not know what had been previously discussed with him, but it was never mentioned. All that was said when I was introduced to them was: This is our boss. That is all we told the Colombians.

[Escalona] How was Martinez introduced? As another member of the group?

[Padron] As another member of the group.

[Escalona] What about when he went to Colombia? Who did he say he was?

[Padron] No, he went as [corrects himself] He went on his own. I do not know who he claimed he was when he went to Colombia but...

[Escalona, interrupting] But you saw each other frequently.

[Padron] I learned about the trip to Colombia later.

[Escalona] But you saw each other frequently. Did he not tell you that he was going to Colombia before he left?

[Padron] No.

[Escalona] Was that a decision he made in Panama?

[Padron] He was going to Panama.

[Escalona] What? Did he decide to go to Colombia when he was in Panama?

[Padron] I believe so.

[Escalona] What did he tell you after he returned? What did he tell you about Mr Pablo Escobar, who must be an interesting person? What did he tell you?

[Padron] He told us that Pablo was annoyed because he thought he had coordinated with some Cuban officials the sending of a boat with drugs—I do not know if it was cocaine or marijuana—through Cuba's jurisdictional waters, and the boat was seized by the border guards. Regarding this coordination, we had no contacts with Pablo; we did not know Pablo, and we knew nothing about the boat. It seems that on several occasions these same people, meaning Cuban drug traffickers, told the Colombians that they had coordinated the passage of drugs through Cuba, yet they did not coordinate anything. It seems that this was one of those cases.

[Escalona] Amado Padron Trujillo, we found \$294,918 hidden in refrigerators and at the homes of your friends. Was this your hard-earned money? Did you earn this money with the work you did during the past 2 years and months?

[Padron] That was money from our last two drug operations.

[Escalona] Why did you not give the money to the MC?

[Padron] Because when the last payment was made, Comrade Tony had already been replaced, so we decided to keep the money.

[Escalona] What for?

[Padron] We held on to the money just in case we continued our operations there. If the operations continued, we would then hand the money over to the MC.

[Escalona] Let us see: You gave Willie Pineda \$20,000; you buried \$108,000 in the cement you gave Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo; you gave Jose Diaz Izquierdo \$166,020 to hold for you, and he in turn gave the money to Jose Medina—that money was in a refrigerator found in California neighborhood. Right?

[Padron] Right.

[Escalona] Since that money belonged to the MC and you had no intentions of keeping it, why did you not make everything legal?

[Padron] Because we wanted to justify that money through some commercial operations we would arrange at a later date.

[Escalona] What do you mean, justify?

[Padron] As we did in the past...

[Escalona, interrupting] Continue making transaction after transaction and continue making money with drug money.

[Padron] It was the only way to do it.

[Escalona] Oh, that is great. Padron, what did you want 11 pistols and 8 revolvers for?

[Padron] I like to collect weapons.

[Escalona] You like to collect weapons and cars?

[Padron] Not cars. That information is not correct.

[Escalona] Lada, license plate No 4591; Lada, license plate No 15858; Lada—the three are Lada 2107 cars—license plate No HB9899; Lada 2105, not being driven and sales contract issued to Margarita Vasquez Hernandez, wife of Amado Padron Trujillo; VW 1300, registration papers in the name of Esperanza Artamendi Ferrer—car believed to belong to Amado Padron; Lada 2107, blue, having some body work done and, according to Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo, it belongs to Amado Padron; Lada 2101, red, having some body work done; Lada 2105, belonging to your son, Alexis Padron Garcia; Lada 1600. Eleven cars in all. How many cars did you drive a day?

[Padron] I will tell you what I know about those cars, at least the cars I know about.

[Escalona] And do not forget the motorcycle because over there you forgot about the motorcycle.

[Padron] What?

[Escalona] Did you ride that motorcycle?

[Padron] No.

[Escalona] Then why did you buy it.

[Padron] It was never ridden because it...

[Escalona, interrupting] How much did you pay for that motorcycle?

[Padron] I paid \$3,400 for it.

[Escalona] And was that money yours?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] Yours?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] From your wages?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] How much did you earn a month?

[Padron] While in Panama, I was making \$700 a month.

[Escalona] And you spent 4 months wages on a motorcycle?

[Padron] No, I had...

[Escalona, interrupting] You went hungry for 4 months?

[Padron] No, I was in Panama for 4 [corrects himself] 3 years.

[Escalona] So you saved that money?

[Padron] That is right.

[Escalona] And you spent 4 years of savings on a motorcycle?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] On a motorcycle you never rode?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] A Honda, five-speed, that no one else in this country has. What did you want to prove to the people? That you could not be punished; that you could live above the standards of our people; that you could go around showing off those fancy cars in Villa Marita while people stood at the corners waiting for a bus? What did you want to prove? That the drug trafficker in Cuba could live like an Escobar in Colombia? Do you feel that you are Cuba's Escobar?

[Padron] No.

[Escalona] The truth is that your business is a sickening business and whatever you touch you make dirty. I have finished, Mr President.

[Espinoza] I was saying, Amado...

[Escalona, interrupting] Mr President, excuse me.

[Espinoza] Yes?

[Escalona] I would like to clarify one more thing. During the last operation, 156 kg of cocaine were buried on Romero Cay. Is that true?

[Padron] Yes.

[Escalona] Several tests were made of that cocaine at the Central Crime Laboratory. The tests showed that: 1. samples of white powder found on Romero Cay, north of Punta Hicacos, and which belonged to detainees Amado Padron Trujillo and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo, were sent to this laboratory for testing. The tests showed that the powder was 100-percent pure cocaine. Cocaine is an internationally banned drug that ranks number one on the list of the 1961 UN convention on narcotics, of which Cuba is a signatory. So you ride around in 11 cars and disregard the agreements this country signs with the United Nations. That is all, Mr President.

[Major Aristides Ruisenor de la Pena] Defendant Amado Padron, you have been pretty explicit in admitting your participation in the various crimes and in answering the questions of the comrade representative of the attorney general. I understand that it is not necessary to expand on details that have already been provided before this court. However, I do feel that it is necessary to ask you the same question we asked the defendant Tony de la Guardia. Please tell us who managed the work you did? Regarding the hundreds of thousands of dollars, how did you hand over that money to your immediate superior, to the defendant Tony de la Guardia.

[Padron] I gave him the money in a bag, in a suitcase, depending on what the money came in. When the money was delivered, no papers were signed.

[Ruisenor] No documents were signed?

[Padron] No documents were signed.

[Ruisenor] Was the section you headed ever inspected?

[Padron] Negative.

[Ruisenor] Never?

[Padron] Never.

[Ruisenor] At no point during your tenure as section head?

[Padron] Correct.

[Ruisenor] All right, when the comrade prosecutor questioned you recently, you mentioned certain things that you have repeatedly discussed with me pertaining to the seizure of 10 vehicles. By the way, the comrade prosecutor referred to 11 vehicles, but the prosecution summation refers to 9 vehicles and 1 motorcycle. During our meetings, you explained to me the origin of each one of

those automobiles. You explained here specifically how you obtained the first vehicle, that is, the motorcycle. Could you briefly tell us how you obtained each one of the other vehicles?

[Padron] I got the first car after my first tour in Panama, that is, between 1970 and 1978. I got the first vehicle upon returning from Panama.

[Ruisenor] Who gave you the authorization?

[Padron] The Foreign Ministry.

[Ruisenor] Did you buy it?

[Padron] I bought it.

[Ruisenor] Aha.

[Padron] I bought the second vehicle after I completed my second tour in Panama. CIMEX, where I worked, gave me the authorization. CIMEX is authorized to approve cars for officials once they complete their...

[Ruisenor, interrupting] With what money did you purchase it?

[Padron] With money I obtained in Panama.

[Ruisenor] Money from what?

[Padron] My salary.

[Ruisenor] Your salary...

[Padron, interrupting] At that time, we were not yet...

[Ruisenor, interrupting] What was your salary at that time?

[Padron] \$750.

[Ruisenor] What about the other vehicles?

[Padron] I have already said that the motorcycle was also purchased around that time. I do not own any other car. I only own the car I was allowed to purchase by virtue of my employment. There is also my wife's car, a Volkswagen, which was purchased with national currency. I helped her purchase it. She had some money and I helped her with 11,000 pesos. She had 12,000 and the car cost 23,000.

[Ruisenor] That is the Volkswagen?

[Padron] My wife's Volkswagen.

[Ruisenor] Was it paid for with foreign or national currency?

[Padron] With national currency.

[Ruisenor] With national currency. What about the other cars that were seized—the one seized from your son, for example?

[Padron] What?

[Ruisenor] The car seized from your son?

[Padron] I did not know about it. He told me about the car after he purchased it at the House of Gold [Casa del Oro] with jewelry his grandmother had given him. He also bought Margarita Vasquez', my ex-wife's, car in the same way.

[Ruisenor] As family members, did they have access to the jewelry that was later used to purchase the cars mentioned here at CIMEX?

[Padron] Yes.

[Ruisenor] They had access to it?

[Padron] Yes.

[Ruisenor] All right.

[Padron] As for the other cars, I do not know whether they are assigned to the section. The cars I own are the ones I have referred to.

[Ruisenor] In sum, you admit having purchased two Lada cars as a result of money you earned during your foreign tours and also a motorcycle and your wife's Volkswagen?

[Padron] Correct.

[Ruisenor] All right, let us discuss another topic. In nearly 27 years in the organization, have you ever received disciplinary or any other kinds of punishment?

[Padron] No.

[Ruisenor] Never?

[Padron] Never.

[Ruisenor] You have led a normal life within the party?

[Padron] Yes.

[Ruisenor] Over all those years, were you given specific and honorable duties such as participating in military operations against bandits?

[Padron] Yes.

[Ruisenor] In what year?

[Padron] In 1961 [corrects himself] in 1962.

[Ruisenor] Where were those operations?

[Padron] In El Escambray.

[Ruisenor] In El Escambray. Did they last a long time?

[Padron] Yes, about 8 months.

[Ruisenor] Eight months. Okay, what has been your attitude during the preliminary investigation process?

[Padron] I have cooperated to explain everything that happened, and I need not express how I feel. I have no words to express my feelings.

[Ruisenor] As your statement indicates, you have made a self-assessment of all these unfortunate events in your life.

[Padron] Correct.

[Ruisenor] And you have arrived at the conclusion that they are deplorable from any standpoint in the eyes of your family and comrades?

[Padron] Correct.

[Ruisenor] Have you reached that conclusion?

[Padron] Correct.

[Ruisenor] That is all, Comrade President.

[Espinosa] You may leave. Defendant Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo, stand before the tribunal. Defendant: The law gives you the right to testify. Do you wish to testify?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I wish to make a statement.

[Espinosa] Answer the question the prosecutor will ask.

[Escalona] Defendant Diaz Izquierdo, on what date did you begin working with the Interior Ministry?

[Diaz Izquierdo] On two dates.

[Escalona] What did you say?

[Diaz Izquierdo] On two dates.

[Escalona] On what dates did you begin with the Interior Ministry?

[Diaz Izquierdo] The first time was in 1967.

[Escalona] So, it was twice.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, I was demobilized in 1969 at my request and rejoined in 1981.

[Escalona] When did you reach the Z Department?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In 1984.

[Escalona] You rejoined that department?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, in the latter part [of 1984].

[Escalona] When did you first come in contact with the drug-trafficking activities?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In 1987.

[Escalona] In 1987. How did you end up in the drug-trafficking operations?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I took part in two operations. In the first operation, I played a support role. I played a support role in the two operations; that is, I drove the vehicle that picked up the drug at the airport. I did not know that the first operation involved drug trafficking, but Amado Padron told me what the second operation was all about.

[Escalona] Who got you involved in the first operation?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Amado Padron.

[Escalona] And he did not explain anything to you?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, I simply picked up the merchandise. When I picked it up it was packaged in such a way that I did not...

[Escalona, interrupting] Where did you take the merchandise?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I took it from the airport to Punta Hicacos...

[Escalona, interrupting] All the way to Punta Hicacos. How was it concealed?

[Diaz Izquierdo] The first shipment was hidden in cartons of Marlboro.

[Escalona] Marlboro cigarettes?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, Marlboro cigarettes. This was during the first operation.

[Escalona] Where exactly in Punta Hicacos did you take the drugs?

[Diaz Izquierdo] To a yacht belonging to the department. From there we moved it to the yacht that was going to transport it to the United States.

[Escalona] Where was that yacht? At the border guard post?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, it was not exactly at the border guard post. It was in the vicinity—in the cockfight arena behind Punta Hicacos.

[Escalona] Who else was involved in the operation?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Reinaldo Ruiz, Miguel Ruiz Poo, and Amado Padron.

[Escalona] Ruiz Poo and Amado Padron. And in the second operation?

[Diaz Izquierdo] The same three people I mentioned and I participated in the second operation. I was fully aware that this operation...

[Escalona, interrupting] How did Amado Padron tell you that drugs were involved?

[Diaz Izquierdo] To be frank, I must say that Amado Padron called me and explained that, because of the importance of the operation—and forgive me for speaking this way but I am nervous.

[Escalona] Calm down.

[Diaz Izquierdo] I am. I am grinding my teeth.

[Escalona] Defendant, please calm down.

[Diaz Izquierdo] I am doing what I can. He called me in and explained that the operations were drug-trafficking operations.

[Escalona] When did he explain that? Before the operation?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In the case of the second operation, before.

[Escalona] Before the operation began?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Before it began.

[Escalona] Regarding the development of this operation, was it like the first one?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Identical. In this second case, the merchandise, that is, the drugs, were hidden in Epsom salt cases. Some of them were shipped out of Cuba in cigarette cartons and others in Epsom boxes.

[Escalona] Where did you change the packaging?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In a house that was rented for that purpose in Varadero.

[Escalona] Where in Varadero?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In Villa Tortuga.

[Escalona] In Villa.... [changes thought] You changed the packaging in that very house?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In that very house.

[Escalona] The same people?

[Diaz Izquierdo] The same people.

[Escalona] Did any other person participate...

[Diaz Izquierdo, interrupting] There were also the boatmen, who were already there to take the drugs away.

[Escalona] How many were there?

[Diaz Izquierdo] There were five boatmen in this case.

[Escalona] Had these boatmen been in the country before, or did they arrive at that time?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, they arrived that day.

[Escalona] Did they leave immediately?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, they left the next day. The plane did not arrive that day. It arrived the next day.

[Escalona] Were those boatmen given an opportunity to meet with their families?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, not in this case.

[Escalona] There was no time?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, they were not allowed to see their families.

[Escalona] I see. In how many other operations have you participated?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Following those two operations?

[Escalona] Yes.

[Diaz Izquierdo] I participated in the last two operations carried out in April. I coordinated them.

[Escalona] April 1989?

[Diaz Izquierdo] April 1989.

[Escalona] Are there any others, Eduardo?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In my case?

[Escalona] Yes.

[Diaz Izquierdo] No. I have participated in many other operations within the department, but I only provided support to Mr Ruiz' first two operations and then the last two operations, which I coordinated directly with Miguelito, also known as the grandfather.

[Escalona] When were these operations coordinated with the Grandfather?

[Diaz Izquierdo] In late March and April.

[Escalona] March and April. Did Amado Padron always participate with you?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Amado Padron was the chief of the section where I worked, and he always participated with me in the operations.

[Escalona] What benefits did you derive from all this?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Well, I received a gift from Amado Padron: \$35,000.

[Escalona] \$35,000.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes. I am not trying to avoid blame. I have worked since 1987, as I told you, amidst all this barbarity—I can say that it is barbarous—and I knew what I was doing. However, I did think that this was possible due to a problem in the department directorate and the trust that I have had in the department directorate and the prestigious comrades who have been in charge of the department where I worked. I knew what I was doing was illicit and illegal, but up to the last moment—without trying to avoid blame for the crimes I committed—I always had the idea that it might be an illicit business but it was done with—not without—with a certain amount of awareness in the department directorate. I have become more certain of this during the hearing and during the time I have been under arrest, and in the talks I have held with the lawyer who is handling my case.

[Escalona] Eduardo, why was there \$184,000 in your house?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Let me explain. The day I was arrested, meaning the 15th, I had gone to Varadero for a visit.

[Escalona] Not to work?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Not to work.

[Escalona] No?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I went to make a visit. Coincidentally, two of the boatmen who had been my contacts, and with whom I had carried out the last two operations, arrived by boat at Varadero that evening. They brought a cooler with a certain amount of money. I did not touch the money, and I never knew how much was there. I put the cooler in the trunk of my car—that is, the car I had—and in the early morning hours I came back to Havana, because I had to be at the office at 0800. When I passed by a room I rented in Santa Maria del Mar, I.... [changes

thought] Let me tell you, I was terrified, and I acted in a cowardly manner instead of delivering the money where I should have and talking clearly. I acted in a cowardly way and I hid it there.

[Escalona] In that moment of terror, did you not think of going to the MININT and denouncing all this filth?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Prosecutor, I think that would have been the right thing to do, but I have to confess that I was so caught up in all this business that I could not think straight.

[Escalona] Eduardo, did you negotiate with foreign exchange?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes.

[Escalona] Whose dollars were those?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Well, I changed some of the money Amado Padron had given me.

[Escalona] Did you exchange the dollars for Cuban money? Did you negotiate with this?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Please, Prosecutor, repeat the question.

[Escalona] In other words, on certain occasions the boatmen gave you dollars so that they could be exchanged for Cuban pesos.

[Diaz Izquierdo] In the boatmen's case you mean?

[Escalona] Did they give the dollars to some officers because they wanted to leave money for their family, to have Cuban money, etc? Was the money exchanged? Was the discrepancy between the black market price of the peso and the dollar modified on certain occasions? This leaves a profit. Did you ever do this?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I never did this in the boatmen's case.

[Escalona] In what cases did you do it?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I did it with the money Amado Padron gave me.

[Escalona] How much did you exchange?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I changed approximately \$10,000.

[Escalona] \$10,000. When did you exchange it?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Well, I exchanged some of it with an old contact of a brother and some more with one of Rosa Maria's contacts.

[Escalona] Continue.

[Diaz Izquierdo] I exchanged the rest through one of Sanchez Lima's comrades.

[Escalona] Through Sanchez Lima.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes.

[Escalona] How did you exchange the dollars?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Well, Sanchez Lima...

[Escalona, interrupting] No, no, no, not the way you did it but the exchange rate.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Oh, the exchange rate. In Sanchez Lima's case and in the Spaniard's case, it was 6 pesos for 1 dollar.

[Escalona] Six pesos for a dollar.
[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, that is right.

[Escalona] And you exchanged \$10,000?
[Diaz Izquierdo] Approximately \$10,000.

[Escalona] In conclusion, Eduardo, did you meet Martinez?
[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, I did.

[Escalona] Where did you meet him?
[Diaz Izquierdo] I met him during his regular visits to the office where I work.

[Escalona] Did he visit the office frequently?
[Diaz Izquierdo] Sometimes. I cannot tell you exactly how many times he came to the office, but he did come frequently.

[Escalona] Mr President, I have no more questions for the time being.

[Espinoza] Eduardo, answer the questions that will be asked by the defense attorney.

[First Lieutenant Esther Recio Zamora] Eduardo, you said that you began working for the MC in 1985.
[Diaz Izquierdo] In 1984.

[Recio] In 1984.
[Diaz Izquierdo] Excuse me, but I said 1984, even though I had worked there before. I had been assigned there, however, the official appointment to the Interior Ministry was in 1984.

[Recio] That is correct. In 1984 you began working at the MC.
[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes.

[Recio] When did you get involved in these drug-trafficking activities?
[Diaz Izquierdo] In 1987.

[Recio] In 1987.
[Diaz Izquierdo] In mid to late 1987.

[Recio] Mid to late 1987?
[Diaz Izquierdo] Mid-1987.

[Recio] Eduardo, do you recall how you were approached regarding these drug-trafficking activities? Please tell the court how you were advised that you would no longer do what you had been doing since 1984 and would now become involved in drug trafficking. Can you do that?
[Diaz Izquierdo] Of course I can.

[Recio] How were you told?
[Diaz Izquierdo] How?

[Recio] Yes.
[Diaz Izquierdo] Well, Comrade, or Citizen Amado Padron told me that because of my responsibilities and because of the kind of person I was, I had been chosen to do the job. He told me it was a dangerous activity, an extremely secret activity and that I had been chosen to participate because I was a responsible person.

[Recio] Eduardo, were other words, aside from dangerous and extremely secret, used?
[Diaz Izquierdo] I do not know what you mean. If you clarify your question perhaps I will be able to answer it.

[Recio] For example, were you told that this was some kind of a mafia that was operating and that it was necessary to do this work?
[Diaz Izquierdo] No, no.

[Recio] Those words were never used?
[Diaz Izquierdo] No, no, no.

[Recio] They were not?
[Diaz Izquierdo] No. I have always viewed what I did as a job. Despite all that has been said before this honorable court and despite the serious charges, I always viewed this as my job. I never got paid for doing it.

[Recio] You were never told that the work you were doing was linked to an authorized mafia?
[Diaz Izquierdo] As of the date I mentioned earlier, I did nothing more than this job.

[Recio] Eduardo, how did you participate in these activities? What did you do during the first two operations? What was your participation in the April 1987 and November 1987 operations? What did you do during the six cocaine drops you participated in and what was your involvement in the Romero Cay incident, which we are discussing today?
[Diaz Izquierdo] You are asking about six different operations. I coordinated two operations—the two initial operations Reinaldo Ruiz participated in.

[Recio] Did you independently coordinate and plan any of these activities? Did you do this without Padron's knowledge?
[Diaz Izquierdo] No, I coordinated these activities with our foreign link, with the Cuban traitor, but my boss was always aware of what was going on. I never did anything on my own.

[Recio] Eduardo, in late April 1988 two meetings were held. One meeting with the Colombians and one meeting with the Mexicans. Why were you at those meetings?
[Diaz Izquierdo] To meet the contacts.

[Recio] To meet the contacts. Who else participated at the meeting?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Amado Padron participated and...

[Recio, interrupting] No, that is enough, Eduardo, that is enough.

[Diaz Izquierdo] I beg your pardon?

[Recio] That is enough. You were there to meet the contacts. Did you hear me?

[Diaz Izquierdo] No, no, I did not. Excuse me.

[Recio] You said that you participated in the two meetings to meet the contacts.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Ah, yes. I thought that you had asked who had participated.

[Recio] We would like you to evaluate before the court the testimony we are hearing here today. What do you think about all this?

[Diaz Izquierdo] First of all, I want you all to excuse me if I get tongue-tied when I make the evaluation. I will try to do it slowly because this is the most important part of all this for me. I did not stop to think for a moment what kind of punishment this honorable court would give me for the crimes and the barbarities in which I participated. I am very sorry for all these barbarities. I was somewhat disappointed to hear the statements of some comrades who have had an even bigger responsibility and, on top of that, have been extremely valuable comrades, yet they have not been completely sincere. I think that my share of the responsibility should not be shared by anyone else, and I want the court to strictly enforce the law and make me pay for my share of the responsibility. This is not simple demagoguery or an attempt to justify anything.

I am totally repentant, and I swear before this court and the honorable comrades who are here and those who are listening to me, and before my children and my small family, that with the last drop of my blood, I will try, in any way I can, to remove the ugly blemish I have given the Revolution and to overcome my great betrayal of the commander in chief's principles, despite my humble origins.

I never had anything. I have always had what the Revolution has given me, which has been a lot because I was born with the Revolution. However, for no reason and in an absurd, stupid, and cowardly way, I have sunk to this level of corruption and selfishness.

[Recio] That is all, Mr President.

[Escalona] May I speak, Mr President?

[Espinoza] Yes, Mr Prosecutor.

[Escalona] Eduardo, I have two questions for you: In the photograph that appears on this board—please show it to him—are you the person who appears in the photo beside the over 100 kg of cocaine?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes.

[Escalona] Then, did you participate, along with Amado Padron, in burying 156 kg of cocaine on Romero Street?

[Diaz Izquierdo] We knew that the cocaine had been buried, but we did not bury it. The cocaine was buried by the boatmen. We, however, sent the cocaine to them. The matter was discussed with Amado Padron...

[Escalona, interrupting] You provided the cocaine?

[Diaz Izquierdo] Yes, we provided it.

[Escalona] One last question: You have stated that in addition to this, Amado Padron was also involved in foreign exchange trafficking and he did this regularly.

[Diaz Izquierdo] That is true.

[Escalona] You participated directly in these operations as you met this citizen [not further identified] to exchange dollars for Cuban pesos on several occasions.

[Diaz Izquierdo] That is true.

[Escalona] You recall that the exchange rate was on a six-to-one basis.

[Diaz Izquierdo] That is true.

[Escalona] Did you exchange money for Amado Padron, or did you exchange Amado Padron's money and yours too?

[Diaz Izquierdo] On several occasions, I exchanged money for Amado Padron, and on other occasions I exchanged money for myself.

[Escalona] Eduardo, as a member of the MININT, you knew of this country's great struggle against illegal foreign exchange trafficking. Is that true?

[Diaz Izquierdo] I do know about it.

[Escalona] However, you helped increase the level of this trafficking. You did it to promote the good life for Amado Padron. You exchanged money for him at a rate of six to one. You mean to tell me that, in addition to blemishing the country and placing us in a crisis situation in regard to drugs, you also contributed to the weakening of our economy and currency by exchanging money at a rate of six to one and that you also contributed to the corruption process that the MININT, primarily, has been fighting over the years? You admit that you participated in these crimes? Is that true?

[Diaz Izquierdo] That is true.

[Escalona] That is all, Mr President.

[Espinoza] Do any of the court members have further questions? Defendant, you may step down.

[Diaz Izquierdo] Thank you.

DPRK Leader Visits 'Cuba Club' in Pyongyang

*FL0607184089 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1700 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Text] Today, Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Korean Workers Party and president of the DPRK, visited the Cuba Club in Pyongyang. After greeting our delegation's leadership, representing our 500-member delegation, as well as guests, he toured the facilities which will revert to being the Pyongyang Palace for Children and Scholars after the festival has ended.

The president of the DPRK took special interest in the exhibit: 30 Years Young, which shows the most representative achievements of the Cuban Revolution. The discussion he had with Roberto Garcia, organizer of the Union of Young Communists' [UJC] national committee, was interesting. In this conversation, Garcia emphasized that our delegation was impressed with the heroic people of the DPRK.

Later, the Cuban Ambassador to the DPRK [Juan Jose Leon Vega] noted how beneficial the time difference between our two nations is because, while the Korean people sleep, Cubans can keep an eye on imperialism and vice versa.

The Cuba Club was the first facility of this type to be visited by the great leader of the Korean people.

Raul Castro Sends Greetings to Graduating Cadets

*FL0607234389 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 2330 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[From "Exclusivo" program]

[Text] A large group of subordinate cadets and officers of the General Jose Maceo Grajales Interservice School of the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] in Santiago de Cuba graduated today during a military ceremony that took place in that important center of education.

The 36th Anniversary of the Assault on the Moncada Barracks Graduation Ceremony began with warm greetings sent by Army General Raul Castro Ruz, FAR minister.

Present at the ceremony were Brigade Generals Leonardo Antonio Valdez and Efigenio Ameijeiras, who are presiding over the FAR control in the territory. [sentence as heard] Other chiefs, officers, sergeants, soldiers, Camilitos [students of the Camilo Cienfuegos Military Vocational schools], members of the Territorial Troops Militia, and youths and pioneers from Santiago de Cuba were also present at the ceremony.

UN Envoy Confirms South African Terrorism

*FL0607145989 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1700 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Text] Faced with Namibia's continued reports that the South African troops and police left in Namibia are terrorizing the population, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari toured the area. He was able to confirm the reports.

Officials from Ahtisaari's headquarters said to the press that those terrorist acts are being carried out to scare the population so that they will not vote for the South-West African People's Organization [SWAPO] in November's general elections. They said that South African soldiers travel the countryside destroying Namibian homes and scaring off their cattle. These are actions in which the punitive (Cohebohep) battalions take part. Pretoria has illegally made these battalions part of the Namibian police.

Namibian union leaders told Ahtisaari that they will declare a general strike if the (Cohebohep) are not immediately removed from the police.

Meanwhile, today's edition of the ETHIOPIAN HERALD states that if SWAPO wins the November elections, a South African military invasion of Namibia is not out of the question. The paper emphasizes that Pretoria has not changed its racist policies, something made evident by the nation's extended state of emergency.

Delegation to Joint Commission Now Complete

*FL0607120389 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1100 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] The delegation representing Cuba at the joint commission is now complete. The delegation will be headed by Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Alarcon.

Division General Jesus Bermudez Cutino and Spokesman Alcibiades Hidalgo have also arrived in the Angolan capital to complete the Cuban delegation. Other members of the delegation are Cuban Ambassador to Angola Martin Mora, military experts, and other officials.

The joint commission, made up of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, will begin its 2-day fourth ordinary meeting tomorrow [7 July]. The parties have had three previous meetings which were held in Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in keeping with an alternating schedule.

150 More Combatants Return From Angola

*FL0607123489 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1100 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] In the past few hours, close to 150 internationalists arrived in our nation from the People's Republic of Angola. Faustino Perez, member of the Communist

Party of Cuba Central Committee, leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces [FAR], officials from the Ministry of the Interior, and mass organization leaders greeted these combatants who returned victoriously to the fatherland after fulfilling their duties.

For these internationalists, most of them young, Angola will remain in their memories as an unforgettable experience. Now, they bear on their chests the medals they earned for the successful completion of their mission. Of the 150 combatants, 61 earned the Internationalist Combatant Medal, first class; 81 of them the Internationalist Combatant Medal, second class; 4 received the Defense of Cuito Cuanavale Medal; 1 the Ignacio Agramonte Medal; 39 the FAR Distinguished Service Medal; and all combatants bear the Cuba-People's Republic of Angola Victory Medal.

Civil Aeronautics Institute President Dismissed

*FL0607043189 Havana Television Services
in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] At the close of this second broadcast of the National Television Newscast, we have received the following information:

At the suggestion of the leaders of the party, the Council of State has decided to dismiss Comrade Vicente Gomez Lopez from the position of president of the Cuban Civil Aeronautics Institute because of serious errors in his methods and style of work.

The Council of State has also appointed Division General Rogelio Acevedo Gonzalez as president of the Cuban Civil Aeronautics Institute. Acevedo Gonzalez held the position of chief of the Central Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Eastern Army Inspection Begins 4 July

*FL0407154189 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 1420 GMT 4 Jul 89*

[Text] From 4 July to 12 July, the territories that make up the Eastern Army will be inspected by the MINFAR [Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces], officials of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] Central Committee's Military Department, and state organs.

In Granma, preparations for the inspection include fulfillment of Civil Defense measures, target practice with infantry weapons by battalions and companies, regional engineering preparations, people's reserves, and the economy in general.

Pedro Garcia Lupianez, president of the National Assembly of the People's Government in Granma Province, said that for the province's inspection, the fundamental base material studies have been completed and the province is ready for defense, first stage.

This inspection will determine if the Eastern Army, as well as the provinces that make up that command, can be the first one to be declared ready for the defense, first stage.

Inspection Continues

*FL0607130089 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1100 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] The commission which is carrying out the national inspection of the Eastern Army in Santiago de Cuba to declare it ready for defense, first stage, is in its 2d day of inspections. So far, they have visited various regular Army units, important work centers, a defense zone in the town of El Cristo, and the main preparation center in the city of Santiago de Cuba.

During the inspection, the people of Santiago showed the level of organization they have in work efforts, as well as their combat readiness. This way, they combine production and defense, something which makes our Revolution stronger and more invincible every day because the entire population is involved in this task.

The commission, which is headed by Brigade Generals Leonardo Andollo and Efigenio Ameijeiras, will review several of Santiago's municipalities to determine the province's general state of readiness to defend the fatherland at all cost.

Sugar Workers Congress To Be Held in November

*FL0607134289 Havana Television Service in Spanish
0000 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] The 18th Congress of the National Sugar Workers Union will be held in November of this year. This was stated today during a meeting to establish the organizing commission for that event.

Pedro Ross Leal, member of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee Secretariat and president of the organizing commission for the 16th CTC [Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions] congress, presided over the meeting. In this meeting, which was held at CTC headquarters, the commission to organize the sugar congress was established. This commission is to be presided over by Manuel Cordero Avila.

Attending the sugar congress will be workers from the agro-industrial centers, research centers, and workshops, as well as representatives from some of the main enterprises which supply construction and transportation equipment.

The notice calling this meeting will be published in the newspaper TRABAJADORES. From that moment on, the sugar workers congress will be talked about by the more than 300,000 members of this union. Pedro Ross said that this event will be free of individualist criteria and will reflect the interests of the nation and the revolution.

Jesus Menendez will preside over the sugar workers important congress.

Frank Pais Enterprise Exports Salt Abroad
FL0407222889 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 1955 GMT 4 Jul 89

[By Marta Reyes]

[Text] The Frank Pais Salt Enterprise in Guantanamo has exported close to 2,000 tons of salt as of last June. The product was exported to Sierra Leone, Guyana, and other nations.

Caimanera supplies 70 percent of the salt consumed in the country and it exports salt for human consumption, industrial use, and animal feed. The installation began production in 1986 [as heard]. The work was then completely manual and it manufactured only 30,000 tons of salt prior to the triumph of the Revolution. It today manufactures more than 210,000 tons of salt a year.

Among the possibilities for investment in the Frank Pais Salt Enterprise in Caimanera is the building of a pier to ship the merchandise. This would save fuel and increase the use of coastal vessels since shipment by vehicles raises the price of the cargo.

Shortage of Bread, Flour, Tubers Reported
FL0507032089 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 2318 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Report by Richard Clenton on "Exclusivo" newscast]

[Text] Today we had a long telephone conversation with Comrade Alejandro Roca, food industry minister, about the shortage of bread in some bakeries in the capital and the shortage of flour in some areas.

First of all Daniel [Daniel Torres, host of "Exclusivo" program], we have to acknowledge that this is not a problem that is typically nationwide, although this does not take away from the fact that some provinces also have these shortages. However, it is a problem that mainly concerns the capital.

It is true that problems currently exist in purchasing flour but that is due, among other things, to delays in flour deliveries to the country. We will not go into why we have not yet received the amount of flour that was expected, but it is very likely that this will improve in some way by the 20th of July.

If a problem arises, the population will not be affected. What I mean by that is that the bakeries [words indistinct].

The comrade minister told us that during the months of January through May, a total of 7,116 pounds of bread were produced daily in the capital, fulfilling their production goal by 101 percent. During July, this figure will increase to 7,750 pounds a day. We know this figure seems a little contradictory because the production plan has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, the consumption of bread is very large. It is higher than what they planned for. I will refer to this later.

In reference to last night's meeting at the provincial people's government, strict organizational measures were taken to guarantee, first of all, good distribution of flour to bakeries, pizzerias, and other stores. Secondly, to guarantee more strict controls over the product so that nothing is wasted.

In conclusion Daniel, and this is my very personal opinion that has nothing to do with what the comrade minister said, the lack of other items, such as tubers, also creates an explosion in the consumption of sweet breads and other products, and there is currently a lack of tubers in the capital.

Bad Weather Affects Ciego de Avila Plantains
FL0607141389 Havana Television Service in Spanish
0000 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Almost 40 percent of the plantain crop in Ciego de Avila has been affected by bad weather. Provincial workers are making every effort to reestablish the crops before 26 July.

The La Cuba Harvest Enterprise in Ciego de Avila's Baragua Municipality, which is the nation's largest plantain producer, reported that almost 300,000 quintales of crops, which were to be harvested this year, have been damaged by winds that ranged between 80 and 100 km per hour. These winds battered the crops last Monday [3 July] afternoon.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording] We have already started work on reestablishing the crops, this is what is going on here now. We are going to take several agro-technical measures which are superior to the ones originally planned. Hopefully, this will help solve the problem of having lost some of the crops due to this disaster. Presently, we are mobilizing all the workers from our enterprise and the province is mobilizing as well, this means people from all municipalities will help us with this task. [end recording]

The information available is still preliminary. However, estimates indicate that almost 40 percent of the crops have been affected. This means that 750,000 quintales have been affected in Ciego de Avila. Besides satisfying national consumption needs, plantain will also be the raw material for the future, and first, plantain pulp plant in Cuba.

Progress Made on Restoration of Telephone Plant
FL0707014089 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1700 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] In 2 months, 21.3 percent of the Agila and Dragones telephone plant has been restored. That is one-fifth of the plant. This means that steel structures have been assembled and equipment has been installed for the plant's phone lines.

The current stage is the most difficult. Workers will install 60 km of interior cables with more than a million connections. After this stage has been completed, internal testing will begin on 17,000 machines that select each

digit dialed in a phone call. Patience and knowledge are required in this work. Each cable has a chronological order that cannot be changed. To guarantee quality, all the connections are checked.

In conjunction with this task, two other groups of specialists are restoring the exterior cables, the installations, and equipment for users. The technicians, operators, and engineers that comprise the (Oscar Carbayeira) brigade of the Claudio Arguelles contingent say that once they have all the necessary technical and material resources, subscribers with damaged phones should be able to make phone calls by 26 July 1990.

Belize

Honorary Consul in Panama Dismissed FL0607170089 Bridgetown CANA in English 1447 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Belize, July 6, CANA—The Belize Government of Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel has dismissed its honorary consul in Panama, Naim Musa, in what observers see as an apparent attempt to distance itself from allegations about the sale of passports and "economic citizenship."

Musa was informed by telex last week that: "The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Dean Barrow, had approved the termination of your appointment as consul, which was for five years." He was appointed to that post in May 1984. But the minister of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Samuel Rhaburn, went on the state-controlled radio and television stations to announce that Musa was removed "because he has been issuing Belizean visas to Asian people despite clear instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Musa flew into Belize over the weekend to deny "certain false allegations made against me in the local press, on the Belize Broadcasting Network, radio and TV".

"I have done nothing improper in the issue of any visa nor have I violated any instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have telex messages to prove that every visa issued by me was done in accordance with proper procedure," Musa said at a press conference on Wednesday. "It is patently ridiculous and absurd to blame me for the number of Asians present in Belize. I will not allow myself to be used as a scapegoat by anyone."

He says he intends challenging the matter in court. Naim Musa is the brother of attorney, Said Musa, who is also the chairman of the opposition People's United Party.

El Salvador

FMLN Denies Attacking Supreme Court President PA0607212789 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1200 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] issued a communique a few hours ago denying that it directed an attack against Supreme Court of Justice President Mauricio Gutierrez Castro.

The rebel communique reads: On the afternoon of 2 July, FMLN guerrillas carried out propaganda activity and occupied 8 km of the road to La Libertad port, between the km 14 and 21 markers, where they erected a barricade. The guerrillas added that they stopped approximately 200 vehicles to meet and exchange views with the drivers.

At the km 14 marker, a vehicle in which (Roberto Matis Regalado's) bodyguards were riding arrived, but the driver did not obey the order to stop, provoking a clash with our units. Two men were wounded and one woman was killed in that incident.

Our forces reported that they seized one M-16 rifle and one .45-caliber pistol. The FMLN document adds that minutes later, at the km 21 marker, the Supreme Court of Justice president's bodyguards tried to surprise our fighters and another clash occurred. During the clash, one bodyguard was killed and the ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance] official was wounded.

Paragraph three of the communique adds that the armed propaganda activities along the La Libertad Port-San Salvador route are aimed at distributing propaganda and at destabilizing this vital route used by government officials and military men to travel to their private clubs located along the coast.

The FMLN, the document adds, reiterates its determination to stop those involved in the genocidal war—those who every day shell the rural areas and persecute and murder peasants, workers, and students—from taking it easy and relaxing at their clubs and in their exclusive neighborhoods. The attack on the National Police station at the Manuel Jose Arce military neighborhood follows this same line of destabilization. Therefore, we call on our people to pay attention to the recommendations and orders issued by our fighters in order to prevent regrettable losses. We warn bodyguards and security guards that we will fight those who are armed and who offer resistance.

The FMLN communique released a few hours ago concludes: We reiterate that we will continue to abide by our revolutionary principles and stick to the truth. We did not participate in incidents such as the attack against [Presidency Minister] Antonio Rodriguez Porth and Edgar Chacon [ideologue of the Orlando de Sola Group]. These incidents resulted from a war within ARENA ranks, and we warn that acts of repression unleashed by the government against popular and democratic movements will not go unpunished and will receive a strong response from our forces.

This was the recent FMLN communique on the incidents that occurred on 2 July on the road to La Libertad port, where the president of the Supreme Court of Justice was wounded.

Cristiani Says State of Siege Not Necessary PA0707043389 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1800 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Report by David Marciano Rivas on interview with President Alfredo Cristiani "at a local hotel" in San Salvador on 5 July]

[Text] Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani said today that although rightist sectors have demanded that the government suspend individual rights, he will not establish a state of siege because present circumstances do not

warrant such a measure. He said that he held an emergency meeting with the Armed Forces High Command this week to analyze the remarkable increase in violence in the country and the measures that could be applied in the next few days. He said: In the meeting, we agreed that current conditions do not call for declaring a state of siege. It is best to seek other legal alternatives to counteract the violence.

On 3 July, the Peace and Work Crusade demanded that President Cristiani establish a state of siege in the country, a measure described as urgently needed to stop the escalation of violence in El Salvador. Cristiani believes that establishing a state of siege would require consideration of the opinions of various national sectors. This is Cristiani speaking at a local hotel this morning:

[Begin recording] [Cristiani] If we must be fair, we must consider the various national sectors' opinions. We have analyzed several alternatives and believe that there has been a misunderstanding regarding the penal code amendments. We want to listen to and consider other people's opinions, according to the law. We do not wish to curtail freedoms inherent in democracy, such as freedom of the press, expression, or movement. We do not intend to do this at all. Nevertheless, anyone mistaking freedom for license will be punished.

The nation in general wants to live in peace and safety without having to worry about mobs setting cars and gas stations on fire just because they want to do so. We want to end terrorism. We do not intend to harm the news media or any kind of organization. They have nothing to fear as long as they abide by the law. However, the current situation does not warrant a state of siege. I discussed this with the Armed Forces High Command and the Presidency minister during a 3 July meeting. We believe it is best to seek other legal means to end the violence without curtailing the freedoms inherent in democracy.

[Reporter] Would you like to comment on the attack against the Supreme Court of Justice president and the murder of Chacon [Edgard Chacon, ideologue of the Orlando de Sola group]?

[Cristiani] I think that both attacks are proof of the FMLN's [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] irrationality and savagery and the little importance that they attach to human life. [end recording]

Cristiani added that despite the violent clashes between the Army and the guerrillas in various locations throughout the country over the past few hours, his government is willing to talk with the FMLN at any time in order to seek a solution to end the armed conflict. The FMLN staged a military maneuver, called—Let Us Defeat the Dirty War and the ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance] Government's Repression—in nearly 10 towns

in the country's interior on 4 July, in which they claimed to have inflicted 182 casualties on government troops. The Army reported that the rebels sustained 57 casualties in these actions.

Cristiani said that the guerrillas' latest attacks correspond to a plan that had previously been reported to the Army. He said that the rebels' plan consisted of launching attacks between June and September to provoke the government into carrying out illegal actions; he added that the FMLN will not succeed. The FMLN's provocations have coincided with a discussion in the United States and other countries on aid for El Salvador. Cristiani concluded that no contacts have been made recently between his government and the FMLN. However, he pointed out that Costa Rican President Oscar Arias has graciously offered to facilitate a rapprochement between both sides to end the armed conflict in El Salvador.

Archbishop Insists on Church Role in Dialogue
PA0707032289 San Salvador La Voz Panamericana
in Spanish 1400 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Homily by Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas during mass at the Metropolitan Cathedral in San Salvador—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Our condemnation of the murders of Colonel Roberto Armando Rivera, director of the Fire Department, and Edgar Chacon, director of the Institute of International Relations, must be categorical and clear. Nobody has the right to kill his brothers. Life belongs to the Lord. Any attempt to solve El Salvador's problems through these methods means plunging our homeland into the abyss of total madness.

Before blood was shed on our city's streets, the issue of the dialogue had been the focus of public interest. Another issue discussed was the role of the church. When a diplomat asked me if we would continue to work for a dialogue, I answered that the church must prolong Christ's mission throughout history, which is also symbolized by the story of the Good Samaritan.

How can one remain indifferent when a people are lying on the side of the road, victims of unjust seizures, murders, kidnappings, executions, acts of sabotage, strikes, and the like? However, we must not be content with toning down the conflict. We must continue working without rest to end the war through rational and peaceful means.

Here is where a dialogue is an irreplaceable [word indistinct] method. There are many ways to work for a dialogue, and we must be happy that so many people want to contribute to it. When positive methods appear to be the weapons of choice, those who are working for a dialogue must be more active, [word indistinct] and hoping against all odds that it will be so. [passage omitted]

Guatemala

Defense Minister Delivers Army Day Speech

PA0607192289 Guatemala City EL GRAFICO
in Spanish 2 Jul 89 pp 12, 13

[Speech by Defense Minister Hector Alejandro Gramajo on 30 June, Army Day; place not given]

[Text] Military power will only be used to promote the nation's sacred interests, to support lawfully established institutions, and to work for our country's development and progress. I ended my speech on 30 June last year with these words. I repeat them this year and will repeat them again if necessary.

Throughout this commemorative speech today, I wish I could have expressed my gratitude and recognition to all the soldiers for their selflessness and devotion to the nation's good, most particularly to those who sacrificed their lives to do their sacred duty, but I must express this gratitude to their distinguished families instead.

I would have liked to tell the Guatemalan people about the soldier's life; his ups and downs; his sorrows and suffering; his everyday hopes; his weariness in the mountains, the jungle, the prairies, the rivers, the lakes, the seas, and the skies of our homeland; and how he silently suffers from his wounds.

I would have liked to do so on this date because many people are unfamiliar with our institution's inner workings and with the details of the Guatemalan defense mechanism.

However, I cannot do so today—the day of the Guatemalan soldier—because I must go back to past pages of our calendar and, like last year, delve into other matters concerning our society. These are problems related to ethics and moral and civic values, which are taken so lightly by some people and which we must openly discuss because they are important to our nation's dignity, our civic conscience, and to maintaining an attitude in line with our nation's fundamental principles and rules.

I am referring to people who still insist on knocking at the doors of the garrisons to resolve political problems or to try to fulfill personal needs, showing deep political underdevelopment with these attitudes, compromising the Army's prestige, and making Guatemala appear in the eyes of the civilized world as a nation of poor people and weak institutions.

Therefore, today it is fair to again remember Justo Rufino Barrios and Miguel Garcia Granados who, as part of a momentous reform movement 118 years ago, transformed the Guatemalan Army and turned it into a professional corps to serve the country as a unit and to let political and economic institutions fight their own battles.

These thoughts were enshrined in the political Constitution of the Republic, which includes a clear definition of the Army's functions, as follows. It is an institution intended to safeguard Guatemala's independence, sovereignty, honor, territorial integrity, internal and external peace and security, and to be apolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative. The president of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the Army. He imparts his orders through the defense minister. The members of the Guatemalan Army in active service are governed by the principles of obedience and discipline and cannot make requests of a political nature or to exercise the right to petition in a collective manner.

In addition, I must emphasize that the Constitution also stipulates that power emanates from the people and that no person, segment of the people, or armed or political force can abrogate the exercise thereof. The people have established adequate institutions with functions that are very clearly defined to resolve all of society's problems and each of them must fulfill its functions.

We, the soldiers, have clearly understood our position in society and this gives dignity to our institution. We have developed a broad concept that allows us to clearly establish the difference between political pressure by parties and groups and our nation's genuine interests.

This broad concept is the basis for our strength, but many have refused or failed to understand it. Ours is the institution that is preparing the most for the future of this country; we are training officers for the future, and those who still believe that our Army has not evolved are quite wrong.

The confrontation between groups and group interests within our country's social forces has led to mixing the national problem with the international problem of systems and doctrines, translating the ideological factors of the cold war to our own soil.

In detriment to our development, this attitude persists in the minds of some groups that do not understand the changes taking place in closed societies and new relations between nations. Hence, is this a national problem or a problem of international ideology?

It is a national problem. It is a problem that affects Guatemala, which is a multinational country trying to achieve its political, social, and economic development; a country rediscovering its own identity of Indian, white, multiracial, and black origin.

Therefore, it is necessary at this time when we are overcoming ideological backwardness that we also set aside political intolerance, that we change our concept of the world divided in two poles. We should realize that if we do not consolidate this process by strengthening our political institutions and society we will never overcome underdevelopment in all fields.

Society cannot develop as a whole unless it has a clear notion of its role as a nation and of its own integration. People should be proud of their history, cultural heritage, and traditions. This fundamental social condition is strengthened in a National Army such as ours, which is a crucible of people and has a clear concept of what it stands for and what it defends. In the same manner that the Armed Institution has again assumed its specific role within the State, social groups have the high responsibility to find solutions to our problems according to the rules established by the people's representatives. In other words, they must be guided by the laws comprising our country's legal framework. By practicing and respecting those laws, we will be able to advance from a state of simple legality to development of a de jure state.

As national defense minister, second in command in the Army's staff, and the professional soldier in active service highest in the hierarchy, it is my duty to declare to the Guatemalan people that: The Army's position under our leadership and guidance is and will be the one established by the Constitution.

We in the High Command are convinced that a nation's security is not exclusively of a military nature, but also includes political, social, and economic aspects.

Therefore, the military believes that a nation's development begins with conscious organization of its society, not only for working purposes, but to struggle for better living conditions. This organization and the strengthening of political institutions as legitimate interpreters of that society will bring about the necessary stability so that capital can create better conditions for our people.

In conclusion, I would like to stress two fundamental aspects:

1. That we are an institution in constant evolution, an Army consciously preparing for the future;
2. That our concept of security is not only circumscribed to the military aspect, because we firmly believe that this is an overall concept, in which political, social, and economic factors are of utmost importance.

Therefore, I reaffirm that military power will only be used on behalf of the highest national interests, in support of the legally established institutions, and as a stabilizing force in seeking the country's development and progress.

Swears In Deputy Defense Minister

PA0607224689 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE
in Spanish 5 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] The Armed Forces' Information and Press Department has reported that General Raul Molina Bedoya was sworn in as the new deputy defense minister. He replaces General Guillermo Arturo de la Cruz, who retired.

The new deputy defense minister was in charge of the military zone in Quetzaltenango, a post that will now be held by Colonel Carlos Luis Rios Mejia.

Defense Minister General Hector Alejandro Gramajo swore in Molina Bedoya during a ceremony at the National Palace.

Honduras

Foreign Ministry on Nicaraguan 'Espionage'

PA0607174489 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network
in Spanish 2153 GMT 5 Jul 89

["Text" of Foreign Ministry Communique No 047-89 issued on 5 July in Tegucigalpa]

[Text] The Honduran Foreign Relations Ministry, based on reports from authorities in charge of security matters related to the interrogation of Captain Adan Solorzano Martinez—an intelligence agent of the Sandinist government—inform the national and international public of the following:

It is a known fact that with the intensification of the arms race by the Sandinist government and the use of Nicaraguan territory as a political and military base for subversive groups, there has been an increase in the number of revolutionary activities, assassinations, terrorist attacks, and other forms of political, economic, and social destabilization in the region.

Over the past 9 years, El Salvador has been the primary target of international subversion and terrorism. Honduras, however, has also been affected by these actions on various occasions.

We recall the deplorable kidnapping of 100 persons at the Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Cortes in 1982; the illegal hijacking of TAN-SAHA aircraft by terrorist commandos who always ended up seeking refuge in Managua or Havana; the planting of two bombs that destroyed power plants in Tegucigalpa; other terrorist acts against Honduras both inside and outside the country; clandestine arms trafficking; and more.

On 27-28 June, the Honduran Government and people were shocked by a statement made in San Pedro Sula by a Nicaraguan citizen who, according to his statements, is an Army captain and intelligence agent for the Sandinist regime. He disclosed that in August 1988, he was assigned a mission to plan the assassination of the president of the Republic and the beheading of the Honduran spiritual and political leadership through the physical elimination of Honduran Archbishop Msgr Hector Enrique Santos and presidential candidates Carlos Roberto Flores and Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero, of the Liberal and National Parties, respectively.

The Sandinist Foreign Ministry responded to these reports by issuing a 29 July 1989 communique, in which it openly admitted that Nicaraguan citizen Orlando Adan Solorzano Martinez was an Army lieutenant—not a captain—and that he had worked for the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry for 7 and ½ years, from 20 August 1979 to 28 January 1987.

The communique added that on 28 January 1987, Solorzano had been fired and that his record showed a long list of disciplinary actions. This explanation very conveniently allows Nicaragua to disassociate itself from the espionage and terrorist activities of its intelligence agent in the event he was caught or deserted. Undoubtedly, the Sandinist government, because of its ideology and its close ties to the financing and training—both politically and militarily—of Central American terrorist groups, has been directly involved at various levels in these groups' criminal activities, which violate international norms on peaceful coexistence and human rights. This situation has given rise to the different peace efforts that have sprung up in the region in order to end these actions. The Honduran security authorities have known for a long time about espionage activities against Honduras and the links between Nicaraguan Embassy personnel in Tegucigalpa and Honduran rebel groups that have been trained in special camps in Nicaragua and other totalitarian countries.

In light of these facts, the Honduran Government issued a letter to the Sandinist government on 7 February 1989, calling on it to abide by Article 11 of the Vienna Convention concerning diplomatic relations and to reduce within 60 days the number of its personnel at its Honduras mission to the number maintained by the Honduran Embassy in Managua. At that time, the Nicaraguan Embassy in Tegucigalpa had 16 diplomatic officials recognized as such by our government and 4 administrative officials. Now, 5 months later, the Sandinist government still has not complied with the request made by the Honduran Government to reduce its personnel voluntarily and currently has 12 diplomatic officials, 4 administrative officers, and 6 domestic employees in its Tegucigalpa office. The Honduran Embassy in Managua has only three diplomatic officials and five administrative officers.

Because of the seriousness of the facts that have been publicly reported, it is hoped that the Nicaraguan Government—at least until the Central American region returns to a state of normalcy—will reduce its personnel to the requested level in Tegucigalpa. This request is stressed because of the statements of the Nicaraguan intelligence agent. Information and Press Directorate Foreign Ministry Tegucigalpa, 5 July 1989

Nicaragua

Vice President Pleased With CNR Document

PA0607182389 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish
1200 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado has pointed out the importance of the document

approved by the National Reconciliation Commission [CNR] despite the wide range of political criteria within the organization. The CNR's document acknowledges that the Nicaraguan Government has fulfilled the presidential agreements signed in Costa del Sol.

[Begin Ramirez recording] ... to consolidate peace in Nicaragua through the institutionalization of the electoral process, the only peaceful, logical way to overcome political differences in the country.

Cardinal Obando y Bravo has also made a very special announcement. He says [the political parties] are to meet with the Supreme Electoral Council [CSE] to discuss the various positions the parties will adopt during the elections and the organizational steps that are being taken.

The statement issued by the CNR—an organization characterized by the diversity of its members' political views—is also very important. It deals with the electoral process scheduled to conclude on 25 February 1990, according to electoral law.

The CNR evidently favors participation in the elections. The language used in the document is indicative of this. I repeat, the elections are the highest form of dialogue available to the country. It constitutes dialogue among all the Nicaraguans who will participate by freely casting their votes.

I must also point out the importance of the CNR's call for the counterrevolutionaries' peaceful demobilization as a means to end the military conflict with the contras in Honduras and strengthen the electoral process. [end recording]

PSC's Ramirez Criticizes Jarquin's 'Maneuver'

PA0607160889 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish
1200 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Text] Criticizing Social Christian leader Agustin Jarquin's maneuver of promising to participate in the elections in February if his party is granted legal status, Erick Ramirez, president of the Social Christian Party, has stated that the Nicaraguan people must identify and denounce false political leaders who surround themselves with an aura of honesty.

[Begin Ramirez recording] It is evident that this is official documentation of the Christian Democratic International, a letter addressed to the president of the International, which obviously could not remain secret because of its nature and its sensitive contents. I believe that, undoubtedly, the Nicaraguan people must discover what current leaders are surrounding themselves with a false aura of honesty; what leaders are pursuing a steadfast and unshakeable opposition line; who resorts to accusations and blackmail against political parties like ours; who follows an independent line; and which leaders and organizations are playing a dirty game together with the Sandinist front.

I believe that the Nicaraguan people must know this because if we want to establish an option to oppose the Sandinists, we cannot build it based on lies, deception, stratagems, and tricks, publicly attacking the Sandinists while sitting to talk, lunch, and conclude agreements of this type with them.

It is true that the Nicaraguan people are disconsolate. They are disconsolate because some people have lent themselves to this kind of maneuver. Many organizations have done this, first with the Somoza regime, and now with the Sandinist regime. [end recording]

UN Secretary General Approves Elections Mission

PA3006180489 Managua Sistema Sandinista Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 29 Jun 89

[Text] UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar has approved sending a mission to observe the February elections. Delegation head Pakistani (Isval Risa) will arrive in Managua next week to finalize preparations.

This agreement between the Nicaragua Government and the United Nations ends much speculation in the U.S. press, which expressed profound opposition to sending the mission.

The group of observers will be tasked with checking the content of electoral registries, submitting reports to the supreme electoral council on irregularities during the electoral campaign, and observing the vote count. The mission will be in Nicaragua during the entire electoral process, possibly beginning on 1 August. It will be headed by (Isval Risa), director of the UN General Assembly's issues [Asuntos] office.

On 8 June, Perez asked the Nicaraguan Government to clarify the role of the observers' mission. Today's agreement will facilitate joint observation of the elections with the OAS. Nicaragua had already requested OAS observation.

D'Escoto Arrives in Madrid, Discusses Elections

PA0407205489 Paris AFP in Spanish 2346 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Text] Madrid, 3 Jul (AFP)—Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto arrived in Madrid today on a private visit. He said that in the Nicaraguan 1990 general elections "the people will support the Sandinist government," despite the difficult time the country, submerged in an "economy of war," is facing.

However, in an arrival statement in Madrid, D'Escoto said that regardless of the results of the elections "the people's will must be respected."

D'Escoto, who also visited the Netherlands and the FRG, said that the "contras" have not been demobilized and that its military organization remains intact. He also described U.S. financial aid to the armed opposition as a "mockery," because "in reality it finances a death machinery."

Nevertheless, he admitted that "the level of the armed conflict" has decreased. He added that armed opposition continues its attacks carried out by groups of three or four individuals "who select strategic places to sow terror and hit the country's economy."

Ortega Dedicates Radio Station Donated by USSR

PA0707041189 Managua Sistema Sandinista Television in Spanish 0200 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] During a day of intensive work, President Daniel Ortega met with the people of Juigalpa and dedicated a new radio station, which will be called Radio (Catarran). The new street that was inaugurated was built by the Sandinist People's Army combatants. President Ortega later dedicated the broadcasting facilities of Radio (Catarran), which has 20 kw of power and which will cover all of the 5th Region and part of the Atlantic coastal region.

[Begin Ortega recording] We want to give special thanks to the Soviet comrades for their donation of this radio station and to the technicians for their work in getting this station ready for today. We also thank the local technicians for contributing to this effort.

Therefore, I declare this station inaugurated, and let us continue working to commemorate its opening in a fitting way—with enthusiasm, optimism, combativeness, work, and effort—during the 10th anniversary of the people's Sandinist revolution.

Viva the people of Juigalpa! [crowd shouts "viva!"] Viva Chontales! [crowd shouts "viva!"] Viva the 5th Region! [crowd shouts "viva!"] Free fatherland... [crowd shouts "or death!"] [applause] [end recording]

Finally, President Ortega, who was accompanied by Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado, held a "Face the People" meeting with small- and medium- scale producers. During the meeting, over 400 homes were distributed among peasants from Boaco and Juigalpa. Also, a debt incurred by the small- and medium- scale industrialists with the National Development Bank was condoned.

Ortega's Independence Message to Zairian President

PA0207234889 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 30 Jun 89 p 4

["Text" of letter from President Daniel Ortega to Zairian President General Mobutu Sese Seko, on the anniversary of Zaire's independence; date and place not given]

[Text] Your Excellency General Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire, on behalf of the people and Government of Nicaragua, and on my own behalf, I wish to express our sincere congratulations on the 29th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Zaire.

I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to reiterate our recognition of your country's valuable contribution toward the common struggle in the defense of the principles and objectives of the nonaligned countries and for just and stable peace in southern Africa.

Likewise, we reaffirm the ties of friendship uniting our peoples. We wish your nation prosperity and hope that the relations between our countries will continue to be strengthened.

Fraternally,

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Panama's Bandon on Sandinist Drug Involvement
*PA0707040089 San Jose Radio Impacto in Spanish
1830 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] Even though the Sandinists have denied involvement in drug trafficking—involvement disclosed during the trial under way in Cuba—there is proof of their participation in this activity. During an exclusive interview with Radio Impacto, Jose Bandon [former Panamanian consul general to New York] said the Sandinists are involved in drug trafficking. Bandon said the agreement signed between the M-19 [19 April Movement] and the Medellin Cartel, which called for carrying out a large drug operation, was supported by Nicaragua in 1983. Following the Colombian Government's strong actions against the Medellin Cartel, the cartel's leaders decided to take some of their operations elsewhere. They reached agreements with Manuel Antonio Noriega to build a cocaine-processing laboratory in Darien Province, Panama, and with Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge to build another such laboratory in Nicaragua. Bandon explained:

[Begin recording] In 1983 and 1984, the Medellin Cartel began expanding its activities to certain countries. The cartel built laboratories. The U.S. courts have photographs of the Medellin Cartel's presence in Colombia, excuse me, in Nicaragua. After the assassination of [Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo] Lara Bonilla in late April or early May 1984, the Medellin Cartel leaders, over 100 of them, sought refuge in Panama. The cartel's top leaders, including Escobar, Ochoa, and Gaviria, traveled from Panama to Managua. They were flown there by Floyd Carlton and [Mario] Bilonic under Noriega's sponsorship. They went to Managua to continue their drug trafficking operations.

In addition, the M-19 (?set up) part of its operations in Managua. The entire Nicaraguan intelligence system was involved in this drug operation. As I said earlier, the DEA and the U.S. Government have photographs to prove this. The DEA and [word indistinct] worked together to uncover part of the operation.

Furthermore, if you closely follow the trial under way in Havana, you will see that Tony de la Guardia, one of the defendants most involved in the drug trafficking activities, has said that when General Arnaldo Ochoa was in Managua, he contacted other drug traffickers. Tony de la Guardia and [former Cuban Interior Minister Jose] Abrantes were the Cuban Interior Ministry's men in these operations. Tony de la Guardia and Abrantes coordinated their operations with the [passage indistinct] illegal activities carried out in Nicaragua. [end recording]

Jose Bandon also said Fidel Castro, Gen Noriega, and the Sandinists have implemented a strategy to destabilize Central America. Regarding the Cuba-Nicaragua-Panama axis, Bandon said that [word indistinct] the Sandinists and Noriega have been involved in illegal operations that are not only related to drug trafficking but also the trafficking of [words indistinct] to Panama and the United States. [passage indistinct] Bandon added that the illegal activities and the [words indistinct] are related. He recalled that in 1989 the only two countries that offered support to Gen Noriega were Cuba and Nicaragua. Bandon said Fidel Castro continues to support Noriega even though their ideologies differ, because this is part of the plan to take over Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras:

[Begin recording] [Words indistinct] the domestic political problems experienced by Costa Rica's democracy. There is an external aggression against the Costa Rican people. The Costa Rican people must be aware of this. The Cuba-Nicaragua-Panama axis is bent on attacking the democracies and [words indistinct], especially against the Costa Rican political structures, against the Salvadoran president, and against Honduras. They have distributed the different tasks among themselves. Panama attacks Costa Rica, Cuba undermines Costa Rica's domestic political situation, and Nicaragua is responsible for attacking Honduras and El Salvador. [end recording]

EPS Kills 4 Contras in 2-3 July Skirmishes
*PA0607223989 Managua Sistema Sandinista
Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Text] Six peasants were seriously injured during a counterrevolutionary attack on 2 July in the Lower Bilampi area, southeast of Matagalpa. The attack was repelled by a Sandinist People's Army [EPS] military unit, which killed two contras and confiscated nine AK rifles, one M-79 rocket launcher, nine knapsacks, and one bag of first aid supplies.

A group of contras attacked an EPS unit on 3 July, and two contras were killed in the ensuing clash.

Panama

Dignity Battalions Send Letter To Gen Cisneros *PA0607154189 Panama City CRITICA in Spanish* 6 Jul 89 pp 16, 17

["Text" of letter dated 4 July delivered to General Marc Cisneros on 5 July by Dignity Battalion Commanders Benjamin Colamarco, Enrique Thompson, (Ret) Major Arturo Martinez, and Chief of Staff Guillermo Ledezma Bradley]

[Text] Panama, 4 July, 1989
General Mark Cisneros, Chief of the U.S. Army South Canal Area, Panama, Republic of Panama
General Cisneros:

Two hundred and thirteen years ago—on a 4th of July—the U.S. people, led by General George Washington, sealed their independence from the British imperialism, thus writing an exemplary page in the history of mankind.

That heroic deed, carried out by men born in the New World, advocated from the beginning principles that permitted foreseeing for our continent a destiny in which all traces of domination or restrictions on the freedom, independence, self-determination and sovereignty of the people were eliminated forever.

In the same proportion, the centuries and the years that have passed since that 4th of July have separated current U.S. soldiers from the noble purposes that encouraged their military ancestors in their struggle against the British colonialist army at that time. Evidence of this is the distressing nuances this celebration has, as in the preceding year, for Panamanians.

General Cisneros, this 4th of July celebration has a bitter interventionist meaning for us, in a personal way, which you represent at this time.

Despite the U.S. Stars and Stripes that may decorate your military uniform, you are a Latin. Because of this, you should understand and defend our cause. However, the bitter truth is that you are against us, which is also a way to be against your own race.

It has not been us, Latin Americans, who have opened the painful abyss in our relations with the United States. It has been them, those at the White House, at the financial "trusts," at the CIA, at the Pentagon, and in the Senate, the ones who have imposed a second-class status upon our nations and upon life in this hemisphere that seek to support your hegemonic presence at the cost of our main resources.

In his prophetic Jamaica Letter, Liberator Simon Bolivar predicted, with foresight, the devastation the United States would perpetrate among us while carrying out its

so-called Manifest Destiny, which simply consists of adapting the "Spirit of '76" to the worshipping of the dollar, to make that glorious quest for independence into a mockery of the past.

Gen Cisneros, you are playing a sad role in history. You are serving as proconsul of an imperialist force that is occupying a country that is armed only with its courage and determination to be free in order to counter the biggest Western power.

In light of your appointment, you are the U.S. military commander who is willing to rewrite the blackest pages in the history of U.S. policy throughout the world: Soldiers like you directed the nefarious Vietnam war, the invasions of the Dominican Republic, the Bay of Pigs, and Grenada; outrages like those committed in Guatemala; and the slaughter of nationalist youths such as the Panamanians who were murdered on 9 January 1964.

Gen Cisneros, perhaps you do not understand the devious schemes of the empire, like the one appointing a soldier of your origin as chief of the Southern Command [as published] troops. This is not a coincidence, even though you have been deceived and will deceive yourself into believing that, through this appointment, military personnel of your ethnic background are being honored. Actually, this appointment was meant to provide the greatest offense and sorrow possible to the Latin American people. This is a way of telling the world that the power of imperialism is such that a general with Latin American roots can march as commander of U.S. troops and carry out an invasion of a nation that could very well be the fatherland of his own ancestors.

What the United States wants to demonstrate is that the ideal of unity in the Americas, as promoted by our independence fighters, is only a dream that can be broken by the sound of the coins—just like the Biblical pieces of silver. That is what it is all about, Gen Cisneros.

That is why, on this 4th of July, the Panamanian people are in more pain this year than last year, even though we join with the American people in celebrating the glory of their freedom. Why are we pained? Because a general named Cisneros—without any apparent family ties to Salvador Cisneros [Cuban patriot who began a revolution in 1868; president of the Republic of Cuba 1873-75 and 1895-97], who, when he fought for his fatherland, was fighting for the great fatherland, all of Latin America—is now willing to fight against us, his own blood.

Gen Cisneros, that is what we wanted to tell you in this open letter, and we wanted to remind you that here, in this peaceful and native America that seeks sovereignty, there is a people that will not be intimidated by all the U.S. military strength. We represent a nation that is proud of its ancestors and culture. This nation is supported by the courage and determination of most of its people. The people are willing to make a sacrifice of love and to offer their own lives to continue to deserve the

honor, dignity, and privilege of being Panamanians and Latin Americans, without having to be ashamed or ever having to surrender at all. Sincerely yours, Patriotic Coordinating Command of the Dignity Brigade Commander Benjamin Colamarco (doctor) Commander Enrique Thompson (architect) Commander (retired) Major Arturo Marquez Guillermo Ledezma Bradley (architect), chief of staff St Michael Archangel Battalion Latin Liberation Battalion 16 December Torrijist Command Battalion Sovereignty Battalion Fatherland Battalion Rosa Elena Landecho Battalion Indian Chief Nome Battalion Atacara Battalion Los Santos Free Battalion Coclesito 205 Battalion Tuiria Sentinel Battalion Admiral Christopher Columbus Battalion Omar's Dignity Battalion Omar Torrijos Herrera Battalion Nele Kantule Battalion Sipir-Market-Sate Battalion Generational Victory Battalion Gustavo Armuelles Battalion "For Panama, our lives"

U.S. Helicopters Buzz FDP Hqs; Company Deploys
*PA0707010289 Panama City Televisora Nacional
in Spanish 2350 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] Continuing the wave of provocations against and disrespect for the Panamanian people and Government by the U.S. Army, U.S. helicopters buzzed the Panama Defense Forces' [FDP] headquarters in Panama City's Chorrillo District this afternoon.

This new act of intimidation took place at approximately 1500, when one Ranger and two Cobra helicopters swooped down on the vicinity of the FDP headquarters, on Chorrillo, and on Ancon Hill before the eyes of stunned and indignant civilian residents, who once again found their lives threatened by the U.S. Army's irresponsibility.

It should be noted that these military helicopters flew at such a low altitude that anyone could see with the naked eye the rockets and other sophisticated weapons they carried as if they were on a battlefield.

In view of the situation, a detachment from the 4th Infantry Company—the Urraca Company—took up positions in various places in the Chorrillo area. They deployed anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers to repel a possible attack.

Government, Opposition on National Dialogue

Minister Reiterates Willingness

*PA0607225989 Panama City Circuito RPC Television
in Spanish 2300 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Interview with Rodolfo Chiari, government and justice minister and acting foreign minister, by unidentified reporter; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Chiari] I understand the president has received a note from the OAS secretary general confirming that the OAS delegation is willing to come to Panama once an agenda for talks has been agreed on.

[Reporter] Do you think the conditions are adequate for the parties involved to sit down and talk?

[Chiari] I believe they are. According to statements by [opposition leader Guillermo] Endara, the opposition is willing to talk without preconditions. This opens the way for talks and an eventual agreement.

[Reporter] Then why have the talks not begun?

[Chiari] Because the opposition leaders were setting conditions for preparing an agenda. They wanted to impose certain conditions we could not accept. It would have meant the meeting would revolve around certain points they are interested in discussing. In light of the above, we could not sit down to talk.

[Reporter] Do you believe that a meeting should be held to draft the agenda and then establish the points to be discussed?

[Chiari] It has already been said that an agenda will be drafted. Once this is done, the opposition will sit down to talk, probably with the help of the OAS delegation. The OAS delegates said that once the agenda is drafted, they are willing to return to Panama.

[Reporter] Political observers and the people in general, however, feel that the government is not interested in sitting down with the opposition to discuss the political situation that has led us into this crisis.

[Chiari] I think you should stop to count the number of times that the government, through the Executive Branch, other organizations, and progovernment political parties, has called on the opposition to sit down and talk. We believe this dialogue is of great importance for the country.

[Reporter] When do you think the OAS delegation will return to Panama?

[Chiari] I cannot give you a date. We do not know yet.

PRD's Duque on Talks

*PA0707045289 Panama City Televisora Nacional
in Spanish 2300 GMT 5 Jul 89*

[Interview with Carlos Duque Jaen, president of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and former presidential candidate of the National Liberation Coalition (COLINA), by unidentified reporter in Panama City; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Duque] Today we held a working meeting with the PRD's [Democratic Revolutionary Party] Public Servants Front to obtain a document containing the conclusions of the Fifth Torrijist Reflection Meeting [Encuentro de Reflección Torrijista] held by the political

committees on 2 July in Penonome. On 10 July we will meet again with the Public Servants Front to study all agreements and points discussed during that Torrijist meeting.

[Reporter] Would the PRD be willing to accept the opposition's call to participate in a national dialogue to include COLINA parties and the Panama Defense Forces?

[Duque] Sure. The PRD has repeatedly expressed its willingness and desire to participate in a dialogue among Panamanians to compile an inventory of the causes and problems of the crisis in order to discuss them at the negotiating table. I am not now as pessimistic about the national dialogue as I was a few days ago, because today I learned about ADOC [Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance] leaders' statements that they are willing to participate in a tripartite dialogue. I believe that the chief executive must now take the appropriate steps to open that great national dialogue.

ADOC Issues Proposal

PA0707003189 Panama City Circuito RPC Television
in Spanish 2346 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Communique issued by the Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC) in Panama City on 6 July—read by former ADOC presidential candidate Guillermo Endara]

[Text] The proposal calls for:

1. The immediate beginning of the negotiations suggested by the OAS mission;
2. In light of the fact that the ADOC and the COLINA [National Liberation Coalition] presidential slates are well known, we suggest that the Panama Defense Forces [FDP] immediately announce the names of the high-ranking officers who will represent the FDP;
3. In order to agree upon the practical aspects of initiating the dialogue, each of the parties involved will appoint a representative. We have submitted the name of our chosen representative to the apostolic nuncio [Jose Sebastian Laboa], and we hope that the others will do likewise so that on 8 July at 0900, the representatives will meet at the Apostolic Nunciature;
4. If the negotiations are to begin on 10 July, the people will be advised no later than 14 July whether—begin quote—a national agreement to ensure, within a democratic framework and as soon as possible, the transfer of power with full respect for the people's sovereign will—end quote—has been reached in accordance with the 17 May OAS resolution.

This communique was signed today, 6 July 1989, by yours truly, Guillermo Endara, and by Dr Ricardo Arias Calderon [former ADOC first vice presidential candidate] and Guillermo Ford [former ADOC second vice presidential candidate].

Endara Urges Dialogue

PA0707002289 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA in Spanish 5 Jul 89 pp 1, B10

[Report by Editor in Chief Juan Carlos Duque]

[Text] Without ruling out the possibility of direct talks with General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Guillermo Endara Galimany, former presidential candidate of the Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance [ADOC], yesterday once again reiterated his willingness and that of his former running mates to begin a process of dialogue and negotiation between ADOC, the Panama Defense Forces [FDP], and COLINA [National Liberation Coalition].

Endara stressed that on various occasions and through various mediators he has tried to promote a dialogue between himself and Gen Noriega, but unfortunately, "for reasons that cannot be blamed on anyone, that dialogue has not been held."

Endara's statement to LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA came 4 days after ADOC expressed its "disappointment" over a recent note issued by the OAS foreign ministers through the OAS secretary general, which stressed that "the parties involved should begin a negotiations process" as a condition for the return to Panama of the OAS foreign ministers for a third round of talks with the opposition, progovernment groups, and the FDP.

"I have always been willing to participate in a dialogue. Former Vice Presidential Candidates Ricardo Arias Calderon and Guillermo Ford and the ADOC parties have given me a vote of confidence in that regard," Endara stressed. He added, nevertheless, that "neither Noriega nor I are indispensable in the dialogue. We have insisted that the dialogue must be between the military—which should be represented by high-ranking FDP officers—and ADOC representatives."

Endara said, however, that it would be preferable if the negotiations took place between the former ADOC candidates, FDP representatives, and COLINA representatives.

"I would prefer not to negotiate alone for the opposition. I believe it would be better if the ADOC candidates and two advisers participated," Endara stressed, adding that COLINA could also participate with two advisers.

Endara said a meeting between himself and Gen Manuel Antonio Noriega could "break the ice," but he clarified that he is not "seeking a bilateral meeting but a meeting among all the presidential candidates."

Asked about the role the Catholic Church or the apostolic nuncio could play in the dialogue, Endara said they could be mediators; however, he recalled that both the church and the nunciature have said any such mediation must be requested by the parties involved.

Endara said ADOC would accept the church as mediator, adding that "perhaps the nuncio would be the best mediator, but this will depend on whether our interlocutors accept or propose it."

Endara said that aside from the role being played by the OAS, "there are no possibilities in sight for that dialogue." He added: "However, we are open for that dialogue, as we were throughout the election campaign."

"We have always been—and many people can vouch for that—willing to participate in a dialogue without preconditions," Endara said.

Regarding the various formulas proposed to begin a dialogue, Endara said that each time a meeting or dialogue with Gen Noriega was mentioned, Endara requested that both sides be accompanied by a "silent witness" to "guarantee objectiveness." So far there has been no objection to that request, he said.

Endara noted that ADOC has asked the FDP to announce the points it would like to propose and would be willing to discuss in a dialogue.

On current events in the Panamanian political scene, Endara expressed doubts over the results of a meeting among progovernment political parties and the Authentic Arnulfist Panamenist Party last weekend. He said he knew nothing about the possibility of ADOC participating in that dialogue, because "the participants are civilians who are political instruments of the military, while we want an effective dialogue with the military."

Solis Palma Criticizes Venezuela's Perez, U.S.
*PA0607034989 Paris AFP in Spanish 0152 GMT
4 Jul 89*

[Text] Caracas, 3 Jul (AFP)—Panamanian President Manuel Solis Palma has said he is surprised at the "complacency toward U.S. President George Bush" shown by his Venezuelan counterpart Carlos Andres Perez, which Solis hinted could even lead to a break in relations between Caracas and Panama. Perez, who once supported the nationalist struggle led by the late Panamanian General Omar Torrijos, has recalled his ambassador to Panama.

In an exclusive interview with the Caracas daily ECONOMIA HOY, Solis Palma said he believes Perez's position "is mainly a result of the (domestic) problems that have led him to show total complacency toward Bush's demands."

"Perez seems to have an obsession with Noriega," the Panamanian president stressed.

Solis Palma called the Panamanian opposition's stance "unacceptable," because the opposition insists that "it won the elections and must assume power on 1 September."

"The elections were annulled by a tribunal that was fully empowered to do so according to the Constitution and the laws," the Panamanian head of state stressed.

The Panamanian president added that "only 201 of the vote-tally sheets from 4,255 voting tables have been received. Maybe the Catholic Church, the bishops, and the opposition parties have the vote-tally sheets. If so, that is unacceptable because they are public documents that belong to the Electoral Tribunal."

Solis harshly criticized U.S. meddling in Panama's affairs and said "the money for the opposition's payroll is supplied by the U.S. Embassy." Panama's situation would be like that of Cuba if Fidel Castro ever said: "We are going to hold elections, and we will allow every Cuban in Miami and anyone wishing to become a naturalized Cuban to come to Cuba and vote against the Cuban revolution."

The Panamanian head of state said: "This is too much; it is impossible and unacceptable. Based on our experience, we have warned Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega: They are going to fill Nicaragua with Hondurans carrying Nicaraguan identity cards, and they are going to play every trick on you. Then they will claim that you lost the elections because the U.S. Government's full machinery will sway public opinion through disinformation."

"This is what we suffered here during the elections. We did not lose the elections on 7 May. We could not win or lose them then. The elections were lost 3 months earlier, because international public opinion had been brainwashed and was ready to say that the opposition won the Panamanian elections," Solis added.

As for General Manuel Antonio Noriega stepping down as commander of the Panama Defense Forces, Solis said: "If Panama signaled to the United States that we are prepared to reach an understanding with it, I assure you that in a matter of weeks the United States would say that Noriega has nothing to do with drug trafficking and that our government is the best in the world."

Bishop Addresses Current 'Crisis,' Church Role
*PA0307134189 Panama City ACAN in Spanish
2100 GMT 2 Jul 89*

[Text] Panama City, 2 Jul (ACAN-EFE)—Regarding the crisis Panama has been experiencing since the annulment of the 7 May elections, Panama's Auxiliary Bishop,

Jose Luis Lacunza, said today that Panamanians are placed in a position where they must choose between a system of "truth and justice" and one of "fraud and injustice."

Bishop Lacunza said: "This is a crucial time for Panama. What is at stake is not one single man, a political system, or a form of government. What is at stake for us Panamanians is whether we live under a system of truth, freedom, and justice or under a system of fraud, oppression, and injustice."

Bishop Lacunza referred to the Panamanian crisis during a ceremony hosted by the Archdiocese Commission in honor of all of Panama's bishops on the occasion of the celebration of the religious festivities of Saints Peter and Paul. Approximately 200 people attended the ceremony.

Bishop Lacunza stressed that the Catholic Church has ethical, not technical, functions. Loyalty to the Gospel and its commitment to serve men often entails criticism of actions and attitudes that attack both the Gospel and men. Bishop Lacunza wondered: "If we are supposed to proclaim freedom, how can we be silent in the face of oppression, division, robbery, violence, and fraud?"

The Panamanian Electoral Tribunal annulled the presidential elections 3 days after they were held, alledging a number of irregularities during the elections, including the stealing of vote tally sheets. Both progovernment and opposition candidates claim to have won the Panamanian presidential elections.

Urges Dialogue

PA0307150089 Paris AFP in Spanish 2159 GMT
2 Jul 89

[Text] Panama City, 2 Jul (AFP)—Today, the Panamanian Catholic Church urged the government and the opposition to act "responsibly, patriotically, and promptly" and to begin a dialogue to solve the current political crisis resulting from the annulment of the 7 May elections.

Panama's Auxiliary Bishop Msgr Oscar Brown, regarded as a moderate figure in the Church hierarchy, told AFP: "We must act responsibly and avoid a prolongation of the crisis because we are running a race against time." The prelate warned that the prolongation of the conflict could "ruin possibilities for peaceful solutions" and force people to choose "violent alternatives."

The release of the political prisoners (approximately 120), the return to the country of all those in exile, and the duty to respect the results of the 7 May elections—which, according to the Church and foreign observers, were won by the Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC)—are issues "that should be discussed," Msgr Brown said.

As for economic and diplomatic pressures exercised by the U.S. Government against the government of Manuel Solis Palma, Msgr Brown said that, at the same time: "We must struggle to defend our sovereignty."

Brown said the bishops are concerned that the "crisis and the country's deterioration will continue" after 1 September, when Solis' presidential term is supposed to end.

Last month, an OAS mission proposed a tripartite dialogue in Panama with the participation of the opposition, the Armed Forces, and the government in order to seek "formulas for agreement" and to settle the transfer of power in Panama.

Although the three groups expressed their willingness to draft an agenda and begin talks "without preconditions," none of the parties involved has taken any effective steps in this direction. Brown requested "goodwill from the parties involved" and warned that "every minute counts because solutions will become increasingly difficult as time passes."

Archbishop Calls Regime 'Military Dictatorship'

PA0607043289 Buenos Aires REUTER in Spanish
0332 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Text] Lima, 3 Jul (REUTER)—In an interview published today in Lima, Panama's Archbishop Marcos Gregorio McGrath described his country's regime as a "military dictatorship" and charged that government forces killed a crippled priest.

In a report published by the daily EL CALLAO, McGrath said Panama's Catholic Church "is being harassed through constant stories in the government newspapers against me as well as other bishops and members of the church."

"My house was surrounded by soldiers who fired at the windows. In addition, a crippled priest was killed in Chiriqui," McGrath said.

EL CALLAO quotes a witness who identified the priest as Nicolas Van Kleef of the Order of St Paul, who was killed by a member of the Panama Defense Forces on 7 May, the day elections were held in Panama. EL CALLAO has been publishing a series of interviews conducted by its Editor in Chief Ricardo Sanchez Serra during a recent trip to Panama.

McGrath said it is highly unlikely that an agreement will be reached by the government and the opposition forces following the annulment of the elections.

"The overwhelming majority of the Panamanian people voted for the opposition, which is headed by Guillermo Endara. The Panamanian people wanted to replace this regime, which we have described as a military dictatorship," the archbishop said.

Peasant Leaders Willing To Defend Fatherland
PA0607032089 Panama City LA REPUBLICA
in Spanish 4 Jul 89 p 2

[Report by Ruben Dario Diaz C.]

[Text] Twenty thousand peasants from the mountains of Colon, Cocle, and Panama City are only awaiting word from Panama Defense Forces [FDP] Commander General Manuel Antonio Noriega to defend the fatherland with their lives, in view of the threats and provocations by the U.S. Army troops stationed in Panama.

These statements were made today by Peasants Movement Central Committee members Genaro Acevedo Cedeno and Adrian Domingo, who announced that these 20,000 peasants fully support the FDP's and Gen Noriega's courage in saying "no" to the U.S. Government. They are therefore willing to take up weapons and defend the fatherland with their lives, the peasant leaders said.

The peasant leaders added that these 20,000 peasants will not place conditions on the defense of the fatherland. We are aware of the modern weapons the U.S. troops have; however, we know nothing of fear. It is better to die for the fatherland." [quotation marks as published]

Acevedo and Domingo reported that it has been difficult for them to meet Gen Noriega, whom they would like to meet because they will always stand, will never kneel, and are always willing to support the general whenever he needs them. Commander Noriega just has to call upon and advise us, they said. "We are very optimistic after seeing how the FDP is carrying out the struggle, and we believe that we will triumph," peasants Genaro Acevedo and Adrian Domingo concluded.

Villalobos on Possible Opposition Media Ban
PA0307213689 Panama City LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA
in Spanish 3 Jul 89 p 24

[Article by James Aparicio]

[Text] Luis Romero Villalobos, director of the National Media Directorate of the Government and Justice Ministry, told LA ESTRELLA DE PANAMA that the office might close the opposition papers LA ESTRELLA VERDE and EL ARNULFISTA, which are not "legally registered."

"They have acted unilaterally, as if there were no authorities," Romero stated. He warned that once proof is obtained "we will take them out of circulation because they are not registered."

Villalobos explained that the radio programs that were "suspended last week, which were directed by journalists Leroy Hubbard and Migdalia Fuentes, engaged in "disinformation, disrespect, and other crimes covered by Decree 155," which he did not specify.

Villalobos said that his office is not opposed to the existence of opposition radio programs, but asked that their "criticisms be objective and well-founded."

"Nobody is impervious," Villalobos said, referring to public officials. He noted that they "are exposed to criticism, but not to disinformation, disrespect, insults, or slander."

Envoy Extends Greetings, Solidarity to Iran
PA0407151489 Panama City LA REPUBLICA
DOMINICAL in Spanish 2 Jul 89 p 12-A

[Speech by Ambassador to Iran Guillermo Vega on presenting his credentials to Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i in Tehran on 27 May]

[Text] Your Excellency Mr President:

Allow me first to express the greetings of Manuel Solis Palma, president of the Republic of Panama, in whose name I extend to you the Panamanian people's solidarity with all the world's peoples who are struggling to achieve full sovereignty and self-determination.

That is why, Mr President, it is our duty to take advantage of every occasion to tell our truths, because the U.S. information blockade denies us access to the international public. U.S. nostalgia over the dominance it had over our Republic has led that country to carry out acts of aggression to turn back the clock of history and return Panama to its former colonial status.

Our people fought against Spanish domination, and today they are struggling against an oligarchic fifth column that seeks, under the guise of freedom and democracy, to deliver Panama to the voracity of international fascism. During the times of the "Made in USA" democracy, our people had the freedom to die of hunger. Today, the U.S. Government, in the name of democracy, is destroying our economy, threatening us with its military might, and lying and distorting the truth to the world, while refusing to remove its army of occupation from our territory. The solidarity of liberated peoples will help us consolidate our independence.

It is a great honor for me to have been chosen as ambassador of the Republic of Panama to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Today we are experiencing the most critical period of our republican history, because we are victims of economic aggression and international distortion by the most powerful country in the world. My mission is a true reflection of the fact that we believe in diplomatic relations as the best path for understanding and friendship among peoples. Panama, one of the

smallest countries in the world, located on the narrowest part of the American Continent, has chosen [ha escogido] the Islamic Republic of Iran because of its prominent geographical position; this choosing is a form of recognition of the brilliant role it has played in world history and the great courage demonstrated by its leaders and its people in making themselves respected as a free and sovereign country in the international arena. Panama and Iran are separated by a great geographical distance, but we are united, Mr President, in courage, determination, and the spirit of progress and independence of our peoples, who are prepared to struggle and shed their blood in their determination to break the chains that tie them to any attempted foreign oppression.

On strengthening our diplomatic relations, we hope to establish a bridge of cultural and commercial exchange and reinforce our friendly relations.

Mr President:

Again I express to you and through you to the brave and noble people of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the respect and friendship of our government, and I reiterate our interest in having our peoples expand relations, not only for our mutual good, but for humanity in general.

Thank you.

Iranian President Praises Stand

PA0207181389

[Editorial Report] Panama City LA REPUBLICA DOMINICAL in Spanish on page 12-a of its 2 July edition prints a copy of an undated 300-word Tehran IRNA report carried by Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English on 30 May. The TEHRAN TIMES article, "Khamene'i Lauds Panama's Stand Against America," cites remarks by Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i during his 27 May meeting with Panamanian Ambassador Guillermo Vega, who was presenting his credentials. According to the article, Khamene'i "hailed the stance of

the Panamanian Government and people against the high-handedness of the U.S. Administration." Khamene'i added: "We support any move against the rowdiness of U.S. statesmen."

Ambassador Vega, the article reports, "seemed to agree with the Iranian president," and he said Panama "lauds the Iranian people's bravery in fighting off world powers."

IRHE Proposes Commodity Swap With Honduras

PA0307221789 Panama City Televisora Nacional
in Spanish 2300 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Report on interview with Ovilgildo Herrera, director general of the Institute of Hydraulic Resources and Electrification (IRHE), by an unidentified reporter, on 30 June; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Herrera] Right now, Gustavo Gonzalez, the planning and economic policy minister, and the La Victoria Sugar Corporation, are exploring the possibility of a barter exchange of 10,000 tons of sugar and 10,000 tons of molasses worth about 2.8 million balboas, toward payment of the 4 million balboas we owe Honduras [for electric power]. We are working on this form of payment; I understand that the Honduran Economy and Commerce Minister will come to Panama next week, so we can continue to work out this deal. We can also check our own [IRHE] storehouse to see what supplies may be useful to them and serve to help us pay the debt.

[Reporter] Does this mean we will not have a power cut on 1 July?

[Herrera] Let us be quite clear, we do not need power from Honduras. We requested from Honduras the equivalent of a little less than 1 day of power; but, that is not a significant amount of our overall electrical production. Instead, it is handy for us to be able, at a given moment, to have at our disposal power that is cheaper than what we can generate at our own thermoelectric plants.

[Reporter] Does this mean that a power cut by Honduras will not affect us at all?

[Herrera] That is absolutely right.

Argentina

Army Chief of Staff To Be Replaced After 8 Jul *PY0607035489 Buenos Aires Domestic Service* *in Spanish 0200 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Excerpt] President-elect Carlos Menem has stated that General Francisco Gassino will not continue in his post as Army chief of staff after Menem becomes president on 8 July.

Menem asserted that during the meeting he held with Air Force Chief of Staff Brigadier Ernesto Crespo at El Chacabuco Air Base they did not discuss problems related to the Armed Forces.

Regarding the appointment of the new military commanders, Menem said that he will appoint them after 8 July and asserted that the internal problems of the Armed Forces must be solved by the Defense Ministry and only as a last resort by the president. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister-Designate Grants News Conference *PY0607221089 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish* *1903 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 6 Jul (TELAM)—At noon today, the future foreign minister, Domingo Cavallo, stated that due to "difficulties anticipated in the 1st week of government," President-elect Carlos Menem will not go to Paris to participate in the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, on 14 July, to which he was personally invited by French President Francois Mitterrand.

In an impromptu news conference at the Foreign Ministry, Cavallo stated that "the principles of Argentine foreign policy will be maintained," because, he said, "they are permanent national values that go beyond political matters."

He explained, however, that a "different effort" will be made to create, through foreign relations, "a political atmosphere in which to solve the urgent economic and social problems of the country."

He added that "more efforts" will also be made to stress Latin American integration, an issue he considers to be "one of the three main objectives" of Menem's future administration, following national unity and the productive revolution.

He said: "We will emphasize all mechanisms" intended to promote this integration. Asked about creating a common market in the region, Cavallo stated that efforts will be made in that regard, but without disregarding bilateral agreements, such as that existing with Brazil, and the Acts of Colonia and of Caucaze with Uruguay. He said that similar agreements will surely be implemented with other neighboring countries, including Chile.

He said that to achieve effective integration it will be "very important" for the countries involved to have their respective economies "in order." He said that that will probably begin to take place by next year, when the agreements will probably begin to yield fruits.

Asked by a Chilean reporter about Menem's remarks about an "ideological" policy imposed by the current administration on relations with Chile, Cavallo stated that the future government sees as very important "the democratic institutionalization" that is taking place in that country.

Answering another question, he said that no date has yet been set for a meeting between Menem and U.S. President George Bush (whose brother, Jonathan Bush, will be in the U.S. delegation at Menem's inauguration).

Cavallo stated that the future president will hold "personal meetings" with all chiefs of state who come to Buenos Aires to attend the ceremony, and that he [Cavallo] will meet with all the foreign ministers. He stressed the importance of the meetings, although the time for those meetings "will be very scarce."

He rejected the possibility of holding a meeting of the Group of Eight, because not all the presidents of the nations that make up the group will be present.

Regarding the celebration of the anniversary of the French Revolution, he said that Menem had to decline "regretfully." He is sorry, because the visit represented an honor, and because it would have allowed him to contact, although at a protocol level, the main world leaders. He said that since he received a personal invitation, no official will go to Paris, but that Argentina will be represented by its Ambassador in Paris Carlos Ortiz de Rosas.

Cavallo, who this morning met with current Foreign Minister Susana Ruiz Cerutti, stated that he asked the foreign minister, the Foreign Ministry Director General Lucio Garcia del Solar, Foreign Relations Secretary Ernesto de la Guarda, and Secretaries Juan Carlos Kastenzien, Miguel Angel Oliveri Lopez, and Gaston de Pratgay to remain within the Foreign Ministry "until they receive their new assignments."

The future foreign minister stated that they are "career officials," whom he asked for "advice and cooperation," because of the need for continuity in foreign policy.

Peronist Roig Previews New Economic Plan *PY0707004889 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES* *HERALD in English 6 Jul 89 p 5*

[Text] Economy Minister-designate Miguel Roig yesterday announced that the Menem administration will pay a lump-sum bonus during this month, but the former Bunge y Born manager was unable to determine the exact figure, "because the country's situation changes every day."

Several sources nevertheless pointed out that the bonus would be fixed at between 8,000 and 10,000 australs.

Roig's economic plan, which he is expected to announce next Sunday, is besieged by a lack of financial aid and blocked negotiations with the business sector to reach an agreement over the much-heralded 60-to 120-day truce.

Roig underlined yesterday that the Peronist government will not offer soft loans to small- and medium-sized industries. "We will not have a discriminatory credit policy," he said, "the financial market will operate freely."

After weeks of speculation and reversed strategies on the part of the future economic team, Roig yesterday offered an idea of the programme he plans to implement next week:

A single exchange rate with a fixed dollar, probably at 550 australs but ultimately determined by tomorrow's black market quotation, and 20 and 40 percent export duties on the industrial and agricultural sectors respectively. Severe restrictions will be imposed on imports.

A price pact with the leading companies, which would operate freely under the terms of the agreement. Most companies have already created a "price cushion" of between 60 and 100 percent in the last two weeks to anticipate the expected adjustments.

A 150 percent increase in transport rates, taking the minimum bus ticket to 50 australs.

Gas, telephone rates and electricity will be hiked by 200 and 300 percent, premium and standard petrol by 500 and 400 percent respectively, while kerosene and liquid gas will be increased by 200 percent.

An aggressive financial policy to bring interest rates down to one-digit figures by August. The Central Bank will stop printing unbacked money while encashment requirements will not be lowered for the time being.

No new taxes at the beginning, but one of the projects under study includes the generalization of the Value Added Tax (IVA), even for the service sector, with a 10 percent rate under study. There will be a single rate for the income tax and the new government plans to reestablish a collection system operating through banks and contributors' checking accounts. There will be severe sanctions for tax evaders.

All legal proceedings against the state will be suspended for a two-year period, while debts to state suppliers will be consolidated and refinanced. Industrial promotion and all state subsidies to the private sector will be suspended for an unlimited period of time together with the "Buy Argentine" bill, which will be limited.

The Financial Solidarity Bond will be refloated, except that with the Menem administration it will be compulsory: 2.5 percent of total billing.

Further on Economic Plan

PY0707015889 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES
HERALD in English 6 Jul 89 p 5

[Text] The incoming Peronist Government's economic plan will have to be implemented with little or no outside financial help, except for a promise by Economy Minister-designate Miguel Roig to obtain 600 million dollars by next Tuesday.

The information was provided by some of Roig's economic advisers and future government officials who participated in several meetings yesterday.

According to these sources, Roig told businessmen during the meetings that the Central Bank will receive 600 million dollars as advance payment for grain exports, but the future economy minister could not say where the other 1.9 billion dollars needed for the first stage of the anti-inflationary plan were going to come from.

The 600 million dollars will be reportedly provided exclusively by Bunge and Born after Jorge Born in person ratified his commitment to help the incoming Justicialist government.

Roig will thus have to patiently await that exporters sell the dollars they have been retaining during these last three weeks and meanwhile begin negotiations to pawn the approximately one billion dollars in gold that Argentina holds in the United States.

Argentine Rural Society chairman Rodolfo Alchouron had earlier told Roig that the agricultural sector could provide some two billion dollars in exports, mostly of soy, wheat and beef, by the end of the year.

IDB Officials To Grant \$100-Million Loan

PY0607035089 Buenos Aires Domestic Service
in Spanish 0200 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] will loan Argentina \$100 million. This information was disclosed by IDB President Enrique Iglesias after a meeting this afternoon with Argentine Economy Minister Jesus Rodriguez.

Iglesias said that he had already held a meeting with President-elect Carlos Menem and with his economy minister but that he had not been asked for the early disbursement of loans to solve the problem of the lack of currency.

Gasoline Rationing Enforced as of 6 Jul
PY0607180889 Buenos Aires Domestic Service
in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Excerpt] The energy secretariat has decided to restrict the sale of gasoline to 20 liters per vehicle. The measure, which was enforced today, does not affect public passenger transportation vehicles, ambulances, and vehicles of the security and Armed Forces. Oil refinery companies have promised to maintain a normal supply of their products all over the country. [passage omitted]

Soviet Delegation Arrives for Inauguration
PY0607181789 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
1553 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 6 Jul (TELAM)—Georgiy Tarazevich, a deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has arrived in Argentina to attend Carlos Menem's inauguration. Tarazevich said: "We greatly appreciate Argentina's contribution in improving the political atmosphere on the planet and we hope that constructive talks will continue."

Tarazevich appreciated the "kind invitation extended by the Argentine Republic," adding that his country "greatly appreciates the potential of Soviet-Argentine relations, which are based on the principles of mutual respect, non-intervention, and bilateral cooperation." He also expressed "interest in future multilateral developments at a stable and dynamic level."

In remarks made at Ezeiza International Airport, where he was met by the Soviet Ambassador to Argentina Oleg Kvasov, Tarazevich said: "We hope that the fruitful economic-commercial, scientific-technical, and cultural ties currently existing between the Soviet Union and Argentina will continue to be strengthened for the good of the people of our two nations."

Kvasov was accompanied by representatives of the Argentine Foreign Ministry who are coordinating the arrival of the various delegations scheduled to attend the presidential inauguration.

Deficit Forces Reduces Soviet Grain Purchases
PY0607180189 Buenos Aires Domestic Service
in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The USSR has reduced its purchases of Argentine grain because of the deficit on its bilateral trade with Argentina. Another reason was the insufficient depth of water at the port of Bahia Blanca. The USSR is Argentina's main grain buyer.

Anibal Grimaux Named Education Secretary
PY0607184489 Buenos Aires Domestic Service
in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Summary] President-elect Carlos Menem has designated former Deputy Arturo Anibal Grimaux as his future secretary of education.

Bolivia

Officials Reject Foreign Debt, Spraying Swap
PY0607143989 La Paz La Red Panamericana
in Spanish 1130 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Interior Minister Eduardo Perez Beltran has said that the U.S. idea to forgive the foreign debt in exchange for permission to spray coca plantations goes against Bolivian law.

The minister recalled that Law 1008, which forbids the use of herbicides on coca plantations, is highly satisfactory and added that the government will respect the law.

The minister said that the international community has repeatedly recognized the effectiveness of our strategy of replacing coca plantations because it does not require violence or the use of chemicals, which could damage the environment.

Perez concluded by saying that U.S. President Bush's idea cannot be considered by the government because of these facts.

The Special Antinarcotics Force has reported seizing 4 tons of drugs, and burning 3,744 kgs [figure as heard] during the first 6 months of the year.

Social Defense Under Secretary Genaro Marquez issued a report on drug control during the first part of the year saying that results are positive despite the financial difficulties being faced.

The statistical summary presented to Panamericana says that during the first half of the year UMOPAR [Mobile Units for Rural Areas] forces destroyed 1,500 cocaine factories, 3,000 maceration pits, and arrested 266 people. Marquez also reported that in the last months the Social Defense Undersecretariat has built new control posts, like the one in Guayara that will be dedicated soon, and began negotiations to build other control posts in Beni, Oruro, Potosi, Tarija, and Santa Cruz.

Asked about the U.S. Government offer to forgive the foreign debt in exchange for permission to spray coca plantations from the air, Marquez said the proposal is not in accordance with the law in Bolivia. Marquez added that Bolivia is using a strategy to cover all aspects of the problem without the use of herbicides and that the program is yielding highly satisfactory results.

Diplomatic Relations Established With PDRY
PY0507131789 La Paz La Red Panamericana
in Spanish 1130 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Bolivia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY] have decided to establish diplomatic relations and to implement a program to improve relations between the two countries.

The document on the decision to establish diplomatic relations was signed by the Bolivian and the PDRY permanent delegates to the United Nations, Hugo Navajas Mogro and Abdullah Salih al-Ashtal, respectively.

The decision seeks to strengthen and develop the cooperation and friendship between the two countries in accordance with international law and the principles of the United Nations and the nonaligned group, and to reach international peace and security, economic development, social justice, and the elimination of all kinds of colonialism and racial discrimination.

Brazil

Itamaraty Responds to U.S. Consul's Article
PY0707014089 Brasilia Domestic Service
in Portuguese 2200 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Itamaraty today released an official note rejecting an article by Miles Robert Rene Frechette, U.S. Consul General in Sao Paulo, published by O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO [on 4 July].

The article criticizes the Brazilian foreign trade policy and the negotiations on the commercial restrictions imposed on Brazil by the U.S. Administration.

The Itamaraty note states that Mr. Frechette's article shows that he has very little knowledge of Brazilian economic history. It adds that, quote, Brazil today is the 17th most important country to the United States. In 1983, Brazil was the 21st most important country, unquote.

The note adds: The Brazilian Government considers Mr. Frechette's remarks unfortunate and inappropriate. They show that he is absolutely unaware of the fruitful dialogue Brazil is maintaining with the current U.S. Administration on commercial matters. It adds that the positive and constructive bilateral contacts Brazil has been maintaining with the Bush administration disproves the accusations made by Mr. Frechette.

Itamaraty's official note concludes by saying that the Brazilian Government regrets Mr. Frechette's isolated attitude, which exceeds his specific consular duties.

This note was presented this morning to the U.S. Embassy Charge d'Affaires James Ferrer, who was summoned to Itamaraty.

Interior Minister Returns From U.S., USSR
PY0607155989 Brasilia Radio Nacional de Amazonia
Network in Portuguese 6 Jul 89

[Text] Interior Minister Joao Alves has issued a report on his trip to the United States and the Soviet Union stressing some understandings that were reached with the World Bank.

[Begin Alves recording] One of the agreements is for emergency financing to combat the uncontrolled burning of the Amazon forest. Our request was granted and we are now studying ways to implement the appropriate programs.

The second agreement is very important from a social viewpoint. It includes some 4,000 km of irrigation channels through arid Brazilian northeast zones. It will affect some 4 million people.

The bank also agreed to send a mission to Rondonia and to contemplate other programs affecting the environment. [end recording]

According to Minister Joao Alves the issue of the environment was also discussed in the Soviet Union.

Government Authorizes Electricity Rate Increase
PY0607035889 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television
in Portuguese 2300 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] The Brazilian Government has authorized a 10-percent increase in electricity rates. The last readjustment was recorded 2 weeks ago. The government is accelerating the increase in public utility rates because they have stayed behind in relation to inflation due to the freeze policy.

Chile

Patricio Aylwin Nominated Presidential Candidate
PY0707030489 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network
in Spanish 2300 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] In a solemn ceremony at the CPPD [Coalition of Political Parties for Democracy] headquarters, Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party [PDC], was designated today sole candidate of the democratic coalition for the presidential elections on 14 December 1989.

Shortly before the beginning of the ceremony, Alejandro Hales, who until then had been a potential candidate, gave his support to Patricio Aylwin.

Furthermore, Jose Tomas Saenz, representative of the Humanist-Green alliance, has stated that these two groups have decided to join the consensus backing Aylwin as presidential candidate and representative of the democratic forces in the next elections.

Radical Party president, Enrique Silva Cimma, speaking on behalf of the CPPD, before introducing Aylwin, referred to the opposition's success in achieving unity.

[Begin Silva Cimma recording] In a few words, ladies and gentlemen, and people of Chile, I want to say that at this moment, the CPPD and the people of Chile have a candidate. We have a candidate who represents the ardent desire of our people to recover democracy. We now have a candidate who represents the ardent desire of our people to live in peace and to heal the wounds inflicted over the past few years, but without hatred and rancor. Our people desire nothing but the participation of all Chileans in constructing a modern democracy. To achieve this we have chosen a man. This man will be our leader from now on. He is the current president of the PDC, our dear friend Patricio Aylwin. [end recording]

Later, the sole CPPD presidential candidate, who is supported by the 17 political parties of the coalition, stated:

[Begin Aylwin recording] I understand the great significance of being a presidential candidate of so many parties. This represents for me a great honor and a great responsibility. I thank you and receive this honor with great modesty, as the fruit of the work we have been doing together for several years. I thank you for your generosity, especially those of you with equal chances of being nominated who gave me your support.

I want to thank all of you, your parties, my party, all the independent sectors, and especially my friends Eugenio Velasco, Ricardo Lagos, and Alejandro Hales. [end recording]

Aylwin then referred to the difficult task he will have to assume in the future. He stated:

[Begin recording] I assume the responsibility with a desire for service, with the conviction and willingness to fulfill the desires of the overwhelming majority of the Chileans. The Chilean people want peace, freedom, and justice. They want progress and opportunities for all. The Chilean people want democracy: that is, they want a fatherland that will belong to all Chileans, a country for all Chileans, and with all Chileans. [end recording]

Hundreds of people gathered today spontaneously at Bernardo O'Higgins Promenade, in front of the CPPD headquarters, to express their warm affection to this man, who, beginning today, will become the leader of most Chileans who hope for the recovery of democracy in our country.

Foreign Minister Leaves for Argentina
PY0707032089 Santiago Domestic Service
in Spanish 2300 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Foreign Minister Hernan Felipe Errazuriz left for Buenos Aires, Argentina, today to attend the Argentine presidential inauguration on 8 July.

Errazuriz said at the international airport that he was representing President Pinochet and carrying a personal message from Pinochet to Argentine President-elect Carlos Menem. He said that his stay in Buenos Aires will be a good opportunity to strengthen relations and to continue the talks that began last April with Foreign Minister Dante Caputo.

[Begin Errazuriz recording] I believe that this is a good opportunity to continue the talks that began last April with Argentina. I believe that Chile and Argentina have a responsibility to develop their common interests. I also believe that on this occasion I will have an opportunity to contact officials from other countries who will attend the inauguration. There are plans to meet with the U.S. delegation and with other delegates. I will report on these meetings after my return. [end recording]

Errazuriz emphasized the qualities of President-elect Menem. He expects good relations between Chile and Argentina.

[Begin Errazuriz recording] There is an interesting aspect about Menem: He is a governor of a province near the Andes, and that puts him closer to Chile, closer to our real situation. President-elect Menem also played an important role when the Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified in a plebiscite. He supported it from the beginning; he had the vision to see that the treaty is a cornerstone in our relations. [end recording]

Errazuriz said that he will discuss regional and world matters with Argentine officials.

South African Cannon Assembled, Tested
PY0607035589 Santiago APSI in Spanish
26 Jun-2 Jul 89 p 5

[Text] With the knowledge and consent of the Chilean Government, Cardoen Industries a few days ago tested a mammoth G-6 cannon, with a bore of 155 mm and a range of 40 km. Several Chilean officers and South African engineers were in attendance, and their camaraderie was obvious. This cannon is an armored version of another cannon tested in March by Cardoen Industries. Both weapons were actually manufactured in South Africa. The Chilean company did nothing more but assemble the weapon.

The whole operation is not really quite innocent. According to the Chilean Committee for Disarmament and Denuclearization (CChDD), this operation serves "to launder" the South African weapons, which cannot be marketed directly because of the UN-imposed embargo on South Africa. Cardoen Industries sells those weapons to other countries. CChDD president Sara Larrain asserts that Carlos Cardoen is not only a competent seller of Chilean-made weapons, but also a "good arms trafficker at the service of South Africa."

June Economic Indicators Reportedly Up
*PY0607143189 Santiago Domestic Service
in Spanish 1030 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Summary] The National Institute of Statistics (INE) has reported that the consumer price index reached 1.8 percent in June. The accumulated inflation rate for this year now stands at 8.2 percent.

The INE has also reported that the unemployment rate reached 8.2 percent for the March-May quarter, an increase of 0.4 percent over the previous quarter.

Colombia

Guerrilla Coordinating Board Makes Proposal
*PA0607142589 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0632 GMT
6 Jul 89*

[Text] Bogota, 3 Jul (EFE)—The Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board, which has consisted of Colombia's armed rebel groups since 1987, today announced its willingness to directly negotiate "political solutions to the war situation" with the government.

A communique delivered to the Commission of "Notables"—which has been mediating between the guerrillas and the executive branch since the beginning of 1989 to find "paths that lead to dialogue"—states that an effort is being made to find "an agreement on dialogue with the government."

The "Notables"—Former Presidents Misael Pastrana and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, as well as Bogota Archbishop Msgr Mario Revollo, and Fabio Echeverri Correa, president of the National Industrialists Association—will meet this afternoon to study the new proposal.

The communique, a result of the Coordinating Board's fourth meeting held in the Colombian mountains, proposes that a new meeting between the "notables," and the rebel leaders "be held, possibly this week."

This would be the first direct contact between consenting Colombian guerrilla leaders and prominent Colombian political and social figures.

With the signature of Jacobo Arenas, military leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest and oldest guerrilla group in the country, the communique proposes "a direct dialogue to study the most intelligent political solutions for the dirty war, the lifting of the state of siege, and an opening in steps toward attaining democracy."

The rebels also pointed out the need to draft a new, modern constitution in Colombia "that reflects the country's reality."

"The country's misfortunes—according to the guerrillas—are caused by the military and the oligarchic groups linked to the international financial capital," therefore they propose solutions "that are determined by fundamental changes in the state and in the political regime."

The National Guerrilla Coordinating Board was created in September 1987 following an agreement reached by the FARC, communist; the 19 April Movement (M-19), nationalist; the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), Maoist; the National Liberation Army (ELN), Marxist-Leninist; the Quintin Lame, indigenist; and the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT).

The guerrilla document released today does not include, however, the signature of the M-19, which is independently holding direct talks with the government headed by Virgilio Barco, or the signature of the ELN, which refuses to be included in any peace process and is the only rebel group that continues to carry out attacks.

The ELN states that an independent struggle against the major economic interests of the government, such as the oil industry, will help "force" the opening of "real opportunities" for the people's participation in public life.

Government Struggles Against Paramilitary Groups
*AU0607105389 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
4 Jul 89 p 6*

[Manuel Cepeda article: "Signs of a Turnaround? New Phenomena on the Political Scene in Colombia"]

[Text] Bogota (Manuel Cepeda, member of the Colombian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, writes for RUDE PRAVO)—Recently new phenomena have made their way onto the Colombian political scene. The government of President Virgilio Barco Vargas has been forced to adopt measures against ultra right-wing paramilitary organizations and differences are beginning to appear in the government and in the Armed Forces.

These arguments are taking place in connection with discussions prior to the elections which are expected to take place in Colombia in 1990. After the Colombian Communist Party [CCP] had demanded from the government secure guarantees that it can participate in them, it announced that it will become involved in the electoral process and now it is striving to create a broad democratic coalition.

The approaching elections as well as the widespread international condemnation of the "dirty war" in Colombia forced the government to take more decisive steps in a number of spheres. The most important of these are:

—Issuing presidentially proclaimed decrees against hired assassins and creating an elite military force for the struggle against them; organizing a struggle against

ultra right-wing paramilitary groups and increasing prison sentences up to 20-30 years for soldiers and civilians who are members of them;

—Conducting a dialogue between the leftist coalition Patriotic Union (which the CCP is a member of) and the supreme commander of the Army with the participation of the minister of defense;

—Conducting a purge in the Army directed against the officers who are associated with groups of hired assassins.

The reason for accelerating these measures was the assassination attempt against the head of the secret police (DAS), General Miguel Maza Marquez, carried out on 30 May by paramilitary groups which are controlled by drug traffickers. A vehicle filled with 100 kg of dynamite was used to try to assassinate the head of state security. The general escaped without injury but during the assassination attempt 7 people were killed and more than 50 were wounded. Because of this act, differences in the Armed Forces and in the Colombian Government further intensified.

Maza Marquez has been the sworn enemy of the mafia and the object of their threats since he revealed that the gangs which carry out assassination attempts against the CCP and the Patriotic Union are trained mercenaries from the United States, Israel, the FRG, and Great Britain. After escaping from an assassination attempt on 3 May, General Maza Marquez sent a letter to the state prosecutor. In it he said that certain groups in the Army knew about the assassination attempt which had been prepared against him.

During the same period Captain Wanumen [name as published] was imprisoned; he had secret documents from the Council of Ministers, the National Security Council, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, the DAS, and the American CIA which list highly placed individuals in the government who work as "spies" for the benefit of drug traffickers from the Medellin and Cali cartels. Although President Barco Vargas denied the authenticity of the documents, reports are generally disseminated that the ruling elite has been infiltrated with mafia agents.

In this situation space opens up for the CCP's proposal to introduce peace to the country by way of a dialogue between the government and all partisan groups, not just with the M-19 Movement, as the government has practiced to date. Although the situation in Colombia is still serious, there are definite signs of a turnaround for the better.

ELN Attack on General Foiled; 2 Rebels Killed
PA0607121489 Bogota Inravisión Television
Cadena 1 in Spanish 0000 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] In Ibagué, the commander of the Army's 6th Brigade escaped death this morning when a powerful dynamite bomb was discovered on the road he uses between his home and the military headquarters.

A clash followed the discovery of the bomb. Two ELN [Army of National Liberation] guerrillas were killed, and five soldiers were seriously wounded. General Jose Gregorio Torres is leaving his post as 6th Brigade commander to take command of the 4th Brigade in Medellin.

Ecuador

Cordovez Offers To Mediate Panama Dialogue
PA0707014389 Buenos Aires REUTER in Spanish
0050 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] Quito, 6 Jul (REUTER)—Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Diego Cordovez today emphatically called for a dialogue among all Panamanian forces and offered his mediation with the United States to help resolve the conflict.

During a visit to the REUTER offices here, he said "Panamanians have a political responsibility to resolve this crisis, which is a Panamanian crisis and thus must be solved by Panamanians with a Panamanian solution."

The minister gave no details about the efforts that he and his Guatemalan and Trinidadian and Tobago counterparts are making in the Panama issue.

Cordovez acknowledged that external factors are influencing the situation in Panama. He offered his mediation in the current conflict between the Panamanian and U.S. Governments.

"Clearly there are problems, and major external factors have significantly worsened the situation. Thus, I am willing to help the Panamanian and U.S. Governments overcome those external factors," he asserted.

Government Alliance Dissolved; Ministers Resign
PA0507192689 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1806 GMT
5 Jul 89

[Text] Quito, 5 Jul (DPA)—The central government alliance that existed here since last August was formally dissolved today after several days of negotiations. Dozens of officials, headed by Juan Jose Pons, former minister of industry, commerce, integration, and fishing, presented their resignations.

The break was officially announced by Vladimiro Alvarez, president of the Christian Democratic Party, at the end of a heated debate of the party executive board, which decided to quit the alliance at the end of a stormy meeting.

However, the Social Democratic Government of President Rodrigo Borja retains the majority in the Congress and in the other governmental organizations.

According to the PDC announcement, the break was made "under amiable terms," and the possibility exists that the legislative alliance may be renewed as of 1 August when the first congressional session ends. The break with the government was termed "definitive."

The PDC sector headed by former Ecuadoran President Osvaldo Hurtado was opposed to the alliance, which it said did not fulfill "any specific purpose." There was also fear that the political deterioration stemming from the alliance might leave Ecuador without any middle-of-the-road options for the 1991 elections.

The break unleashed a succession of resignations by officials linked with the PDC. It was announced that there will be cabinet changes in President Borja's administration in the coming days.

Government Resumes Payments on Foreign Debt
PA0507191989 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1827 GMT
5 Jul 89

[Text] Quito, 5 Jul (DPA)—After suspending payments on its foreign debt due to the withholding of \$80 million by Citibank, Ecuador today resumed interest payments on its \$11.3 billion debt.

According to Secretary General of Administration Washington Herrera, those payments will only be "symbolic," until a "clear recovery" of the economy is achieved, to demonstrate Ecuador's firm determination to "honor all its financial commitments."

The \$16 million disbursement announced today is Ecuador's first payment since late May, when Citibank confiscated \$80 million to cover "pending commitments," an action that was described by Quito's government as an "act of modern piracy" and was repudiated by dozens of countries, including the United States.

The accounts withheld by Citibank included funds deposited by the World Bank and resources to pay interest on the debt.

Paraguay

Parana State Governor Pays Official Visit
PY0607160389 Asuncion HOY in Spanish
6 Jul 89 p 8

[Excerpt] "Welcome to Paraguay" were the first words used to greet Dr Alvaro Dias, the governor of the Brazilian state of Parana, who arrived at the Silvio Pettirossi International Airport [former President Stroessner International Airport] yesterday afternoon.

These words of welcome were uttered by Foreign Minister Luis Maria Argana, who then introduced Dias to Interior Minister General Orlando Machuca Vargas and to Defense Minister General Adolfo Samaniego. Machuca Vargas and Samaniego, along with Orlando

Soares Carbonar, the Brazilian ambassador to Paraguay, and members of the banking, industrial and trade sectors also went to the airport to greet Dias.

After exchanging greetings with the Paraguayan officials, businessmen and industrialists, Dias said that this is his first visit to Paraguay. His tight agenda began last night at the Paraguayan Yacht and Golf Club, where the Second Agricultural and Industrial Fair to be held in the Brazilian city of Curitiba was announced.

Dias stated that among his activities is a meeting with high-level Paraguayan officials, with whom he will discuss bilateral relations, especially trade. [passage omitted]

Central Bank Reports Cost of Living Increase
PY0607224289 Asuncion EL DIARIO in Spanish
6 Jul 89 p 13

[Text] According to official figures released by the Central Bank, the cost of living increased 13.6 percent in the first half of this year. The largest increase—5.2- - occurred in June, when new prices went into effect.

The estimates for the second half of this year are very similar to the increases of the first half; therefore, inflation this year is not expected to go over 30 percent [as published]. The U.S. dollar exchange rate is now increasing and this situation can create inflation. Experts, however, consider the increase normal.

It should be pointed out that the inflation rate in Brazil in June was 25 percent and in Argentina it was 110 percent, according to the latest estimates.

Acting National Cement Institute Chairman Named
PY0607163089 Asuncion EL DIARIO in Spanish
6 Jul 89 p 4

[Summary] President Andres Rodriguez and Industry and Commerce Minister Antonio Zuccolillo have signed Decree No 1579/79 discharging Ramon Centurion Nunez as chairman of the National Cement Institute (INC). Industry and Commerce Under Secretary William Wilka has been designated acting INC chairman.

Direct Dial System With Brazil Established
PY0607155789 Asuncion EL DIARIO in Spanish
6 Jul 89 p 11

[Summary] A direct dial system linking Paraguay and Brazil was officially inaugurated by Paraguayan President Andres Rodriguez and his Brazilian counterpart Jose Sarney through a telephone conversation they held for several minutes yesterday.

Uruguay

Official Denies Presence of Troops in Brazil

PY0307155089 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0930 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] The mayor of Uruguaiana [Rio Grande Do Sul State, Brazil], (Antonio Brazil Carus), has reported to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry that Uruguayan soldiers are in Brazilian territory.

Brazilian President Jose Sarney has ordered the Foreign Ministry to investigate the case thoroughly.

(Brazil Carus), on behalf of 18 townships on the western border, has charged that the soldiers, citing government orders, are preventing Brazilian products from entering Uruguayan territory, and that they have dared to walk along the streets of Barra do Quaraí, a Brazilian city on the Uruguayan border, thus violating Brazilian sovereignty.

Uruguayan Defense Minister Lieutenant General Hugo Medina has denied that Uruguayan soldiers have entered Brazilian territory, as was reported by an ANSA news agency cable datelined Porto Alegre.

Brazil Denies Incidents

PY0507013089 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0000 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has denied that incidents have occurred along the border with Uruguay where Uruguayan soldiers are helping repress contraband.

Eduardo Hossanna, Brazilian ambassador to Montevideo [title as heard], has informed his government that until yesterday no incidents had occurred along the border.

Itamaraty has confirmed that the Brazilian Government was informed on Friday, 30 June, about the presence of Uruguayan soldiers on the border.

According to Rafael Pintos, president of a special commission on border affairs formed by Brazilian and Uruguayan councilmen, a climate of calmness and normalcy prevails in the Brazilian border towns Xui, Bage, and Santana do Libramento.

Candidate Hugo Batalla Picks Running Mate

PY3006023389 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0000 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpt] Economist Juan Ramon Quijano, 45, will be Senator Hugo Batalla's running mate in the upcoming presidential elections. Quijano said his front has the most clear, revolutionary, and promising proposal anyone can make to the country. Batalla and Quijano are

supported by the Party of the People's Government [PGP] and the Christian Democratic Party [PDC]. Quijano told reporters he was an independent and a former Broad Front member.

[Begin Recording] [Quijano] I accepted this nomination because I believe in the country's new conscience. I believe Batalla's platform is the most clear, revolutionary, and promising proposal anyone can give to the country in the political field. I accepted the nomination because I am willing to work for this program.

[Reporter] Were you part of any one of these two groups in the past?

[Quijano] No, I am an independent. I agree with many of their positions, however, and have been following their political evolution in the last few years.

[Reporter] But you were also a Broad Front follower.

[Quijano] I sympathized with the Broad Front in the 1970's. Not so in the last few years. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Japan Grants Loan for Regional Development

PY3006184589 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0930 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpt] The Economy and Finance Minister's visit to Japan has produced positive results. Upon arriving at the Carrasco Airport, Minister Ricardo Zerbino said that a \$48-million loan for a regional development project had been obtained, adding that negotiations for the sale of Uruguayan bonds in Japan continue.

[Begin Zerbino recording] At the Japanese Finance Ministry I met deputy minister [name indistinct] and we talked about aspects of Japanese financial cooperation with Uruguay. I also visited the Overseas Economic Cooperation Foundation where I obtained confirmation that a credit of 7,166,000 yen, between \$48- and \$49-million, for the so-called regional development project has been granted. This project will be implemented as soon as possible. The foreign ministries will exchange notes immediately and we will be receiving a [words indistinct] in July. At the EXIMBANK, the institution that is helping to float Uruguayan bonds in Japan, we discussed some final aspects of the contract. The contract is expected to be signed shortly. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Public Works Minister Begins Loan Negotiations

PY0507131389 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0930 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Public Works and Transportation Minister Jorge Sanguinetti has begun negotiations in Rome to secure a \$5-million loan to implement a project involving the construction of a bridge linking Colonia with Buenos Aires. Sanguinetti has held a number of meetings with Italian authorities.

Executive Branch Establishes New Minimum Salary

PY0607121289 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish
0930 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Summary] Labor Minister Luis Brezo has reported that the executive branch has increased the minimum salary to 49,500 Pesos as of 1 July. The minimum salary of domestic servants and rural workers was also increased.

Venezuela

President Gives Independence Day Speech

PA0607222889 Caracas Domestic Service in Spanish
1420 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Independence Day speech by President Carlos Andres Perez at the Miraflores Palace in Caracas—live]

[Text] President and vice president of the Congress; Supreme Court president and magistrates; His Eminence Cardinal Lebrun, archbishop of Caracas; president and members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; Judiciary Council president and magistrates; former Venezuelan President Dr Luis Herrera Campins; Vice Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, former President of the government junta; cabinet ministers; federal district governor; attorney general; comptroller general; prosecutor general; most excellent ambassadors of friendly countries; honorable charges d'affaires; representatives of international organizations; senators; deputies; generals and admirals; members of the military high command; secretary of the National Council of Security and Defense; president and members of the Municipal Council of Libertador; president of the Municipal Council of Sucre District; university rectors; presidents and rectors of the national academies; president and members of the Bolivar Society; executive offices' directors general; Venezuelan men and women: There is no better time than today, 5 July, to reflect on who we are, what we were like in the past, and what we can be.

This is a day to reflect on our victorious achievements and our past setbacks. Above all, it should make us reflect deeply on the battles still to be won. This is a day on which we cannot simply rejoice over our history. This is a day on which we should seriously dwell on the true significance of that 5 July in 1811, that time of exemplary confidence and optimism in the character of the Venezuelan people and in the fatherland's destiny of freedom. Today is when we should reflect on the bravery of those great men, who did not hesitate for a moment to set out on the long and arduous path to gain our independence.

If 5 July is an opportune time for reflection, perhaps never before have we felt so obligated to resist the comfortable and superficial feeling of remembering that date as a mere historical anecdote. History should be the backdrop against which we project the future.

Today, perhaps more than ever before, we must cope with and overcome fatigue and pessimism so that the Venezuelan people can continue to make progress, united in a joint project, united in a task that began exactly 178 years ago with the signing of the declaration of our independence. If I say that this 5 July has a significance that it perhaps never had before, it is because today we face difficulties that trouble the Venezuelan people. We were almost asleep, overconfident as a result of our wealth gained from petroleum. We refused to see that the country was not living off its hard work but its oil revenues. Then, one day, we were rudely awakened by that reality. That easy money had led us to be habitual private and public consumers, which does not correspond to the true situation in Venezuela. Those consumers' habits force us to face today the diabolical alternative of either continuing to take the same path as we took during the last few years and inevitably falling into the abyss of chaos and disaster; or we can come to a screeching halt on that path in recognition of the necessity to sharply divert the path that the country is taking and of the necessity to make the decision to take a path difficult for all of us, but which will be an genuine and sincere one. We must take the only path that will lead us to true economic development, without inflation, with full employment, with social democracy, to which all Venezuelans are committed.

Right now Venezuela has reached the moment when it must redefine its place in history. For many years, Venezuelan political parties and institutions worked toward the goal of achieving, defending, and consolidating democracy as a way of life for all Venezuelans. At the same time, our basic policy was to regain national sovereignty. We extended health and education benefits to all Venezuelans; we modernized the peasants and general work force. We also generated growth in the country, we strengthened the middle class, and we nationalized iron and petroleum, our basic resources. We carried out a bold program of professional training by sending thousands of Venezuelan youths to study at the best universities in the world. We guaranteed that the political parties, trade unions, and business and professional organizations would play leading roles. Civilians and neighborhood organizations are now assuming important roles in society. This is the beginning of a new era, Venezuelans.

We are justified in feeling proud. As societies prosper and develop, new experiences bring new challenges. Moreover, during this process, of course we have made mistakes and neglected matters, facts that no leader of this era can disregard. Therefore, in addition to the achievements made, we confront an extremely complex government that is not effectively leading society, but it does manage to annoy citizens, a government that in many ways instead of helping has ended up being a severe obstacle. We realize that today.

Within our society, some evil symptoms have appeared, because we have all become accustomed to a government which had as its basic mandate to redistribute revenue

instead of stimulating production. Public administration has evolved into an anarchical struggle for more or less power. It is the victim of demoralizing cronyism or of group or even personal interests.

Corruption, which unfortunately exists in all societies, has become a system dominated by public and private interests here, and it has even become a sort of national subculture. Creative effort and hard work have been neglected because of corruption. Both high- and low-level officials as well as businessmen and ordinary citizens have sought refuge in the shadows of corruption. As a result of this harsh reality, scandalous rhetoric has often been used, which has led us to actually believe that we are inevitably headed toward disaster. If this were true, we could not possibly meet the challenge of setting things right.

It is true that the situation has reached such extremes that a vigorous national rectification crusade is called for, not only to raise the moral fiber of Venezuelan society, but also to formulate objectives and goals, to take new paths, to change attitudes, and to reform institutional practices to prevent further deterioration—deterioration which can no longer be concealed.

A direct result of so many past mistakes and neglect is that we have reached a crisis. In the political arena, the crisis is evident in the alarming pragmatism that today harms political parties and society in general; the crisis is evident in society in the increasing deterioration of the Venezuelan people's quality of life; and the crisis is evident in the economic sphere in the serious lack of economic, financial, trade, monetary, and balance-of-payment stability. As if this were not enough, we must add that we are weakened by reduced international reserves and the unbearable burden of the foreign debt, which we cannot continue to pay under the present circumstances.

My government plans to implement big changes in Venezuelan society. Unfortunately, some believe that the crisis means inevitable defeat and surrender, a desperate time of resignation, and the end of the world. For us, however, the crisis opens opportunities. It is a time of agony and struggle in which we can bring out the best in ourselves. It is a time to take long strides in history. It is the dramatic hour of truth, similar to what the deputies attending the 1811 congress had to face. Now it is up to us to face this crisis with the same firmness and determination. We are at a crossroads like ones faced in the past which have allowed great peoples—such as the great people of Venezuela—to overcome difficulties and to begin to undertake great changes.

This is how I have always understood the crisis. It opens opportunities for building the future. I assumed the challenge of the crisis when I decided to run for a second, and difficult, presidential term. I did not assume the presidency to satisfy the personal vanity of a public official nor to enjoy the privileges of power; I wished to

struggle with my people to construct a modern Venezuela, something I promised the country that I would do during my election campaign.

This is not an easy or simple struggle, dear compatriots. This is a struggle that has darkened the Venezuelan people's horizons with many difficulties and that has forced us to make unexpected sacrifices overnight. This is a struggle which, after barely 5 months, already allows us to see the light at the end of the tunnel, which seemed immeasurably long only a short while ago. This is why we are making great changes in Venezuelan society. Things are not as some are trying to make them out to be. It is not true that our only reason for resolving the severe Venezuelan economic crisis is to benefit the privileged classes. Our goal is to redirect Venezuelan society and to allow democracy to reach its true economic and social potential, which will allow us to overcome social problems. This is what we will do.

The economic crisis is grave. The dedication and determination with which we have faced the crisis is testimony to our resolve. Venezuelans are already witnessing positive results, although we still have a lot to do before we fully overcome the crisis. The process of confronting the monetary imbalance has enabled us to establish clear and stable financial guidelines, thanks to the single exchange rate system. There are still contentious issues, such as high interest rates. However, interest rates will be reduced to the extent that the inflation rate decreases, which is now happening.

The immediate impact of our economic policy was not understood by the majority of Venezuelans, who despaired over the sudden increase in prices. However, the crucial decision to adjust prices, which had been artificially frozen for years, resulted in our being able to confidently project economic development for the period after 1990. The gradual elimination of subsidies and the new commercial policy will enable us to reform industry in order to offer Venezuelans and the world a powerful and efficient industry ensuring economic stability and social welfare.

The seriousness with which we have begun this complex task of restructuring our economy has obviously meant sacrifices that we are not used to making. However, these efforts and sacrifices will guarantee for us and our children a brighter future, a future the security of which is proven by the fact that in barely 5 months we have been able to persuade the international financial community of our success. As a result, the fresh cash flow, which had been interrupted for years, was recently reestablished. New international reserves are beginning to accumulate in the Central Bank. We can ensure Venezuelans that in the next few years we will have resources to promote development.

We have adopted measures in the social sector. Although these measures do not fully compensate for the impact of the economic reforms, at least they lessen their most devastating effects. We have promoted public and private sector salary increases.

We have increased interest rates for social security monies placed in trust funds at banks. We have increased the scope of our food and transportation bonds. We have prepared a vast employment and investment program that will provide jobs for 170,000 Venezuelans. This program's implementation only awaits the necessary approval by the Venezuelan Congress. In this regard, we have also prepared a broad food subsidy program, which will directly benefit low-income Venezuelan families.

However, we must point out that the political and institutional crisis in Venezuela is as serious as its economic and social crisis. This crisis is sinking Venezuela into stagnation, because we have lost confidence and credibility. Tangible proof of this is the loss in stature of many institutions and the lack of confidence, in every respect, in the strength of Venezuelan leaders. We have lost the strength to confront difficulties, and the principles that bind us as a nation have weakened. My conviction regarding this situation has led me to repeat again and again during my election campaign that to promote and to fully implement a new national program, this endeavor must not be regarded as the task of a single administration, party, or president; to be successful, this program must be regarded as a collective task requiring all-embracing, national, concerted efforts.

Change is essential for the fatherland, and therefore I do not hesitate to accept the views and opinions of sectors that politically oppose our administration but that understand the seriousness of the situation and are willing—without relinquishing their identity or disregarding differences—to promote an all-embracing, concerted effort to make possible the basic national rectification project. By fulfilling this task, we will give our people the important perspective gained through the realization that their leaders—despite differences and controversies—are aware of the need for a new national strategy and are willing to promote the necessary national consensus.

Many believe that we are enduring a stage of destabilization during which everyone is confronting and criticizing each other, making demands, and protesting. It is true that there is unrest and discontent. This is true because all changes made in the traditional way bear costs and require sacrifices. I must point out, however, that there is another very positive aspect of what is happening in the country; we are experiencing a very broad process of democratization and reform evident not only in institutional changes, but in the freshness we feel as a result of the changes and transformations that have occurred within Venezuelan democracy during the past few months.

We have soberly exercised the democratic power corresponding to our most basic national principles. Nobody has been prevented from exercising freedom of expression, assembly, or from stating his or her position. Democracy is flourishing and sometimes manifests itself inappropriately through abusive language and conflicts.

Nevertheless, whatever the cost of mismanaged freedoms, Venezuela has meritoriously endured new criticism. I have stated and I maintain my position that there are exaggerations and excesses with which I do not agree, but this is the price we have to pay for a flourishing, unimpeded Venezuelan democracy. I know that we have set sail on turbulent waters, but I am certain of one thing: The country that I govern has had a democratic resurgence without precedent in its history during the past few months and will continue to flourish in the future.

The change that we are implementing means that we will face resistance from vested and administrative interests, from those accustomed to the traditions and practices of state control. For some time it was believed that the country was entering a blind alley. Attempts were even made to impose ideological views on our administration. However, little by little, feeling our way with calm, we can see that the country's confidence is being restored.

It is a matter of restoring confidence in a leader, a president, or a government. Above all, it is the recovery of society's confidence in itself as the key protagonist of the change taking place in Venezuela today. We have developed policy not as a result of heeding recommendations from any economic institution, or asking for help from the IMF or the World Bank, or by following dogmas that are not our own. We formulated policy after considering all available options given our severe limitations. We have not taken action in accordance with imposed ideologies or at the request of international organizations; reality leaves us no other option than the one we have chosen. We will not deviate from our progress on this path. The country is gradually regarding this process as less traumatic than was thought at first, but this does not mean that our problems are over; they exist and we are suffering from them. We have problems and will continue to have problems, but what I want to say is that the country is changing its attitude concerning basic matters.

Fewer and fewer hands are outstretched toward the state, and more and more people are meeting the challenge to create, to produce, to invest, and to develop. I do not want to make it appear that our problems are over, just as I did not say so during the worst moments in the recent past. We will face difficult times ahead, and my government will not hide this fact. Today, however, we are better equipped to face them. The country knows that there is evidence that we have corrected our course to achieve an overall restructuring of the economy and Venezuelan society. Among the severe problems we must face and resolve, the most important is that of the foreign debt. We are convinced that if the industrialized nations do not adopt a substantial change in their attitude and if international banks do not improve the terms of their negotiations with Venezuela and with the rest of the fraternal Latin American nations and the rest of the developing world, any economic program that we undertake will be doomed to failure.

It would be a new and mortal irony of history, if, after demanding democracy from us and changes in our countries' economic policies,—as is taking place in Venezuela—these same industrialized countries were the ones to prevent us from being successful, subjecting us again to the infernal spiraling fiscal deficit and hyperinflation.

There are indications of a change in the industrialized nations, although they all persist in bilateral negotiations—the so-called case-by-case policy—with our countries.

We must point out the attitude of U.S. President George Bush in promoting the plan formulated by his treasury secretary, James Brady. Although the ideas of the Brady Plan are still not complete, the truth is that they reveal the new U.S. position regarding the debt problem. My government supports [the Brady Plan] and promotes it. A substantial and effective reduction of the foreign debt is an indispensable condition for our economy to achieve a genuine recovery. All Latin American countries are firmly committed to this position. I would even add more: If Venezuela is not presented with an alternative to the foreign debt problem, other than what we have been offered thus far, we will have to greatly modify the current terms of our commitments with international banks. It is not a case of whether or not we want to pay the debt. It is simply that Venezuela cannot pay it under the terms demanded thus far by our creditors. To do so would be tantamount to condemning Venezuela and Venezuelans to an intolerable and unacceptable sacrifice.

We are willing, as always, to secure constructive agreements, so long as these agreements conform to Venezuela's real possibilities and do not endanger the country's economic stability and or adversely affect the welfare of Venezuelans.

I sincerely trust that the seriousness of our effort to reorder our economy and our firm political desire not to compromise in defending the true interests of our people will allow us to find ways to reduce the foreign debt and to obtain conditions that will enable us to service the debt. This is awaited and needed by the other fraternal Latin American nations.

Our concern for the solution of these problems has not led us to disregard political issues. On 5 July 1811, the process leading to our independence not only began, it also meant the beginning of a democratic effort that our society continues today. That is why I want to refer today to the controversial debate currently being held in Congress regarding election reforms. In early 1988, on 23 January, during a solemn session of the municipal council to celebrate 30 years of democracy, I promised all Venezuelans that a list of reforms would be implemented. Election reform was among the ten points of

this proposal aimed at modernizing the Venezuelan Government. Unfortunately, during the current discussions on the new voting mechanisms, there has not been the consensus I expected.

The chamber of deputies has already approved the relative majority voting system [formula uninominal] for the municipal elections. Nevertheless, the voting took place amid heated debate, and it was a close vote. Now it is the Senate's turn. I would like to take this opportunity to ask the deputies and senators to consider the importance of this parliamentary debate. Political parties should not look upon this as a political contest to test their strength. We want to give Venezuelans what they want; we want to satisfy their legitimate aspirations to individually elect their councilmen. The people want councilmen to engage in political or party activities, but they also want councilmen to align themselves with the rest of the community.

The municipality is the nucleus of a democracy that offers more democratic freedoms and less interference. A few days ago, I met with representatives of those great neighborhood organizations, whose development I am determined to promote strongly, and I reiterated my commitment to support the relative majority system. I urge you today to fully share the just position of the neighborhood residents throughout Venezuela so that in Congress there will be no conquerors or vanquished ones. This debate should conclude with an overwhelming victory for all Venezuelan neighborhood residents. I have faith and confidence that this will happen.

Yesterday we witnessed a ceremony that perhaps surprised many when they watched it last night on television or today when they read about it in the newspapers. It had been said that this would be just one more frustration the Venezuelan people would have to face in their attempt to form a system of concerted effort among businessmen, workers, and the government in order to confront, determinedly and successfully, the serious economic problems during this time of profound change and readjustment.

Last night at Miraflores Palace, on the eve of celebrating this 5 July, the CTV [Confederation of Venezuelan Workers] and FEDECAMARAS [Venezuelan Federation of Associations and Chambers of Commerce and Industry] leaders and the president of the Republic, accompanied by FEDEINDUSTRIAS [Federation of Industries] and other economic groups, signed an agreement for a national concerted effort, which our compatriots and foreigners who reside in our country will be happy to read about in today's papers. For 5 months we waited patiently for these fortunate and positive results, which today we can responsibly and happily offer our country.

We will continue to work with the same determination to achieve a concerted agreement with the political parties so that the Venezuelan people can feel complete confidence that we will resolve the serious difficulties we

suffer today; so that corruption will no longer threaten to subjugate the nation and hypocritical rhetoric will no longer threaten to destroy the nation's faith in its ability to rectify mistakes and to struggle against the vice and crime undermining the nation's morals; so that political parties will show the country that controversy and polemics—which are the essence of democracy—are not obstacles; and so that all Venezuelans will remember and share the responsibility of leading Venezuela to economic recovery and social well-being.

This is the message I wish to impart to my compatriots today. This is a message full of optimism, because as a result of everyone's efforts and sacrifices, we are emerging from the crisis. Despite all these problems, the country understands the justice inherent in the policies we have been adopting, because you—dear compatriots, Venezuelans, and foreigners sharing with us the tasks of national reconstruction—are the same people who 178 years ago engaged in the heroic struggle for our independence. Nobody has more of the courage required to confront and to defeat historic difficulties. Today, as on 5 July 1811, we are launching a process of profound change, and, at the end—today as back then—Venezuela will emerge victorious. Let us get to work. [applause]

Guyana

Contingent To Join UN Force in Namibia *FL3006184589 Bridgetown CANA in English* 1315 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, June 30, CANA—A contingent of 30 Guyanese policemen has left here to join the special United Nations force set up to ensure the smooth implementation of the independence process in Namibia. The men were selected from amongst more than 150 volunteers who had applied for the one-year assignment and who met the requirements set by the UN.

At a special briefing session for them, former vice-president of the UN Council for Namibia, Noel Sinclair, who is also a former Guyana permanent representative to the UN, cautioned them that their task would be a difficult one. He told them that they will be coming face to face with apartheid, a system of government illegally thrust upon the people of Namibia by the South African regime.

He said it was fitting that Guyana should have been asked to stand up and be counted as apartheid draws to an end in Namibia for Guyana was one of the first countries to be identified with the struggle by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and other freedom fighters in southern Africa.

Sinclair is now permanent secretary at Guyana's Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Also addressing the policemen were Home Affairs Minister Stella Odie-Ali and Commissioner of Police Balram Raghubir. Odie-Ali told them they should guard against losing their identity and display the exemplary behaviour for which they are well known in Guyana.

The Guyanese will join volunteers from the police forces of several other countries including Barbados and Jamaica.

Foreign Minister Meets Colombian Counterpart *FL3006214489 Bridgetown CANA in English* 2051 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, June 30, CANA—Guyana's foreign minister, Rashleigh Jackson, and his Colombian counterpart, Julio Londono Paredes, have expressed confidence in the prospects for the integration of Latin American and Caribbean countries.

According to the local foreign ministry, the two ministers affirmed their confidence during talks in the Colombian capital earlier this week.

Jackson was at the time paying an official visit to Colombia at Paredes' invitation.

The ministry said the two ministers stressed that the forthcoming dialogue involving the foreign minister of Latin America and the Caribbean and the 15th Ministerial Meeting of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) on August 2, in Cartagena, Colombia, could make significant contributions to the integration process.

Meanwhile, according to the ministry, Paredes has undertaken to explore the possibility of expanding trade between Guyana and Colombia, and, more specifically, to explore the role Colombian companies can play in the current phase of Guyana's economic development.

Both countries are signatories to the treaty of Amazonian co-operation.

According to the ministry, a technical co-operation programme in the field of health and within the framework of the Amazonian Co-operation Agreement signed in Colombia in 1983 has been prepared and will be signed shortly.

Opposition Asks Caricom To Study Election Fraud *FL0607154089 Bonaire Trans World Radio* in English 1130 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] In Guyana, the opposition People's Progressive Party [PPP] is calling on Caribbean Community [Caricom] leaders to discuss what it calls a pattern of election fraud in Guyana.

In a statement issued in Georgetown, the opposition party said that the issue of elections in Guyana should be of greater concern to Caricom than the situations in Panama or Haiti.

Fuel Shortage Relieved With Arrival of Gasoline
FL0707015189 Bridgetown CANA in English
0013 GMT 7 Jul 89

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, July 6, CANA—The arrival of a shipment of fuel sparked near pandemonium at some petrol stations here Thursday as gasoline went on sale once again and brought some relief from an acute shortage now in its third week.

Police were forced to set up road blocks in at least two sections of the city to establish some semblance of order. Hundreds of motor vehicles could be seen snaking around city blocks or in lanes stretching for blocks in the vicinity of petrol stations as motorists, some pushing their vehicles, joined queues hoping to fill their tanks.

The pumps at most of the 12 petrol stations in the city went dry since last Friday and the others since Monday or Tuesday forcing scores of motorists to park their vehicles and leaving hundreds of commuters stranded for several hours as public transport fares quadrupled in some instances.

Head of the Guyana National Energy Authority (GNEA) Mark Bender, told CANA Thursday that 14,000 barrels (or 490,000 gallons) of gasoline arrived in the country Wednesday and will be distributed to all gas stations. Bender said that should motorists desist from hoarding and co-operate by conserving on their use of fuel, Wednesday's shipment will last until the arrival of the next shipment.

The government has blamed the current difficulties on the recent seven-week strikes in the bauxite and sugar industries which cost the country nearly U.S. 30 million in foreign exchange receipts some of which, it says, would have gone toward paying for imports of fuel.

Suriname

Arron Begins Visit to Netherlands, Belgium
FL0607203389 Paramaribo International Service
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[Text] Vice President Henck Arron leaves for Holland today at the head of a delegation which will hold discussions about the development relation between both countries. In Holland, the vice president will hold political discussions with the Dutch prime minister, Lubbers, and the ministers Bukman of development cooperation and Van den Broek of foreign affairs. The vice president will also hold a discussion with the Second Chamber commission for development cooperation.

Arron has yesterday told journalists that a good basis has been laid for a further cooperation with Holland. The vice president indicated that many preparatory discussions have taken place between him and the Dutch ambassador in Suriname. According to Arron, these have been positive.

At the same time, the remaining members of the delegation of the vice president will participate in official policy discussions between Holland and Suriname.

The policy discussions were deadlocked in March this year because both countries didn't agree with the rules of procedures of the development treaty. During the policy discussions, projects within the framework of the development cooperation between the two countries will be discussed.

After Holland, the vice president will pay a visit to Belgium where he will hold discussions with the Belgian Government on bilateral relations. In Belgium, Arron will also have a meeting with the director general of the European Community.

The delegation is expected back in Suriname on July 17.

High-Level Delegation To Hold Talks With Rebels
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[Text] The government has named the delegation which will have to negotiate with the terrorist gang of Ronnie Brunswijk. This was told to our newsroom this morning by the president's spokesperson (Claudina Fermund).

The negotiations which are to be held are a continuation of previous discussions held between an assembly delegation and the gang a month ago. These negotiations have resulted in the peace agreement to stop the hostilities and a letter of intention consisting of demands made by the gang.

The government's delegation consists of Justice Minister Jules Ajodhia, Education Minister Ronald Venetiaan, and Social Affairs Minister Willy Soemita. Assembly Chairman Jaggernath Lachmon and members Rufus Nooitmeer and Milton Belgrave have been added to the delegation as advisors. The delegation will possibly be enlarged with representatives from social groups within a short time.

Previously, the president's spokesperson had stated that the official declaration of the peace agreement could only take place after discussions between the government delegation and the terrorists. It is not yet known when the negotiations will get started.

Herrenberg Contests Transfer to Foreign Ministry
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[Text] The former director of the cabinet of the military authority, Henk Herrenberg, has asked the judge to demand the withdrawal of his transfer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Defense. Herrenberg was recently transferred after he had tendered his

resignation voluntarily as the director of the cabinet of the military authority. He's, however, of the opinion that the transfer took place on unjust grounds.

Attorney Ronald van Ritter has stated that the resumption of Herrenberg's activities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs doesn't mean a heavier load for the budget. The fact that the former director was not involved in his transfer decision is furthermore contrary to the principle of fair play, said van Ritter.

Herrenberg has demanded that the transfer resolution be withdrawn within 2 weeks after the verdict.

Foreign Minister Speaks at Nonaligned Meeting
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[Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Eddie Sedoc has said that development plays an important role in the just and fair distribution of natural resources. Minister Sedoc

spoke Wednesday [28 June] at the ministerial meeting of the Nonaligned Movement which is being held in the Dutch Province of The Hague.

The theme of the conference is: Peace and the Role of Law in International Affairs. The minister has indicated that Suriname recognizes the essential conditions for maintaining international peace. According to him, it is important to develop successful systems and procedures for peaceful solution of conflicts. Sedoc is of the opinion that a different state should respect and live up to the obligations of international agreements to live in peace and [words indistinct] with each other.

The ministerial conference of the Nonaligned Movement ends today. Minister Sedoc will visit the Suriname diplomatic post in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Brussels before returning home.